Natural law and positive law : the doctrines of Aquinas and Suarez compared with later theories by Lumb, R. D. (Richard Darrell)
A�SI1 
ON\f1SN33nO 
:JO 
AliS�3/\INfi 
3Hl 
TBBSIS SUB1ITTED :POR THE DSGR:&E o:r DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHI 
IN '!HE Uif IV ERSITY OF OUO.RD 
NATURAL LAW AND POSITIVE LAWc THE DOCTRINES Ol 
AQUINAS AND SUAREZ COMPARED WI�H LATER THEORIES
R.. D • LUll'lb
Oriel College 
Oxford 
Triniv Term
1958 

Chap-ter· 1. 
Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3· 
Chapter ... 
Chapter 5. 
Chapter '· 
Chapter 7. 
Chapter a. 
Chapter 9· 
t."hapter 10. 
Chapter ll .. 
Table ot Contents
Law, Reason, W1ll 1 
�he Natural Lava Its �sic 
teaturea elucidated ao 
Natural Lawt Ohanse and the 
Iua G-.ntiua 5T 
.!!.!. and Iustitia 8,J 
Human Positive Law 105 
Human :PcuJi ti ve Law a Some 
particular problema 137 
The Transition Period 15J 
The "Givenn and the "Constructed" 171 
Morality, Sooie ty, Law 211 
Natural Law and Positive Law 241 
Natural Lav and Legal Positivism 266 
Bibliccraphy 285 
The thes1e falls into three parts.  In the first 
part {Chapt$re 1-6) tb.e schoolmen's d1acussJ,on ot natural 
law and positive law,,and of th relationshiP which Xista 
b•twe n them. 1e ex.pounded and evaluated • .
In the second part ( Obaptere 7-9) the n tu.re of the 
reTiv 1 l1!1f the natural lnw doctrine 1a eamined with 
special ref'e·:rene to two ain notions in the wcrks of the 
modem writers - Geny, Dabtu, Du.guit - !. the notion of 
the 'givenu and the °ConatNC�edn, 
pel1t1oal common good. 
b th$ notion of the-
Xn the third pert ( Ohapte.r 10-11) the doctrine ot
the relat1oneh1p bet en natural law and positiv• law 1s 
ori tioally e-.m1ne4 in the context of modem. 3ur1apnden­
tial thought and the d&otr1ne is compared with. that of 
legal positivism. 
Obapjer �· 
AqW.:naa de.:tines law ae e. b1:nd1ng x-uleH baaed on 
reason. sua�ez's deif1n1t1on is et out and compared with 
that of Aquinas. The meaning tfJt the Phrase "baed on 
reason' 1s eumined: 1n the Scboolme-n's view the rule 
must be founded on a good moral reason. 
11 
lt is pointed out that they have in mind an imposed 
rule. This is br0Ught out in Snarez'B discussion, in 
which emphasis is plac.oo on the uaet ot will .. as the 
eeaent1al element of law. 
It 1s suggested, that two questiQns are involved in
the Schoolmen' s approach to the problem: 
1. Under wha� conditions is it true to say that a
rule of law exiete.
2. Unier what conditions is it true to say that .a
subject is obliged to obey such a rule. Bath Aquinas and 
suarez asailllila.te these gU.est1ons. It is shown that, 
in orde� that a rule of law may bind the sUbject. it must 
have some goed moral qual.i ty,. 
Cb!;pttr 2· 
At the beginning Qf the cb.a:pter the relationship
bet�n the Ete�al Law and the Natural Law is discussed. 
Tb.• features of' the natural law ape then eluo1dated. 
It is ehown that. the natural law consists of basic hu:tDanL 
1nel1nat1ona. In eo far ae these incl1llat1ons are b01.1n.d 
up with judgment on the part of men as to their pro� 
end, the natural law �ookfJ towal'ds an oN:ei-ed system of 
buamn relatione, and does not reat on spontaneous activity 
alone. 
iii 
The raelat · onsh1:p between inclination an judgment 
is more closely examined. Refarenee ia made to the con­
cept of the §V!4EW.!sia, and the connection between thia 
"habitn of the natural law and individual action is 
explain d. 
'lhe question 1s posed: 1n what sense the judgment
of reason may be regarded as a rule of law. ��arez's 
opinion that the obligatory foree of natural law :t.s 
derived f'rom the Divine . ·111 1s questioned.
The na.ture and genesis of the precepts of reason 1e 
then discuss.ed. Rei'er$nce is made to ambigu.it1ee in the 
lanSllage which Aquinas uses in d1aeuasini this quest 1on 
anCl which suggeste that moral judgment is a qu.estion of 
deduct ion from the prinQiple, !1do good, avola evil�. 'lhe 
conclusion 1e reached that the pr1nciple �do good, avoid 
evil n is of a formal natm-e: the substane of the natural
law is to be found tn the eoncMte ppee pte. In SC) fax-
as these precepts a� cono9rned, a distinction is to b · 
made between p�imal"Y' ones, the reoosnttion ot w.b.i�h ·1s 
immediate, and secondary ones, the recognition of which 
is associated with a certain degree of ref�eet1on. 
Di SOUPS ion turns to the question Of knowledge of the 
natural law. Aquinas asserts that there can be no 1gnor-
tv 
ance of the primary pr�evte. It is ahovm., if! the light 
ot: suarez's commentary� that this statement must ref11tr 
t-o tbe formal principle mentiened abov • 'lh question of 
the erring e onsoi ence 1sddlscussed and it 1e explained in 
what way an individual may be said to be bcmntil by $ precept
of the natural law o:f wnieh he ie unawar • In conclusion. 
there is some diseuesion on th4' applice:ti<>n of pr�eoepts .. 
CMm!r '· 
The question is posed; in what way th na�al. law 
constitutes an unehmnging standard. The schoolm-m. �efexa 
to the preeepte of the natural law as failing �1-n pe.uolol"!bus u. 
It is ebknvn that tlle precepts are endewed 1J'1 "b a eexwtain 
openness. Thoy apply whore certain b1as1o f aturee of a
situation are present. Their mapp11eabil1ty in other 
cases is exPlained by suarez on the pound that ehar1t7 
ant 3Uet.1ce demand. that an ••option be reoognized.
Howner, his recourse -.o a tie'tion to �XPla1n ·thie phenomenon 
is er1tic1ze4. It ts suggested that the scboo)men have 
in mind a conflie"-ot-dut1ee si tu.ation, end tbat the 
applieat 1on of l!»ne principle rat hex- than another to th& 
c1rcumstences of a particUlar ease depends on the val�e 
which we attribute to one pnneiple retb.er than to the 
other in the event ot a conflict. 
Another aspect of the �J'Oblem 1s tnen discussed. 
The SChoolaen regnrd the D..'Ls�tiYJ! as detraetir.J.g from 
the naturGl law= the atate of' common owru�ra.h1p !s eon­
treated w1 tb the insti tut.1on o'£ private propert7. Tb.e 
approach of the Augu,stbli$n sebQol whieh 41-atinpishea 
bet n a pr -Fall c'i a pQst-Ffill natuval law 1a re3eetEJd 
'by Aquinas iB fav� of Em fil�)l'()ilCb whi�h d1et ingu.iahes 
between a preeept1v and a peJJI'.lllissive form of ne:tu2;'a.l law. 
Whil.e Aquinas, however, is inclined to regard the tue 
gentium as in $Ome way natUJtal to man. SU:arez a:tt:Pibutes 
to it a utilitarian foundation. 
SUo�e�'a discussion of the natural law of do�tcn 
1s elucidated and it is suggested tnat he ia vexw oloa€t to 
reecgnizing a 4oetrine of natural Pighta . • :a;ho restriot1one 
which the 1nst1tu:tions ot the ius gentium impose on these 
rights may be explained along the same ltnes as those 
whieh t;;lpply to pree pti ve natul'Ql law. 
cans lt• 
The ditf ereuoe between "'1u.s tt and tllex\1 is 41seu.aaeu. 
Two aoe•ptatione of the tel'Jil ;tins"' are noted. Aqttinas 
regards "ius "t as the ol>;tee't of �ustiee, end StUt�CtZ inter­
pr·eta this in a wa.y whiQ·h sU&lJests toot Aquinas has 1n 
mind a subjective right. It is abown 1n what way the 
virtue of ju.stio·e ci 1ttere tra the other virtues. The 
conclusion 1ft\ :t:.eaehed -hat, while Aqllinas has in mirul 
the objective use o£ ·t�ius'•, suar·EH� brings into �lief 
the subjective use of th@ ward$ 
vi 
We exroninfll the Seb.oolmen' s diotinc·tien 'bG'tween 
commutative and dintri'b\tttve justice. It is pointed out 
that B doctrine of net�l eqtte:llty is 1nvolvad in the 
reocgn1tion oi" canain baeic concrete rights and dUties. 
The notion ot: legal juatioe as the v.irtue which 
dixaecta the aets ot· all the nrtuen to eth�r people ts 
discussed. Aqtti..11aa• adh�renee to Ax-tototle in thie context 
is eri tici2ed and it is �uggested that a distinetion :an1et 
be drawn between th� virtue of charity and the netiVity 
of the legielato·� in making laws for- the good of the 
pel1t1eal ·COmmunity. 
Qt\!PJ..t�, '-• 
The schcnolmen•e a:lttit11t1e to"W'Ude politicdl aoeiety 
ls set t)U.t. It �ects ·the Artstetelitm po·s1t1«m te tke 
eft'ect that man ts e sooia1 animal. It is PQ1nte4 O'lit 
in. what wers p&l:l:tionl autho�ity dttrero fPOm othe11 types 
ot authority. �be person holding P011tiea1 au:tho�1ty 
has the power ,of making 1aws b:eCiuilu.ee he 1a concem$4 with 
the good of the eivic oommun1t7• 
vii 
The nature of the political eonmon good and its
relationship with l&gal juatics and political prudence 
ie discussed. Re:ferenee ia made to en im:porta.nt article 
nrhere Aqa1nas poses the questien whether it ia an effect 
of law to make men g-ood, and suarez 0 o commentary on this 
passage is enmined. A distinetiQn is mstle bet en the
moral 8\"'0d and the civic good.. In oo far as the law aims 
at achi rtng the civic good!!! it should be e.oncerned with
th eubjec�-matte� ot those virtues wnich affect other 
people .. 
The distinctioll between � uconclllaion at""ld "determina­
ticn of natural law is critically examined. It is suggested 
that Suarez, mora so then Aquinas• recognizes the utUitar­
ian basis. of the ndetcJJtmine.tio��� the political common 
good embraces more than the prescription of the moral 
virtue$. 
�h$ Schoolmen' s discussion of the obligntoPy -roree 
of poe1 t 1ve law is set out. It. is shown that, tn their 
mind, the penalty which aocompan1es t h.e J"Ule is an in­
sufficient moral Peason jtor obedience. Th · obligato]7 
force at the rule is to bG found in lts lllQml value. 
Pina1ly, tbe Behoolm$ll' s approach to the unju.st law 
1s oamined. 'l'wo forma or injustice are distinguished
Viii 
and the su.bject 'a duty of obedience ta discuaeoo.. It�) 
is suggested that t'\ro va.lttes rnust be taken into account -
justios nnd eeoa�ity. 
gpJl'2l!lr 6. 
In the ·opening p�t Qf tb.e ohapte�, diaou.aeion centres 
on eer-tain aspects of the rule of positive law -
!. cont 1nu1 t.y 1!, ehange. 
!. It is pointed ��t that this 1.ll'fPlies the formal notion 
of' ce�a:inty and. t\m.e a r· l�tionah1.p with th� notion of th 
eomm.on gooa1• 
}t A l:"'tlle of J.aw may be changed to meet new needs., and 1 t 
may aleo autommtieelly l!ipse. The distinct1R betwetm 
an 1n\r1n�ic and s� extrinsic objeet 1n a roie ot law ie 
exs.ndned. 
lJ?he Scho0l.men' s $p�ch to 1nt epP!'Ota tie.n and equ..1 ty
is disClllBsec!. Illtsrpretat1on ia diat1ngll1shed �- ecpity 
by thC!t t"edt thrat in the latter case the spix-lt x-a,her 
than the letter of tae law ig applied. It is suggested 
that 1n �ec'tiee th� 1,.$ overbtpp1ngw. 
A short sullll!lQW of the Scl'wolmen·• s diseussion of 
Ol!etom is given. 
ix 
ID.vW!r.Z• 
!he seventeenth and eigbteent h centur doctx-1n� of 
natural law is ex.CJmincd. It is otnted ou.t that it 
41f'.ters :rram the scholastic doctrine tn bFee resp.ecte� 
1. There is le�a ��hasiG on the obligatory nature of
natural law,. 
2. 'fhe dividing lil\e bet"< <;;; (ln the nt'\tural law and the 1-us
gentium is blurred. 
3· It to a doc·trine of rm�ursl rights rather than of 
natural law. 
The �-eotion of the :Englimh util1tw1ana against the 
natural law dootrine i.e de3.criboo. It 1a sugges\ed that 
their criticism 1e tnottf':ficiant in ao far as th� :fail to 
take ecccm.nt of ·c::ertain ba�ic features of th<t aeholast1e 
doctrine. 
The »ev1val ot the nat.unl law is dis�:ussed. It is 
sugg ated thsft th-e JnOdem revival is onlY a partial r·s­
Vivtll in that the moci(!m writers ttr>i enl3 cortcemecl with 
tne seeorul ps:rt of the SehQolmen � s dirot.Weion, 'rtz s the 
relationebip bet'd!ttn nJ&tu$1 law and POai·ttve law, SBd 
�ot with nnturtll lsv1 as an othieal doctrine-. 
QH�· 
G-eny • s not ion o'f ttae Jnristic '*(liVen n is diSOUB�. 
It 1e 'P�inted @\rt in wl'h�t "'ray bia tOll!' ·t3-pee of ngtv@l � 
rsn ect th · · Seh�olraen, t s <11seuasion o·f natu.�al law, and 
it 1� suggearted that Geny' a 11�1!ionn& iri�d ., 1s a pro{lreas1on
'beyond the Aeho<>lmen' a thought •. 
The notien ot tecbni�e 1s el(a'Ud.nd. �he stages of 
development !n tlul elabot'aiion of the rttle ef positive law 
are set ou;t. GeQf�G emphasis on technique as the work � 
the will brings tQ mind thti �date�t1o., of th.e gsoboolmen. 
'the ainu� and methods of iu�ehni<;Pe al"G described. 
Geny usae tb.& phraS$$ �mibmtitution of �t1'Y tor qttalf:fi,7� 
and �elind.nation� to de'hote the process 'by wb.ieh the 
1111givena� are t.nft()�rated into pos1tS:vfl la:w. The· �mp.loy­
ment ot legal f'o:rms, eatesoPies end concepts 1n th1s. Pl'O ... 
eeJSs is described. It 1m -p&btetl out that� 'WbU• CfiXQr 1 B
41scusaien ttu-ows JnQft l!pt hom a ;J\tMs,ic p,tn;t •'� 
n•w on the qu0stitm. e't the 1n�ol!'J)era.t1on of ne.tltal law 
into positive lawt b.ie dtseuss.i&:n dOes blUP the 41T!t\1n;g 
line bdweon the two. 
It is tor th1e rea$an tbat Dabin el'it1e1see GEm,J"'a 
notion l!1t e legal 'Mg1venu, In Dsbin'tJ mind, the natu�ta:1 
law 1e an trthical and not e. lepl not1•n• He ·also points 
out that the natural law '-s liatted to oosic pM.netples 
and does not. include u.eefll  d�te:um.L'Ilatione. -;Io:r-e so 
than GenY:� he ew.:phas1zQs the freedom of' choice of the 
jurist, 
!t. is pointed ou.t that Geny' s approach is oloew 'to 
that �f the Jchooltnen. 
:Ptwaso »natural law� mmy be U:!>tad b"A 1,.e:'f -lllt)IlCe to tl 
gen\13rol body o:r ethieal ppineiplas provided that it is 
lJecognized that t!le word "law"' is used i:n 8. ddl:B.fer·ent 
aenme to that 1n whtch it is ttaed in the :p�as ��po · i'tlve 
�tn.2� 
?:he criteria f!or determining wna:h P.lle·s o� mo»alitU 
are tit for inoo:rporatiotl into positive lsv l'Et •�mined· 
Dabin.�s development of th� notion of the political !()ommon
8f'Od 1a d!ecuosed, and r�e�f!Jnc-0 t.m made to h1u vtew that 
public opin1on tzm\Y atten demand e.bst$ntion on "he pap; 
et th$ jurist. In 1Uu s �enpeet, the OOb®lmen' a 41eeuas1on 
of �ootic�bil1ty is �oall$4. 
The notions o:f �:rtieula:r tm.d lepl 3u$tice ere then 
diseu1eed. we P&s• th� qnestion in what respect tbe moral 
l'Ule is related to th� utilitarian framework .ar the law. 
Radbl"UCb' e opinion that juatiee and the oom.on good are 
x11 
antinonnc elements 1n t.ne legal rul� is gaootionad. 
'D�'B1l1 tv a oo:nCtlPt1on err p.,�sitive lfl�'l 1a analyzed. 
ll1e {l()otr1ne of social rSDliitarit:,r in (n.:umnari.zed, and his 
att1tttd.a to the t<Jrnlnl stJUNe� ot law� the Qanotion, and 
obligation 1e disel!s£ed., 
There f.e some C!1Mttss1on ef the i.de.aG of Duguit'a 
£ollowe:rs - Bennard f1.ntl Rsgl.ade - and we sb.¢'W 1n what we:y 
th�y hav� develop�d. hj.fil. thought. It te pctntea. out that 
the difference b0twean G� �.nd t.1s.bin on the 0ne hantl• 
a .4 Du.gntt and hf.s follewers en the oth•r hlnld, 11ea, 1l'l 
the :fact that th� former ley emphae1� on tho written law, 
the latt,.r on C:U.Gtem. In CQID.elusion, the l'elatton.ship 
bet en the natu-ral law ana. positiv� law ex;pounded in 
their Wl:"kS i.!i! f1.11Jililei):'1Zed. .• 
Q.}}flJlt!r 1g .. 
In thts chEtpter tll..e POe1t1'V1i)t•·o d�tnitton of law 
is com.parect liith thnt of tll-e natural lat4Y'V• It is pOinted 
w t that th� tl';&di t icr .. e of the two aonools ue 1nfluen.oe4 
by their reep.,ective e.pproacJles: whilCJ the �'\ural la.'Wfer 
:f'tt-\ds �hat. there 1e an eseential cu.,nnectio.n 'between 
moml,.ty &nC. law, the �siti.vist denies this eozm.ection. 
Both sehool.a, taowove:r, mro prep� to mak:s x-oom fox- ether 
approaches. 
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�he euff ta·iency of t b.$ e�!loo.cb t:Jf the ecnool.men 
end the mo<h.wme to tid.$ probl�n in cJic.e,lsoed.. �heir' 
�•nierar.nhiaal � epr.rooneh is e:gp1ail'led and e�i t1$1�ed. 
It ie lthovtn tn what -we� t;he natural lat.rr doctville 1H 
relevant to the tea� of ! 
1� til$ leg1alato�;jt J.n thta r�m�oet • VJe' point to tllG 
creat.1 ve :role which. tho :1 . gislt\tor b$.1te n...�d �h.1eh i� .n&t 
to be eqtlated vr.lth tbe �ole o'f the ta'Omlist .. 
2) the ,;fudge.. Soma x-ti)flec:tit>na tiX>·e of:reroo. o... the tae..an­
i.ng of the p�se �ext:ro-legal u U$ed to tleeeX'ibe the 
jtl.dge' m recourse to e(}.Ui ta.ble �r1nti'1Plea to deQide a
part iealar eaas. 
3) tbe subjeet. It 1li Pl'inted crn.t that thl! formal
aftl'O of lew muat b@ 6ndoweet w:tth aomo �ol value ba'o!*e 
it is wrmtby of f>bed!ence. 
4) the legal th<®ortflt.. It is notntoo ou.t that tilt
natural lawyer n.ews 1aw atJ e phenomenon � more o:r;en 
textu!'$ ee �ol!l;{laretd 'Wit.h the B:Pl'>roaeh, rtf ttw :poelt1v1s�. 
�..nt.•-.ll· 
In thte chanter, disc�st<;m, centres Qn thG ��stion 
whetheP legal poe1t1v1.mm te eomplete ms a s:rstem o:t 
thought. Two �estione are poe" 1
xiv 
l ) In. wh.Elt way the ori terion of utility is superior to
tb.e natural law cr!te;-ion of the common good as a stendard 
by which to evaluate positive law. 
2) Whether the emphasis en the "pos1t1vi·t�rf} e:t law ia
likely to lead to an tnt llectual atmosphere in which 
legality becomes the criterion of obedionce for the aub3eot. 
In the diseusaion ·c:Jf the :fil,.st qu.estion* the b..flu­
ences which led to the utilitarian re-action ageinat the 
natural law doctrine are d�itsoribed. It is suggosted 
that the concept of the common good offers more f'ift 
cr1ter1a for judging the goodness of laws. 
In the dieeuaaion ot the second question, the d1ft1-
eult1es in acecmodatins tvro types of �•ought n - the mol'al 
�ought n and th legal nought ft are pointed out and Keleen' s 
views in this respect are eam1ne4. It is sua eted
that ·obligation is primarilY' a moral phenomen&n and must 
be taken tnte eeeount of the �1st. 
some geneml :remal!'ks are made on the pes1tivist 
and nature.l law e.pproache.a. T-he opinion ia offered that 
theH is va�ue in asserting that a :re:Lationsh!p bet'W8en 
monle and law exists. The wottd t:trelationshtp� is explain­
ea.. The chapter conolud•s with a �etlec'tion on the 
app:roach or the jurisprudent to the definition of l 11•
1 
Chapter 1. 
Law, Rea son, WUL 
I. 
In the tirst artiole of his $eot1on on law, .Aquinas
essays a geneJ;'e.l definition of law (lex): 
"' ••• law is a wle and measure of acts whereby m.an is 
1ndueed to act or is restrained from acting, for law
derives 1 ta origin trom l.ipndo, because lt obl1-e 
to aotiGn. llow the. rule and measure of human acts 
is the reason which is the :ti�st principle of human 
acts; s1noe it belongs to the reason to daeot to
the ·end,, wh1o h is the first principle 1n all mattes
of aotion, aoooriing to the Philosopher Aristetle 
••• Bence law i_m something_ pertaining to reason 
(P!l'tmens ad rajiOllQ) tt �J. 
Enlighte ni ng is his response to one ot the ob;Jeotione
1. F."i Thef'9ft' Prima . Secundae_ , Qp.estion 90, article
. , e ted n . er 1n the :tollo� 1lll7 s 3..::7, 1-11, 
q.SJO ut.l. Oo�of.:1a, 'l'QJae 7 (Leonm. Wt ton, 
Rne, 1892). � s�t1on used is that or the Fathers
o:t the Englieh Dominican province, vo1.6 (London, 1915).
For a discussion of the SO'tU'Ces on which Aquinas rel1ea 
for hie detinition ot law, see
Lettin, ji 4!tinit1of Olf.\ssigqe de. la lo!, 
ewe Neo-se�olasti(Jle, PP• 129 et seq {1925).
L• droit naturel oheq s. Thomas et aes 
predeoee.senrs (2nd Ed., Bruges, 1931 ) . 
vrop�eed in thir article to the effect that "whatever 
plenees the sovereign ha£ the :force of lawu, the old Roman 
. adage with its imperial basis. Acuinas' anE''·er is very 
curt .. In order that command may have the foree of law 
it must be in accord �.'1 th some rule of reason. 
1 
it will be iniouitas rather than law. 
Otherwice 
!\t this stage,Aouinne has said nothing ab::-,ut the
origin o:f the rule of reason nor in v.rhat it consists, but
we �t some indication of these matters �rom hie reply to 
2 
a second �bjeetion. Acoordin� to thi$ objection, law could
not be vievred ae pertaining to reason because la11'1 w·::mld cease
functioning once the act of reason eeaeed, i.e. once the 
:pere�n in whom the act of reatton1ng occurs ceased. to think. 
In his reply, Aquinas seems to supgest that the act of 
reason in question is that of the subject who is bound by 
the law. He likens t't:ie process of reasoning to artir.tie
activity. Just as, he enys, we may speak �f art in two
\"U:lys - :.r the process of ereat1.on and as the :f'1nishec1 vrork,
so too we can speak of an aet of :reason as the process of' 
reasoning and ae the conelusi:>n o'f that reasoning. 
1. s-T, 1-11, q.90 Hrt. 1, ad. 3.
3 
''Such universal propositions :::>f th.e ,ractical intellect 
that are directed to actions have the nature of law • 
. 4nd these proposi ti�n� are sometime e. under our actual
eonside:rati�n, while �ometimes t��Y are retained in
the reason by means of a habit u. 
At first eight Aquinas seems to be confue1ng two iseues: 
in what way law 1e made and in what way it reveals itself
to the subject. The substance ot' the article suggests that 
he has in mind the reason -:>'f tr.e legislator, but the reply 
t::> the ebqve objection more likely ref"ere to the subject. 
l\s we shall see later, there is a def'inite reason f'or this
contusion and it resides in a "dualistic" approach to law
which is viewed as both an imposed rule and a rule the origin
of which has to do with the subject rather than with the 
2 
legislator - the rule of conscience. If', however, we 
leave aside the content of this objection for the present, 
'J're can see that Aauinn� is emphasizing the fact that in order 
to call some t7Pe .c.f' rule of law 1 t must 'be grounded on
rea� on. The meani� of this latter phrase will become more 
clear, after we have examined Suarez's commentar;r. 
Suarez's appr-oach is seemingly r�unded on that of' 
A.auinaa. The opening chapter of the De Legibus is entitled 
-------------- ----
1. s-T, l-11, o. 90 art. 1, ad. 2.
2. Infra, Ch. 2, pp. 30-36.
"�,'hat is law�' a.e is the second chapter. The difference is 
thr.:t different word.s are used. to deeignate ••taw" : *ell: in 
the first eaee, �u� in the se�ond ease.
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In hie diecuaeion of �, Suarez notes three accept­
ations of the term s {l) that •rhich Aquinas adopts - a rule
obliging to action (2) as aesoeiated with the word 1nclinat�o 
(e. g. �tle.w of the members") a.nd ( 3) a metaphorical use 1n
reference to art and technique (e.p:. "laws o:f grammar,
1 
"laws of: war" ) .  These latter meanings are, according to 
2 
Suare?., metaphorical. Properly under�tood, law is a 
rule which obliges human beings as :far as their moral bctions 
3 
are concerned. 
To this extent he ie. in agreement with Aquinas. As 
yet, however, he hr: s said nothing about the rule being 
1. De Deo Leg1s�atore et de legibus, Book 1, Chapter l,
Sectione 1-9, in OJ;aera Omnia, Tome 5, Ed. Bert ::>n 
Paris 1856, cited herea�ter in the foll�w1ng waya 
�e Leg1bus, 1, 1, l-9. A partial translation o� the 
e Legibue 1s to be found in Selections tram three workg 
ot Suarez (Class1es of International Law, Oxford, 1944). 
2. De �gibus, l, l, 5.
3. Ibid. 
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r�unded on reason. In the latter part of the chapter, he 
turns to the various etym�logieal f�undations of the word 
!!I· He mentions the �ne to which Aquinas adheres : that
1 
which derives the word from lisare. Of the other two,
one is �avoured by Isidore of Seville relating � to 
2 
legere (to re ad) ; another relates it to eligere (to 
3 
choose). Unfortunately he concludes the chapter without
attempting to show how these usages bear on his later 
diecuseion, indeed without seeing that a choice o� one or 
the other has a definite bearing on the focal point from
which "law" may be viewed, i.e. ae an 11act of' reasontt or
as an "act o-r will". Indeed, a definition or law which 
empha�izee the factor or choice in law-making is likely 
to attach itself t� the eligere feature, while that which 
emphasizes the actual formulation of the rule of law would 
more 11ke1y attaeh itEelf t� the content o� the rule and
the proeess of deli�eration aeeociated with it.
----- · ··---
1. 1, 1, 9.
"Lex est const1tut1o scripta". Ibid. 
3. •'Alii denique legem dictam esse putant ab eligendo,
vel Quia cum magna et prudent! electione ferenda sit,
vel quod unicuique oetendst 01lid e11p-end.um ei t •••• " 
Ibid. 
!\gain, in the second chaT>ter of this work, where he 
l 
... 
discusses iup these features are again t�uchea upon with-
'ut their significance being fully realized. In this
chapter, Suarez notes, inter sli�· the association of th' 
2 
�ord !us with iu§titia (which Aquinas, as we shall later,
6 
3 
fav�ure) and T,.hich refere to what is in harmony with reaeon.
But he sho�n! hie preference 'for another etym�log1cal f:)und-
4 
at ion which derives iy,s f'rom iubere ( to order) . In his
conclusion he makee a leap for he assumes that, whether 
one usee the word leJt or tus to designate "law", what is 
b 
prescribed must necessarily be in accordance with reason.
This indeed is the crucial question with the Scho.,l-
men. Aquinas, it will be remembered, aPeerted that one 
could only use the word "law" ( lex) to ref'er to acts of
willing, if they accorded with reason : a '�are" command 
6 
would be iniou��as. Suarez assents to this although he
1. 1, 2, f.S 1 et aeq.
3. 1, 2, 4.
4. 1, 2, 6 nnd 11.
5.. See 1, 11.6 Although he still speaks of vera lex.
a. �� 1-11, q. 90 art. l, ad. 3.
has so1ne oualme ab:>ut saying that unjuet laws are not
lawsa Such a law may be called by that name ttin a manner 
. of speaking'' but it lacks the quality ot true "legality" 
7 
1 
because 1 t does. not prescribe V-'hat is 3uat and reasonable. 
In Suare?:' s mind, the only rule whleh can oblige is a
rule which ie �ust. The conclusion to which one is
forced ie that the Sehoolmen understand by lex a just law, 
a law which does not depend on the mere willing of the
sover-eign alone. In doing this, they have {from one 
point o� view) prejudged the question o� the unjust law.
We might get a clearer insight into �hat the School­
men are sayinF 1:r ,��e pose the question in another way.
If we say that in order for any person to say ttthis ie a 
law", he must p�int t� a rule which prescribes some
C·?urse of conduct, does this mean to say that the rule
must also be ''rati·,nal" or founded on reason? Can there 
be an irrational rulet a rule which is based on willing
or whim alone'l (e.g, what pleases the sovereign has the
1. 1. 1. 6. "Lex autem 1ni�ua non est mensura rect­
itudinis opere.tion1s humanae, nrun potius aetio 1111 
eonfor.m1e iniqua eet ; non est ergo lex, Eed partie-
1pat n�r.en legis per quamd&n analogiam, quattnus in 
ordine ad aliquem f1nem praeecribit eertum operandi
...  " mou.urn. 
force of law) . Clearly the Sehoolmen thought that there
must be some rea son to sustain the aet of willing. On 
the other hand t they ?'ere aserib!np: a further quali t;r to 
8 
law viz. that the reas �n muat be a good one or 3ust!f1able , 
without evidently being aware that thi e hae introduced a
further element into their definition i. e. the justice 
or fairne ss or the rule. 
II. 
Moreover, it is clear that both Aquinas and Suarez
were thinking primarily of a particular t��e of rule or 
law : a rule laid down by a Qme leg1slat ::>r • With Suarez ,  
this bec omes more apparent in his discus£: ion in Chapter& 
4 and 5 of the �e. Legibue. The actual title of Chapter 
4 is "What acts in the mind of the legislator are necessary 
for the making of law?'• .  In thi s  chapter, suarez assumes 
that certain mental activities precede the formulation of 
a rule o� law by a superi or. These may be briefly stated 
ae follows : the legislator dee ide e on an end, chooses the 
means to attain the end and formulates the rule with the 
intention of binding the eubjeet. 
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F irst of all , Sue.rez ae:: serts that the legislator 
desire s t o  attain a eertnin end.
ample e. dee.ire t o  c orrect certain abuees v;h1ch arise from
the consumption of alc �h�lie liquor) . He will then turn 
his attent i on to the problem of what means are most suitable 
( e. g. whether a licensing s7stem is preferable to the lower­
ing of the ale�ho1ic percentage) . Such cons iderations ,
1 
Suarez as sert $ , intervene remotel�. 
Event·ually, the legislator arrive s at his decision 1
he �udges that this or that method 1s to be preferred.
Having mnde this judgment he then chooses the deeired pro­
vision and wills it to be observed by his eub 3ects ( e. g. 
2 
there shall be a licensing system) . 
"The will in QUestion may be deecribed in yet another
wa7 ae being the will to bring about a given action 
bec ause thot action is necessary t o  the preservation 
o� equity, for the will of a superior has this moral
efficacy ,  namely that it can place a binding obligat­
ion upon its subjeet and make that a requia1te3.matterfor virtue which was not in 1teelf e ssent1aln . 
The que eti�n whether the es sential feature of a law 
w as that it was an ttaet of the intellect" or ••an act of 
the w111•• had long been debated in seholaat 1o c ircles.
l. 1 ;  4 ,  6.
2 . 1 ,  4 ,  7. 
3 .  1 , 4., 9. 
lO 
It �ae a perennial cuest ion which was considered to have 
gre: t significance as far as any definiti::>n of law wae 
1 
c oneerned. Suarez '  e emphas i s  on 
electio 
ns n the eseentia1u 
feature seems t �  add something to hie previ�us discus si�n 
of lex , indeed t o  separate h� from Aquinee on this point. 
For as we have seen the emphar: is in Aquinas' article is on 
" reason" as it is another part o:f' the 
Summa 
where a stn1lar
2 
ouestion ia canvassed. In this p art , Aquinas asks the 
quest·i on, n•t:hether to command i a  an act of' reas on or an act 
of will'• , and replies : 
"lrow command it eecent ially indeed an act ot: the
reason :for the c ommander orders the one who is commanded by way 
of 
int imation 
or 
decJ.aration.; 
and to order thus
by intimat ing or declaring ic an act -or reason. Now 
the reason can intunate �r declare some thing in two 
ways. F irst , absolutely , and thie int imation 1e 
1. Suarez lists AQuinae and his own Spanish colleague
Sotj among the intelleetualiete , 1 ,  6 ,  1 ;  Occam and
Bonaventure among the voluntarists , 1 ,  5 ,  e.
2 .  � jr a comparison of the approaches of Aquinas and suarez
eee Farre�l, The 
N�!!!r..!! La.!£.. aeeorSJ.ip.p; to, �guinas Bn;d 
Suarez
... 
( 
1930) •ftt 
is the emphasis on precept as an
aet ot: the reason which distinguiehee the teaebin.r in
Th�as on law f'rom the voluntarism of Suarez••. P• 7.
a.no see Martyn1ak1 r.a defini
t!on thomi§t�.��e i-a loi, 
Revue de ph1loeophie
(l93o) , 
pp. 231-250 eep. 238-241 ,
�or a prec ise statement of the position.
expres::ed by R verb 1n the indicative mood, as when
�ne pers�n says to e.nothE"!r : thie is what y�u ouy)lt 
11 
t� d�. s,:>met ime r however the reas on intimates s ome-
thinp: t� a. man by 
I1,!0V1ns 
him theret:>; and this
int imati on ie expre s sed by a verb in the L�perative 
mood; as when it i e  saie t o  some one : do this. Now 
the first mover , among the pqwerz 
of. 
the 
sou11 
to the doing 
of an act ie the ,.ill. , as 
stated 
above 
l 
('9) . Since 
therefore the second mover ( the reason) does
not move save by virtue of the first mover, it follows
that the very fact that the reaeon m�ves b7 commanding 
is d.ue t o  the power o:r the v:ill. Consequently , 
e o.'Tunand i s  an act of: the reaeon, presupp�sing an aet 
o� the will , in virtue of which the reae on by its 
eoo.mand ( 
t;nperium) 
move s the power t o  the execution
of the 
aet • . l  
It ie neee�ear.y to put this statement int o more simple 
terms. AouinaB is speaking of the procese b7 which a 
rule is made b7 one pereon �or another. Under what eon-
diti :>ns i s  it true to say that the rule 1s made? The 
ane��·er gi\f'en is that the will of' the commander must be 
�o�ated for or declared to the subject and it is in 
thie declaration that one finds the 
�geential 
feature and
not in the 
electio 
whieh preeedee it. However ,  the contue-
i on in the article lies in the faet that Aou1nas mentions 
two types of intimat i on or ways of' int_imat ing without
showing how they affeet the question which he ie di scussing.
One may c onclude that he recogni zes that in any simple 
1. �' 1-ll, o. 17 art. 1. Emphasis added. 
c onunnncl there i e  1nvolv·ed not merely the s imple act of 
orderir�g ( �  this)  but an intirnnt i on of what i s  to be done
{ d.o �hi§) ; nnd that or the two the latter ie  primary.
Suare z ,  on the :)ther hand, emphasi��es  e;treeti>21 the
actual prooeee �f ehooc i r�. He recogni ze s ,  of c ourse , 
t hat euch u choice must be f�rmulated and intimated t o  the
1 
sub ject but holde tha.t thi s is merely c oxleequential.
In Chapter 5 of his w::>rk he di scus ses the vo.ri ouc
argument s 'put forward to support the " rntionaliet " and 
"voluntarist" p os itions:. Thoee who are in favour of the
12 
former p :.>int t o  the fact that certain feature £\ of the word
;Lex arc u P. s ociatcd wi tl'1. what one would regard aa the faculty
2 
ot rea � on : lavr �ngtryc_.ll and en;Lighj;en§• The nvolunt-
arist s " , on the other hand , point to those features which
3 
� ·e assoc iate vri th the will : law move� and !mpe;!.e to action.
rome writers , oontinuec Suarez , comb ine the two positi ons
4 
and admit thHt both element s nre of equal importance. At 
the end. �f thi s chapter , Sunre z becomes rather c onfused 
l. i! L§g{bga, 1 ,  4 ,  lQ-14. and seearrell , o·p. eit. , pp. 54-61. 
Martyniak , QP• c�t. , PP• 238-241,
Lottin, �a def!n�tton el�c�ique de_la lg1, op, clt. , PP•
259-270. 
2. De Legibue , 1 ,  5 ,  3.
3 .  !bid. , 1 ,  5 ,  11-13.
4. D 1d. , 1 ,  o , 20.
1 3
and at t ime::; seems t :�  e:>r.:pres s  doubt on the valid! ty of the
p osit i :>n 11'lhich he has v..lready t aken up by making a distinct­
ion between law 8.e i t  i s  viet"ed f1·om the standpoint of' the
legislat or ,  and law v1e�1.1ed f:rom the standpoint of its
formulation. Fx-om the standpoint of the legi slat or , will 
1 s impot•tant ; fr�il th.e other standpoint (which, a aye
Suarez ,  we as sociate vrith the actual use of' the word .J&l)
it seems t o  denote the s ign or 
indicium 
of the legislat ive
1 
will . ( n posit i on cl�se t o  that o� .Aquinas) . 
III. 
In order to cle.rif'y this debate on reas on and ll7ill, 
it is necessary for us to re-state the quest ion at issue.
Rather than a sking "what i s  the e ssence of law" VJe may ask
uwhat points v,rere the Schoolmen making when they d,iseueeed
l aw in terms of' reason and will?,. It seems to me that 
implied in this diseue s ion are two problems or quest i�ne : 
a Under what conditione is it true to say that a rule or-
law exists b under what conditions is it true to Bay that-
the oubjeet is obliged to obey such a rule.
1.
ll21d. 
, l ,  5 '  24-25 • . 
The d1f:ficult7 
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i s  that the Sebjolmen' s di scussi::>n assimilatee the second 
c ue stion to the first , that i s  t �  say, the7 embark on 
their d iscuer· i :.n ns if any rule of l�1w must a.utomatiea.J.ly 
oblige for it to be a rule �f law. In suarez' s words
l 
th� 
regula 
c an :)nly be recta and 
honeet�. 
A s  far a€ question a i s  concerned the Schoolmen -
examine the Dl"Oblem f'rorn the point of view of" the process 
of reas oning which is involved in the creati on of a rule 
of lav,r. The dif'ferene e  bet�r'een them centrer.; :>n the point 
of t tme at wh1eh the rule mP�es its appearance. suarez
h�s� lf dictinguichee remote aet s  from acta which seem to 
be in t ise nearer to the actusl formulation of the rule ; 
t:ut at th i fJ  Gtage he poses a. que s t i:ln which, in the form 
in which he puts it , admits of n� final and deter.minative
r eply : whether the c s s e r:u� e  of la\'1.' 1s in the 
�leet�? 
or
in the aet of reas on. 
'.":hat he really wanted t o  do was to emphasi''e certain 
aspects or the legal �ile : its 
preceptive 
character and 
1 te 
enlightening 
ohare,cter. .. :hen he d 1 scuseed the f.irst 
nspect he was point ing to the fset that a rule of law was1mpome� 
b7 the superior on the subject, while in discussing
l. 
Ibid. 
J 1 ,  l ,  6.
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the second aspect he was pointing to the fact that , despite 
such impositi on, such a rule has a s imilarity with n�� 
. imposed rules or rulee which are freely accepted in that 
it indicates to and enlightens the subject as t o  what he 
should do. 
It i e  Suarez rather than A ouinas who recognizes the 
importance of the preceptive character of law ,  that i s  to
say ,  the �lement of imposition. Suarez i s  a.wue that a
mere 
ordinatio �tigni§ 
is insufficient to bind another
p_erson to a c ourse of conduct. For the 
ord1nat1o_ra$1QAl8, 
as he point s  out , may include both precept and counsel. 1
Yet we do not usually speak of e�unsel as having obligatory 
force ( unless one ie prepared to aecept it ) .  For example ,
one pe�son might eay to another 1 ''You eh:>uld always help
your neighbour" ( general) or ''Eelp X'* (particular) , 
Unless the rec ipient of the advice accepts it , it is not 
true to s� that he is bound by such advice. If , however, 
an emplO)'er aaye to an employee : ttAlwfl7s be at the office
b7 9 a. m. '' ( general) or "Come to-morrow at 9 a. m. •• ( part­
i cular) the rule 0� conduct enunc iated would be consi dered 
binding. F inally if enunciated by the State or its
subsid1at7 organs such a precept might be called a rule 
of positive law. Likewise , a eommand or rule 
1. Ibid. , 1 ,  1 , a. an the distinc t i on between counsel 
and precept see Martyn!� ,  
02• 
cit. , 249.
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i ssuing f"ro.rn God "<.'t.lu.l.d be regarded !te divine positive law. 
In discusning thEl fec:ture s of law vre may point to 
the f'�ct tl·tat it eJ."�.J.ipJ�ttE:na as tCJ a c :>urse :>f' conduct to
follo"J� , and that it. is ��•J{iB from a pereon having e:uperior
e. u.thori ty. Viewed in this li� t , legi elat ive ac tivity
may be seen 1n the context of debate and deliberat1:->n lead-
i ng up to decision and choice and to the frru��ing of the 
l o�\. But the Question still reraalna : i s  the pers�n t o  
l 
whore the law i s  addressed bound or obliged to obey it. 
The cruc ial word is "binding" . It seems that the 
fact that the laY.T i s eue s from a superi or auth:Jrity :nakes 
1 t binding �\ �; f'a.r af the inferior i s  c oncerned. But does 
the �'Ord imply tJ; at a fee.ture of' any rule of law must be
that it is ttgood" or " just" , or arc we 
;reetricteg 
to S81'1ng 
that involved in the creat ion of a rule of law is a 
process or reas oning which sh�uld be accurate ( although 
it may be muddled) and a dec 1ei�n which should ·be in accord. 2 
with prev1 �us reasoning ( although 1 t might be rash) ?
1. ef. R. M. Hare , Can I be 
blamed f'Qr obezi!!£ gr(}er§, 
The Listener , October 13 , 1955 , p. 593. 
· 
2. In evaluat ing a rule of law aa in evaluating a person' s 
condue t f  one would be dissatisfied with an explanati�n
sueh as "Oh the rule or principle upon whieh I acted 
i s  juet something v.rhich I happen to like". If' how­
ever the pers on proc eeded to eq " I  formulated this 
rule or princ iple bPcause I think that it will remedy
Ae we have seen, the P crr)Olmen cone if1ex- that lex Jnust be
- . 
just : f:l. lex 
inicua 
i e  a -�H::rvers i ')n of law .. In their
minds , all l�J7e rnue,t be blnt.linz; 
;.;rp:o , 
all laws muot be 
just. 
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On the ::>ther hand , it c :)ulc be sait1 that the queet i :m
or the goo0ness or badness i s  a separate one from the quest­
i on ::>f vrhat is inv::>lved ln the pr�cese o'f legi elat1ng 
which lea,:.::: t o  the f' :irmul&t ion of a rule prescrib ing s::>me 
( althou�h n�t necessarily £OOd) c ourse o� c onduct. 
It may be ber:.t if we treat the quest i on in this way. 
A c c ordingly , ·Ne may say that the problem :>f the definition
of la:r e an be c ons id�red not only from the legi slat ive 
p o1nt of vie"f.r but al:3 :> from the point of view of obligat ion 
to obey on the part of the subject. In discussing the
second que � t i on 'ue :r:f:;.y ':ay that a rule of law, if it i s
t o  b e  obeyed by a �ubjeet , sh?ulQ b e  good. From this
an£le , something more than an auth�ritative o�amQnd, embo�­
ing any eontent , is nt�edea bet!lre we can say u that is a
rule of · law which binds the subject tt . FrO-in the etymol­
ogical point ot' vie''' if VFe accept 
ius 
as de s ignating what
such and such an evil , he has given a reason whioh 
may or may not be a good one from his 
own 
point of
vie�. The third stage ie reached when the quest ion
is asked " Is this reason justifiable?" Here one 1s
appealing to a standard by which one e an  evaluate 
individual dec isions. In the Schoolmen' s view this 
standard was to be found in the natural law. 
i e  good and fair we may still say that a l.!,& ma,- D.Q1 
c ontain iY.§.. 
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One final question remains : what is the law to which 
the Schoolmen r•fer? Quite clearly they refer to a rule 
of la. laid down b7 a superior �o� an inferior and as such 
have in mind the positive law o� God or the positive �aw 
of the state. 1 . In one place, however , Aquinae re1"era
t o  "universal preoept e or propositions in the mind of the
subject,. as though he did not wish the natural law to be 
2 excluded from his definition. suarez ,  too, is thinking 
mostly in terms of poeitive law { whether divine or humaa) .  
we have seen haw he refers to the use of the word 111 to
denote " inclinations" and comments that thi s 1e a metaphor-
leal use. 3 It aeema as if the notion has become �irmlr 
l. Subse(?Uent articles in q. 90 ot th•
Sl'fPIW: 
show that
Aquinas has in mind posi ti:ve law.
See Lottin; 
:M!: 
"Taleur 
dee · :trlrmfH:es de ea:IJlt, 'tb*!l
 
SA' Ag-gin gog�p.mt J.a l:S!! . .n:atsrehb�· 
Mele.nges Marechal.. Tome 2 , P• 345 at PP• 367 .. e { 1950).
2� !!:tJ.n.t:! 
I M 2. -3 .
3. sunr.a 
I "' 't • 
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embedded. in hie mind that the notion of la\'1 is ine:xtrielllbly 
t ied to the notion o� a legislator. At this stage , I
merely wish to po int to the difficulty of ineluding the 
natural law within the seh�lastic definition. As distinct
from the positive law, it is a law �written on the hearts
of men" . Indeed we ean scarcely say of it that it 1s
ot 
nothina 
eMaatiq hoa 
•-ttl', ...-.a 
ft.lM .., DlYb.• PJrori4•••• • •tMt 
fd -.. v.at..-.. _ _...._ 
.......,... tJd.JaP 
fit 1&-. 
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And s ince the Divine Reason' s conception of things ie 
not subject to time but 1e eternal • • • •  therefore it 
1o that this kind of law muet be cHilled eternal. r�l
The following artiele contains a definit ion of natural la• 
and is complt•entary to thie art icle :
'' • • •  fince al.l things eub�ee:t to Divine Providence are
ruled and measured b7 the eterna1 law it is evident 
that all things partake e :xnewhat of the eternal law,
in so 'tar as , namely, from ite being imprinted on them, 
the7 derive their respective inclinations to their 
proper ends. Now among all. others the rational creat­
ure 1e eubjeet to ' Divine Providence in a moet excellent
way 1 in so tar as 1 t partakes o� a share of providence,
by being provident both for itsel� and others. Where­
fore it baa a ehare of the Eternal Reason, whereb,J 
it has a natural inclinat ion to its proper act and end : 
and this participation ot the rntional §reature in the 
Eternal Law is c alled the naturaJ. law. " 
At first eight , this eee::;s to be rather a paradoxical
statement and it might be asked how a person, even though 
he participate� 1n the Eternal Law , ean conceive of its 
eternal origin, subject ae he i e  to the l�itatione of 
this world. In other words , even alt�.h man may become
aware o� eertain natval ends how doee he become aware ot 
their divine origin? · Aquinas employs an analog to explain 
thia paradox. He sa7s that even though a person ma,' not
e ee the sun he may nevertheless come to know it by 1te �a & 
1. e-:, 1-ll• q. 91 art. 1. With Suarez more �aeie 
1e placed on the Divine Will � De Leg1bua 2, t, pesst,m. 
2. �� 1-11, q. 91 art. 2.
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in the same way a pere�n reflecting on the ends prescribed 
by nat�re may see these as refleetions ot a higher end. 
Aquinas recognizes that some people m� onl7 be aware of 
the irllnedie.te ends 3uet as a person may eee light without 
1 
p ondering on ita origin. In effect the issue :raised in 
this art icle depends ultimatel7 on the positi on wbich �e 
adopts in regard to the natural law, viewing it as having 
autonomous force or ae dependent on a legislator. 
It may be better if we leave this question for the 
t ime being and examine the meaning ascribed b:y the Schoolmen 
to the phenomenon of the natural law in o�der to see in what 
way the issue is susceptible of a solution. It w11� be 
recalled that the7 spoke of a rule of law as eamething 
which obliged men in their actions , only to introduce the 
2 
superior - inferior relationship. It i s  necessa:t7 to 
aecerta1n whether the natural law comprehends euch a 
relationship. 
II 
In one part of his di scussion ot the �eJ, n&$ural1e , 
1. �1d. , q. 93 art. 2. 0� course it could be eaid that 
the r�e are only a sign or the sun because eome one has 
eeen the sun su��tciently often to c onnect theDk 
2. Supre. Ch. l ,  P'P t .t.t .uv · 
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Aguinae equatee it with inclinations of whieh he l1ate 
three c ategorie s : the inclinati on to self-preservation, 
the inclinati on to procreation and education of offspring, 
and inclinations which are common to man onl7 such as 
the knowledge or God and. soc ial intercourse based on 
l 
j11et1ce. 
Thi$ bringe to mind a use of' the term "law" which 
mi17ht be empl()J'ed in a phraee such ae the ''law of the 
specie s" , e specially if we consider the first two 1nclin-
atione apart t"rom the third. Such inclinations would 
uauall7 �e associated with the word " instincts" and ae 
eueh would seem to. be the very opposite ot what we mean 
b7 "lawtt when we use that word to re:f'er to a binding rule. 
Such inclinati ons , . it muet be ea1d , are the ob�ects o-r 
stu� of the anthropolmgi st but are of secondary import­
ance as far as the atu4y o� the moralist is concerned . 
for the primary mark o'f the moral law is lacking ' oblig-
at ion., If however the emphasis is plaeed on the third 
category we seem to be nearer the concept of obligation 
for these tnel1natione suggest. rec1procit7 and aceordingl7 
1. s-1, 1-ll , q. 94 art. 2. 
1 
rights and duties. 
Indeed , thi e  ver7 d1v1eion of categories gave b irth 
to a conception of " the two natural laws" , one based on 
vital instinct ( i,ue naturale) and therefore eommon to men 
and an�als ,  and one based on reason and therefore common 
2 
to man only. However , a c omparison of the use of the 
word 1nel1nat1o in the pe Leg� part or the Symmt with other 
parts of A.ouinae' work ehowe that Aquinas did not under­
etand by it " instinct••.  Rather does he use the word 
3 
aatsiones to denote the instincts. 
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Moreover , in article 2 of Q 94 it is clear that AQuinas 
is speaking of incl:f:ne.tig as ass�eiated with a 3udgm.ent 
made b,J man as to what he should do : the inclinatio is a 
first stage , as it were , which leads to a judgment , fo� 
ulated b7 man, contai ning a principle of action. In thi s 
section, Aquinas conceives of moral acti on ae being grounded 
on pr1nc1p1ee , �uat ae speculative thought proceeds accord­
ing to certain princ iples which assist men in making 
------------- -
1. senn, D! la �ustiee et du droit, Parle ,  1927 , P• 72. 
2. Ulpian' s viewpoint. 
3,  s-T, 1-11, q. 22 et seq ; e�. De LegibU§ l ,  3 ,  9. 
particular judgments. The prtmar.y moral notion or prin-
c iple ie to be 'found in '' the good.. : Seek what i e  good, 
avoid it s contrary. All the precepts of the natural law 
l 
are based on this. 
At thie stage • Aquinas asserte that the not ion of 
II 
good ie revealed in the "1nolinat1one§. V:hat ought to be 
done is discovered by reflection on the natural ends. 
Therefore , life is to be preserved, marriage 1e a wortb7 
2 
i nstitution, �ustice shoUld be observed. But the diff-
i culty o'f the '' two natm-al laws" seems to be still with 
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u s ,  for preservation of life and intercourse are 1nelinat1one 
of a different order to those inc.luded in the third eatego17. 
Aquinas does not s atisfac torily solve thi s  proble�Dt 
In one part of the summa - in his dieeueeion o� lYi and 
Iustili,!-he accepts Ulp:i.an' s definiti on of' J,:ug sentig ae 
being common to man only, i:p.g natYrale as common to man 
3 
and the animal world; while 1n the pe �eB! section his 
4 
v1ewe are contradietor,r. 
l. s-T , 1-ll , q. 94 art. 
2. {bid. 
3. S-T , 11-ll, q. 57 art. 
Suare z ,  for hie part , refers 
2. 
3. 
4. 1-ll , q. 95 art. 4 in cor:e and ad. l. 
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to the explanat ion of certain 6choo1men to the effect that , 
while the eub3ec�-matter of the first two categories is 
c ommon t ?  man and a.ntmale ,  the precepts are eo.t11non to man 
l 
alone. In another plaee , he pointe out that the prec�pl 
of courage is derived from the first inclination, and the 
2 
preeep! o� continence from the second. 
It seeme that we can ex.pla1n the first two categories 
ot inclination as 'be ing included within the natural law 
only on the basis that their moral significance derives from 
a 3udgment on the part of man as to their nature. In this 
c ontext , it would seem that the inclinations ought to be 
tempered , 1n the ease of this or that individual , b7 a 
realizat ion that the needs of other individuals are involved. 
One ought not to seek to preserve one' s li�e A$ all gogtg 
nor to engage in R£9!P1S$1UOU@ sexual. intercourse. In eqing 
thie , we are , as a result , recognizing that there is a 
c lose relationship between all the incl!nations and that 
the lex natur,li@ has as 1ts end an ordered .. system or hUirlan 
relations and cannot be 1dent if'1ed with apontaneous activit,-
l. Rf LetQ.bug, 2. 17, 5. 
2 .  Ibid. ,  2 ,  a ,  4. 
alone. In thi s eaae , we see that the precepts ot the 
natural law reside in the judgment of' reason, even though 
2 
such judgment ie prompted, as it were , by the inol!natio. 
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It may be said : even if one grants this interpretation, 
in wlfat way can man be said to ' acquire' an 1nc11nat1on, 
which , b,- some process or another , ie  • tranaf"o:rmed'_ into a 
judfJ!lent? At first sight such a transformat ion seeme 
impossible , Surely , it may be ea1<1 , the 1ncl1natig or 
i tself doee. not lead to any judgment. This cruc ial QUestion 
has scarcely been t ouched upon by writers prev1 ?uSl7• It 
1 s fundamental it" we are to understand the meaning which 
t he Schoolmen attach to the natural law. 
In n 94 article 1 Aquinas poses the question whether 
the natural law is a habit. And he poses this question 
betore he dieeueees the actual content of the natural law 
in article a. More attention bas been paid b7 writers to 
article 2. To our mind the eentt-al question is diecu.eeed 
1n the r1rst article. It would seem that the reason which 
prompted Aquinas to aek thi s question 1e to be tound 1n the 
l. 
2. 
�. suarez epeake of the •ncl inat1oneg as being tteJ:iVated by a pl"oces e o'f rat ional gradation''. 
cf. Meeener 1 oe1. ct. t. , 63. 
general diffieult7 in talking about principles of conduct 
�r or moral judgment as th�ugh they were constructions 
built up from the princ iples which tbi§ person holds or 
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from the moral judgment s which that person makes. In this 
article , Aquinas showe how we can talk about general 
princ iples c�rmon to mank1nd1 wh1le still recognizing that 
only thi s or tba� person ean make a moral 3udgment. There 
i s ,  he says , a natural habit o� the primary principles or 
precepts o� the natural law which inclines all men to eeek 
what ie  good and avoid what is evil. This habit he denotes 
l 
by the Greek phrase eznderes i!• In another place he speaks 
of gndereei.§. " inciting'• to the good and "murmuring" at evil. 
Accordingly, he says , men retain the principles in their 
minds b7 means of this habit while at other times the7 bring 
2 
them under actual consideration. 
The notion or tznderes1s ie very similar to the Latin 
notion or eon§eientia. In both Aquinas' and suarez• s works 
reference 1e made to the authority of Bas il { "trnde�:eeis or 
conscience is the law ot our intellect")  and Jerome 
l. s-�, l-ll, q. 94 art. 1. 
2. s-T, 1 ,  q. 79 art. 12. Of course · the word nhabi t" is 
ueed here to denote something which 1s inherent in man, 
as distinct from that whieh is attained b7 practice. 
( "The law of c �Jnseienee which 1e disregarded by the 
very young and unknown t 6  inf'ants but which , when 
intelligence begine t o  ar sert itself , come s  to the 
fore and lave down commands regarding those things 
which cannot be made to accord with pure rational 
nature. " )  . 
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suarez himself prefers the phrase recta rat&o ( right reaeon) 
t o  explain the habit or the principles of the natural law 
and remarks that it is bett er t o  use th1 e term to ret'e:r 
t o  epderesy and to use the phrase ;Lex naturnJ.1 e to signify 
the precepts i. e. the moral �udgmente which are prompted 
1 
by the habit. 
Now the notion of szndere�i s ,  right reason or conscience 
appears . to be the key to the explanat ion of the 1ncl.1nat 1on-
judgment controversy. F or 1 t connotes both an inducing 
and an enlighteninp :ractor ae the basis of e. system or 
moral rule s. It is th1 & notion which is indispensable to 
our understanding or the s ignificance ot the word natqralil 
in the phrase lex natural!!• If we eonaider that there 
i s  an innate urge and an innate capacit7 to understand what 
moral actions ought to be per-formed it 1s not difficult to 
l. R! hegibus, 2 ,  5 ,  14. on the notion of sypdereli' aee 
Lott 1n, �BYSbQlQEie et Morale aux XIIie et �XII1 gieo�e§, 
Tome 2 ,  pp. 103-349 , esp. 222-235. 
Leclercq , L@ ph1lO!QBb1� morale de eail)� Thomas d' A.guip 
duant .la pensee_q_ontgoraine ( Louvaln, 1955) , 
pp. 382-392. 
see in what way the preeep�a.tJonie are natural to m�
The d1f�1culty is  to find a suitable English phrase to
explain this habit : consc ience might seem to �fil the
r ole but , as we shall see , this 1s usuall7 given a more
1 
narrow e ignificat i on than eynderesi§ or £§et a rat12• 
It we use the word §fnderesis to refer to the natural
habit or the first principles of the natural law it is
necessary to add that what we are saying i e  n::>t that " all 
men know the precepts of the natural lawn. Rather we
are making a more complex statement about a cap acit7 for 
enl1y�tenment and an urge or drive t owards reali zing that 
c apac ity. Marita1n combines these features when he speaks 
2 
or ••knowledge through inclination'' • This can onl7 be a
' shorthand' way o� saying something wh!en cannot be f"Ully
explained unti� the features pointed out above are ,lucid­
ated, as we have dona in the previous pages. 
III 
If' we restrict the term "natural law" to deeignate
the judgments whioh are made as a result o't the prompting 
1. tnfra, A- ro .
2. M!Jl and the State ( London, 1954) P• 82 and n. 2.  nontrast
Cotta, , .,!L�oncefto . .  �..L�egge neJ:l!L �umma theolortc.� 
d! s, c 'l!ouJn as9 , 1955) , p. 90. 
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of ripht reason, the que eti�n remains whether such judgments 
can be called ''precepts" , whether in tact the word law or 
precept i s  used in the same sense here as it has been used 
by the Schoolmen in speaking of law in general. It will 
be recalled that they considered that natural law wae Ult� 
1 
ately dependent on the Eternal La�. 
\'11  th Aquinas this issue i s  not canvassed while, in the 
pe Legibus , it i e  elevated to a most important place. 
Indeed, e.uare z de"'lotee a whole chapter to the que stion "Is 
2 
Natural Law preceptive Divine Law?" It i s  not difficult 
to see •1'17 the issue 1 e  more prominently featured in the 
De Leg! bU,?. In the centuries which elapsed between the 
writing or the Summ! and the appearance of the De Legibus, 
certain wr iters had presented an interpretation C}f natural 
law which �ound its nature to reside in the judgment of 
reason alone independent of any hiyfter legi slator. Such 
writers were wont to make a diet1net1�n between natural law 
as a lex indican§ and natural law as a l!! Rraec�piene and 
to assert that , properly interpreted, natural law wae ot 
3 
the former tJPe o�. 
1. supra 1 M 'ko - 1 1 .  
2. De :teesibu§, 2 ,  e. 
Hugo de St. Victor ,  Gabriel , De Legibus , 2 ,  6 ,  :3. 
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It is difficult to see how Suarez could have �eached 
an1 other conclua i �n on the basis or his initial premi se 
( Natural Law dependent on the Eternal Will) than that 
the natural law was preceptive divine law. And that was 
1 
the conclusion to which he was :forced. Moreover , 
believing as he did that a superior - interior relation­
ship was essent ial to the existenc e of law , even natural 
2 
law would eeem ultimately to be derived from a legislator. 
On the other hand, his di scussion o:r natural law has 
c learly ehovm that he believed that it was not e. ' usu.al' 
type o:r law residing, as it did more in the subject than 
3 
i n  the legislator. 
The vital quest i :>n wh.ich troubled him was the problem 
of obligat i on. How could one say that a person wae 
1. �e k•gibu�, 2 ,  6 ,  5. 
2. Ibid. , 2 ,  6 ,  13. 
3. For a critic i sm  of the uvoluntariem" of Suarez ,  see 
FarreU, gp. g1 t. , PP• 147-155. 
Pens. ,  Eagai c;ritigue sur les ngtions de l9l eterp.elle 
et .de lo& atl!!£!1J.e. A.rchi vee de ph1losopbie du 
' dPoit et de soeiologie juridique ( 1986) P• 92 eep. 
PP• 117-121. 
and eontrast Blic , e v l n ari e di ue 
Sg§Ee�l Revue de philosophie B. s. Tome l 1930 
p. 213 at 223. 
Rommen, Vt£1�siones sobre la fi�osof� id!ea z 
polit1Qa d., suarez ,  4 ?enaamientolr[948) 493 eep. 498-
504. 
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obliged by a rule , ir obligation is not ulttmatel7 based 
on a duty to obey Jamegne ? On the other hand, could one 
eay that a person was obliged to obey the commands of his 
reason? In answering these questi ons Suarez doee not 
make any definite choice. He admits that natural. lav.r is 
indicative in that the �udgment pointe to the evi1 or 
l 
goodness of an act. Yet he considers that such a judg-
ment is insuffic ient to found its obligat ion. 
law, he says , is related to God' s Will. 
The natural 
"Therefore whatever i e  against God' s � all is necess­
arily against the natural law. Therefore the natural 
lav1 includes God' a \Vill , since with:>u't an act of will 
no legielatign exists'' ( eine vo,}.,tyltate ngn eet 
leg�slatig) • .u 
The cruc ial leap is tax. en in this last paragraph : in 
answering hi s questi on he has committed the error o� pre­
judging the whole question b.Y inserting with-the terms of 
his definit i on the superior - interior relationship. And 
yet , in his final conclusi on, he asserts that right reason 
is a sufficient sign of divine voliti on :  
2 .  
'' If' the volition on the part or God ie essential to 
a f'i tting and prudent governance over mankind, it is 
in c onsequence neceesa1'7' that , by V1%'tue o'E this same 
providence , that divine volition shall be capable of 
�id. , 2 ,  6 ,  10. Also see 2 ,  6 ,  7. 
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being made known to men; and thi e process is autf1c-
1ent for the nature o� precept and of law; nor 1e &n7
other for.m of declarat ion necessary. Ylheretore it 
may further be stated that the ver,r faculty o� 3udg­
ment which is contained in �ight reaeon and bestowed 
upon man b,- nature , i s  o� 1teel:t a eutt'iclent sign of 
such divine1v�lit1on, no other noti�1cation beingneceeeary. '' 
As we have said, the difficulty into which Suarez is
forced stems from the fact that his conception of law ia 
c entred on the superior - inferior relationship. It be
had viewed law merely ae a rule which obliged human aets 
t hen his ;lust1f1eat1on of nat�al law a.e tt law" would baTe 
made more sense. And he would have realized that a differ-
e nt t7pe of anal7aie would ha•e been proper in aD7 discuss­
i on or a rule dependent on right reason or on conscience 
as compared with an imposed or a comnanded rule.
If we eay that a rule of law exists when human beinsa 
are obliged to perfo� certain conduct or abstain from 
certain conduct , we ean then go on and dieeuee the quest1oft 
what �roe1 of rUles b1n4 human acts. One tne will be a
�ex 29!1'\a, a rule ldi down by a superior for an 1r&rer1or. 
le!!X naturaJ:il will be another t7Pe - a type which baa 1 te
own special features : the judgment of: eonseienee,  the moral
rule which binde or ob�iges human beings in their etatua as 
l. JJ?&d. , 2 ,  6,  24.
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1 
such. It i s  only when we have recognized theee feat-
ures that we rna� aek the quest ion : is the Natural 2aw 
dependent on a Higher Legislator? To this question the 
Schoolmen• s answer is almost a confession o� faith : 
assuming Divine Providence ,  7ee. A s  Aquinas points out , 
a number of individuals will onl7 see the natural law 
ae a binding, but autonomous , s7stem of rules. 
The re-formulation or the question in this manner 
seems to me to avoid the d1:rf1cul ties into which Su&Pez 
and modern commentators have �al.len in t17ing to reconcUe
"voluntarism" and "ratione.�! emu . It enables one to 
assert that there may b• di�ferent tJPes ot obligation 
and conseouentl7 to avoid the use of' terminology such as
1nd1eative - preceptive which has the ef'feet ot con:f'ueing 
the question to be e.nswered.
If the 1nterpretat1�n presented here ie correc·t , 1t 
t'ollowa that the ob�1gatoey source or binding toree of' 
t be lex n!ztural�a is to be round in .the n·:ltion o� the 
1. cont:ra., G1erke 
Political Deoriee or t}le liddj.e Ageo 
( 1938) p. 173 n. 256 who brackets Aquinas with Suarez
1n attributing the binding :torce of' natural law to 
God' s '-'ill. 
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natural good revealed b7 right reason, which, according 
t o  the natural law hJpothee1 s ,  1mpoaes it eelf as the moral 
goal ot every human being. Only seeondarily i e  thia 
source to be �ound in the authority or a superior lawgiver.
I t  ie precisely 1n this respect that the scholastic concept 
of obligation differs f"rom that which is t o  be found in
writers eueh ns Hobbee and Auet1n. 'f/1 th these writers 
the concept ot obligation is related to the author1t7 or 
p ower of a supreme legislator to inflict a pain or penalt7
on the eub3ect as a means O't enforcement or the rule.
Indeed the development ot' the notion of sovereign\,- applied
t o  both moral rules and legal rule s reflects the gradual 
decline or the natural law thesis and the gradual aacendaney 
of the authoritarian thesis as t o  the nature of legal and 
moral obligation. 
our diecuesion or the natural law in section II prompts 
t he furtheP queet i ons a what ie the nature of the precepts 
of �eason which are bound up with the natural inclinations
o� man? What i s  their genesis - are they stored up tn
the mind o� every human being t�om the moment of birth or
a re they built up from exper1ence f 
·;·:e have a.lrea.cy referred to that passage of Aquinas
where he speaks of the precepts following the order .�f' 
l 
the natural 1nc11nat1 ons. He goes on to c ompare what 
he calls the primary p�ecept of natural law with other 
precept s in such a way that hi$ te�inology sugge ets 
that there existe a general llrecept "Seek the good and 
avoid the evil. .. ' from which certain sub stantial precgp'fifA 
are "derived" ( such as : d:> not kill . do not steal) as
thou?� certain concrete precepts can be derived from a
2 
formal principle. In other places , he speaks of a 
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sel:f-evid.ent nr1nc1pl.£. which l.eads to immediate eoru;ly.§i2ll§ 
and contrast s the sel:r-ev1dent pr1ne 1ple ( Seek the good) 
3 
with the conclusi ons ( do not kill etc. ) . St ill 1n 
1. §up:rm .  /"' t r
2. S-T, 1-11 ,  q. 94 art. 2 and ad l. The expreea1on 
u :rormal" here 1e ueed to dee1gnate a pr1nc1pl.e which 
does not 1n 1tselt in'form a pereon as to the actual
course o� conduct which he ought to follow. Ae such 
it 18 contrasted with the expression ffconeretert which
s1gn1:riee the course or conduct to which the principle
relates. The prineiple ttdo good" is t':>rmal ae
eontra&ted with the principle " do not kill... In the 
subse4luent discussion I will attempt to show that 
the Sohoolmen belieTed natural. law to be o'f a concrete
t7Pe as contrasted, for example , with Kanfe universal
imperative.
3. Ibid. , q. 94 art. 4.
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:.ther places, he seems to eq:uate the concrete precepts 
with the self-evident principle { when they become " self­
evident principle s" ) nnd to make a distinction between 
the se and other principle s which are not immediately self•
l 
evident but are only ascertained after reflectio� 
Much of the confus ion to which the terminology give s 
r ise seems t o  revolve around three questions 2
l 'K.hat 1& the status of' the first prineiple tl do good« t 
a '/hat is 1 t s  relationship w1 th the concrete precepts 
( and 1nelinations) 7
1 What , if' any ,  distinction is there within the concrete 
precepts themselve s? 
At first s ight , it would seem as if Aquinas usee the 
expression " do good, avoid eviln as a moral imperative 
to denote the duty of every human being to aet according 
to their natu:re. It is a shorthand way of' sqing a ''You 
ought to do ;tl}oee 1hinge to which your nature impels you
and you will find out what those things a.:re b7 rerlecttns
on the t'undamental ends o'f human ex_istence. n It ia
necessary, however, t o  ask what mental ac t ivity this 1mpl1ee. 
1. see q. 94 art. 6.
I s  it an immedifite intuition? A :proees c  of reflec t i :>n 
i nvolving perhaps a working ::mt of a syetem of rule s ?
Or tr,e :rrui t or experienc e ?  
,A. ouinas ' ancvtF- r· seems t �  inv olve s.ll three. Man, 
in e£�ect , through the agene� �f §ynderesip hae a eympat�
etic understanding of what he ought to do. ' Jlt aot e
aecord1ng to principles ,  some of wh1eh are tmmediately 
intuited, others of whieh are built up by reflection and 
experience. The values of life and the propagation of 
the human raee , ae we�l as the values of social intercourse
and relationehip w ith Go� are c omponents of the moral life
of eve� individual. In eo far as they therefore aonstit-
uted en.de "tor man there was an obligation on hi s part to 
� 
purs1J.e them. Consequently he would aet morall7 only if
he accepted the principles enshrining the se values.
It is the uee ot the phrases ��1�st principles� 
"eonclusione" which suggest that the prooees o'f aox-a.l
tor.mation 1 a 1  with Aquinas , mainly associated w1th a tJPe
of rationalistic eyetem-build1ng, ae if men could onlr 
c ommenoe to act morallt onee they had worked out tor
themselves a moral s7etem to guide all their future actions.
It we interpret A.o.uinae' language in this way, we might
s ay that a person deduce e the precepts Qf the natural law 
39 
:from the prine 1ple "Se�k the e-ood• avoid the evil'' •  
Unfortunately, A quinas does not set out t i n  hi s 
t reatise �n Law, to eYplein the m�.nner in which men become 
a�.r"rare of' the precept E of the nature.l law apart :rrom eaying 
that 
gyndereei§ 
inc ites to the good ��d murmurs at what
i s  evil. He d:>e s not conce rn himself here w1 th the quest--. 
i on of moral format ion. On tbe �ther hand, he wne �ea47 
t o  recognize that moral form.atit>n vrae not a question af
40 
system-building. He speaks for example o� the d1rf1eultiee
nss::-Jc iated with the di ecermnent of" moral obligations and 
1 
ot the liabilit7 to error. He recognizes that certain
precepts were u�uall7 immediately �eeogn1zed by men ae
being valid, while the recognition o� the val 1 d1t7 o�
others depended on a certain amaunt of' reflection ( and 1n
respect of which the judgments of wise men were orten
-2 
p aramount ) .  Accordingly, he we.e wont to speak about 
immediate eonc1usione as compared with remote conclusions, 
3 
primary principles as compared with secondary prtne1plea. 
1. q. 94 art. 4. 
2.  
�d. 
On the contrast between prtmar,v and second� 
precept s eee RommE!n, The Nature.l. 
La,w, 
PP• 215-229.
3. Irt §:!1 1-11 , q. 94 arts. 4, 5,  6.
Element§ gf � a  solution. 
At tbi e  stage we will tr,r to eee whether Aquinas 
believed that the precepts of the natural law were derived 
from the first principle. In Q94 artiele 2 we may find 
the eolut1on of this puzzle. In this article, Aquinas 
speake of the first principle ae being the basis or moral 
action. He continues :  
" S inee however p-ood has the nature of an end and 
evil the nature or a contrary hence it ie that all 
those things to which man has a natural inclination 
are naturall7 apprehended by reason as being gOod, 
and consequently ae objects of pursuit,  and their 
contraries as evil, and ob�ect s of avoidance. Wbere­
'tore according to the order ot natural. inclinations
1 e  the order ot the precepts of the natural law. " 
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It seems that the crucial phrase i s  '•naturally apprehended" . 
Phrased in a different w� : man apprehends or intuits
certain fundamental values as having a claim upon him. 
These eonetitute the concrete precepts of the natural law. 
The formal princ iple ie me:r-e&explanato:ey ot euch moral 
activity. It 1 e  the internal principle of moral action 
-
but in no w1J.7 can 1 t be said to Worm as to the content 
ot the moral precepts. When we epeak of the natural law 
we are referring to the concrete precepts • .  The principle 
ttdo good, avoid evil'• may therefore be regar-ded as a
1 
preamble to the natural law. 
In the De Lep;ibus , Suarez ,  although he use e  termin­
ology similar to that of Aouinaf!, , seems to reach thi s 
conclusion. He says that 
" natural law works more thr-ough proximate principles
or conclusions than through universal. pr1no1pl.ee; 
r.or a lew is a proximate rule ot acting� and the 
general principles mentioned above are not rules 
save in so far ae they are det'ini tely applied b7 
ape c 11'1e PO.les to the individual sorts o'f acts and 
virtue s". 2--- · 
Suarez ,  however, dist 1ngu1ehee an intermediate-tJpe 
principle which ie dif�erent from the general principle
· ( Seek the good) but is nevertheless ·of a more general 
nature than the concrete precepts. As examples of thie
type o't pr1nc1pl.e he mentions : "Justice should be done ,
God should be worshipped, One should live temperatel7"•
( cf. the Roman jurists . Bonegte v�yere, nemlnem •••dtre1 -
Such principles spee1f7 the 
broad content o� the co.nerete precepts without apec1f)'1ng 
3 their form ( e. g. how 1e one to live tem,pel'ately?) . 
1. Mar1tain, Man and th' state , P• 81.
2. Dt L§g�bU§1 2, 7 ,  7.
3. Ibid. 1 2 ,  7; 5.
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or c�urse , the introduction ot this tY,Pe of princ iple 
intnediately causes us to ask : "Does one intuit or apprehend 
the concrete precept itself ( e. g. I should not steal) 
or the principle ( I  shoUld be �ust) . V!p-a-y1o euch pre­
cepts , this type of principle woul.d eeem to be a principle 
lacking content , for it does not 1ntor.m ae to the exact 
dutJ" or tJ'l)e of action whieh ought to be performed. In 
1 tseU' 1 t ie explanatory of t�e concrete precept a To
steal 1e to be un�ust. But it seems to differ rrom the 
other principle to w"hieh vre have o:t'ten re�erred ( "Seek 
the good11 ) in that involved 1n the apprehension of the 
· precept rt one ahould not steal" is the awaxaeness that one 
i s  been unjuet to another 1� such an aeti�n 1 s  perfo�ed. 
What in fact this intermediate-tne principle doea is to 
specif7 the aub 3 ect-matter or class of virtue to which a 
concrete precept belongs. 
S'WIJ'l1ing up ,  we may say that when the Sehoolmen ue
the term "natval lawu in association with the words 
" sel�-evident principles" or tt concluelona" we have to be 
on guard lest we attribute to these principles the eame 
status and effects. It ie neeessary to d1atingu1eh the 
preamble to the natural law, certain general principles 
wh1eh specifY the subject-matter o� the natural law
or localize the bgngm mora�!' and finally the precepts
themselves - the rules which 1nfor.m ae to what one ought 
t o  do or abstain from doing. 
Awareness of such preoept e is not aehieTed by any 
t7,pe of deductive method �rom the �ormal princ iple to 
the precept s for , according to the natural law thesis, 
moral reasoning 1e not of this kind. When therefore 
mention is made of' " sel�-evident prineiples'• or "manifest
conelusionen such phPases must refer to an intuition ot 
c oncrete moral dut1ee , euch intuition being prompted 
b7 ftlndtres1s or sympathetic understanding which men 
possess and whieh, when brought into the sphere of 41e-
cutud.on• can be supported on :rational grounds. And 
when mention is made of eelr-evident or prtmar.r prtn-
c iplee as compared with geoQnd@El or re;gte conolue1ons,
the c omparison intended 1e . between those precepte which
depend on �ediate app�ehension and other Wh1eh are 
discerned onl7 after a certain degree ot rerlectlon
and debate takes place. While murder is 1mmed1ate1y
recognized as something involving moral turpitude , 
usU17 ie not. The goodness or turpitude underlying
the second class of aet1ons i e  not immediately apprehended
because one must enQuire into the nature of these actions 
and weigh the interest s involved, bef'ore coming to a 
deci sion. 1 
v 
An 1 e eue which arises from our previous discussion 
may be stated ae f'ollowe. It it be granted that there 
i s  an innate capac ity to know the precepts of' the natural
l aw, what etatus does thie eapaeit7 have in respect or 
the moral thought and action of anr iP41y1du&+ person? 
1. See Coplestone , agu1na! ( 1955) PP• 222-225. 
It might be aeke : how can you s ay the.t murder , for 
example , forms the eub3ect-matter of an immediate
intuition? Is it because whenever we f'or.m a concept
o't murder, a mental picture of a.n action tJP1171Da
murder f'laehee through our mind ( for example a person
being done to death in a violent way) . It seems
that such a mental picture 1e otten involved when we
auddenl7 ref'lect on the wronp.ess of au.ch an action,
but that it only aaeiats in tooueing our attention
on the 1net1nct1vely•:t"elt repulsion ( or. attract.1on,
1n the case of good ob�ecte) towards such an aetton.
Sucht it aeeme, is the process by •h1ch 
ezndfl'a1e 
or conscience dormant , ae it were , for a per 
od 
1a
violently awakened when attention is tU1'ned towarda,
or judgement tor.med on the mo�ality of aueb actiane.
Doee 
everyone 
actually know the precepts of the natural 
law? Thi s  question is prompted by the thought that 
there i s  a difference between e�ing that a person is
b �und by the natUl'al law and &$7ing that a person 1s 
aware of its binding force. 
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Aquinas suggest s  that no person can be ignorant ot
the primaey precepts of the natural law 1 but that cterta1n 
1nd1..-1duale or races can be ignorant of the secondary 
precepts an� or the applicat i on of the precepte to part­
icular acta. 
"Ae to the prima17 p:rinciplea , the natural law, in
the abstract , cannot be b�otted out from men' a · heal'ts. 
But it is blotted out in the case of a particular 
action, in so tar as reason is hindered 'from applJ"•
ing the general principle to a particular practice 
on account of some concupiscence or some other 
practice • • • •  But as t o  the other , the eecond&r,J prin­
ciples ,  the natural law can be blotted out t'rom the
human heart 1 either b7 evil persuasions , 3uet as in
epeculati•• matters errors occur in respect o�
neeeeearr conelue1one , or by v1ciouc habits and
c orrupt practices , as among eome men; theft , a� 
�en 't11'ln8tural vices were not e steemed s1ntul . .. 
This part1c�sr paeeap,e 1e somewhat ambiguous. I� 
Aquinas means b7 the p:rimaX7 p:rt1ne1ples the formaJ. prin­
c iples aiseueeed prevlousl71 it would seem that what he 
i s  asserting ie that to act morall7 a person must accept 
l. s-T, l-11 , q. 94 art. 6.
the proposition that he ought t o  seek what i s  goo� or 
rather, that to act m�rally ie to act according to such
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a principle. If' • however , Aquinas i s  comparing principles
suoh as "do not steal .. with the more remote pr1no1plea 
then he may mean that all men are aware of the fUndamental
duties but � be unaware of the lese fundamental duties.
Th1e latter c onclusion however is inaccurate as i s  
Ehown b7 the fact th•t he recognizes in the example cited 
at the end of the above quotation that certain races mar
1 
be unaware of the 
ar+mr.rz 
concrete preeepte. In etreet, 
i ·  
this ie the interpretation which suarez adopte. suarez 
makes the distinction between the �or.mal principles and
the concrete precepts and holds that ignorance of the 
for.mer is inconceivable 
• tnasmuch as these principles are by the very terms 
def'1ning them comp:Ietely known and to aueh a degree
in h&l"'D.0%17 with and f'itted to the natural bent o-r 
reaeon and will, that it is not possible to evade 
them. ttS 
' 
' 
As �ar as the concrete precepts are concerned, Suarez 
belie.ee that one or other ot these maJ be blotted out
1. 'for example • of the precept •ao not stealu.
2. 
� :Lerl'JaU.t; 
2 t  8 ,  6.
( although one is never 
�ot!lll 
eradicated) but he points 
out that it i s  inconceivable that such ignorance would 
c ont inue , in the ease of a primary precept , tor any great 
length o� ttme or without a sense of guilt. Aa 'far ae 
the secondary or remote precepts sre concerned, thi s mq 
well be the c aee i. e. there may be ignorance for a length 
l of time and without e. sense of gu1l. t.
If the Sehoolmen had written a little later , the� 
might have been S1ll'prised to discover that there was a
wider divers ity in moral practice than the single example 
of thett , taken from C aesar' s De 
Be�o G�l1eg1 
indicates.
Puffendorf , writing in the l.atter part o� the seventeenth 
centur,r. and with great knowledge ot the texts of elaeeiaal 
writers , refers to the evidence or writers who e ite a 
2 
great number of perTersiona practised by certain tribes. 
And indeed it could be shown on the baeie or soc1olog1cal 
1.
t\?&d 
• •  2 ,  a ,  7.
2. Por e%ample a 1111eit intercourse with mothers and
4aughtere among the Pereiane , cannibalitm1 among
the Scythiane, the killing o� the aged among the
Maesagetat
Puffendorf, 
On the La
w 
o� 
Nature 
and 
Nation,. 
trana.
c. H. and tf'l;. A. Oldfather
t 
Oxford 
1934) 
, P• 191.
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evidenc e  collected in recent times that among civilized
peoples there are a number of aberrati �na �hieh afflict 
s number of individuals and which sUggest that the natural
l 
law is not universally understood. 
Does eueh evidence subvert the baeie �f the natural 
l aw? Not at al.l. Even though it is asserted that the 
natural law 1s binding on every individual as a member of
the human race , no assertion is made that ever7 individual 
i s  aware ot all the precepts of that law. There is one 
Qual1f'icat 1on however to make. It 1e inconceivable 
that a. person could aet morally e.t all unless he wae-
1mpl1citly mare of the validity of the principle that he 
should eeek what 1s goo<L If' he said to htmself "Evil , 
be thou my good'' we eould only say that th:la was a wilful 
refusal to recognize any f'or.m ot moral obligation at all. 
The dif'f'icul ty x-emaine that the Schoolmen' a term1n­
olo8J occasionally euggests that they are not thinking 
... , 
or the fUrther question, namely, in whatA an 1�v1agal 
1 a  bound bJ the natural law. And this 1e not surprising 
because the use of phrases eueh as "right reason� doea 
1.
sugyeet that there is a type �f universal c onsc ience in 
existence. In s�e places ,  they do use the word •• eons-
c ience" to describe the individual capac ity of each person 
t o  d1eeern the right and the wrong, and it is this phe� 
omen::>n which might hold the key to the universal-individ­
ual problem.
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In C.l9 art. 6 ,  Aqu1na.s makes the rather strange 
s tatement that the Eternal Law cannot err but that c onscience 
m� err , and he goes on to distinguish Nat�al Law �ram
c onse ience, whieh ie the individual capacity of each 
pereon to decide whether particular netions are right or 
l wrong. Suarez approve s o� this distinction and aeserte 
that while Natural Law ( here used to denote §Yndereeig) 
only looke to the future , consc ience takes account of 
past acte and can " accuse" and tt admonish". He conclude s . 
by e�ing that eonsc ience can take aceount of other rules
besidee the rules of the Natural Law and therefore mQ' 
e rx-.·2 
l. 1-11, q. 19 tU"t. 6 ,  ad 2. See also 1, q. 79 art.  13. 
2. De N!slbug, 2, 5 ,  15. For example if it take s  
account of and �ollowe an eyil custom or rule of
positive law. 
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In eluc idating this distinction between the natural
l aw and c oneeience ,  it is neeeeea� to indicate the reasons
f or assuming the existence of euch capac ities at all, and 
the c orollary , nemel� , that one is insuf�1cient without 
the other. In eftect ,  we are making two distinct state-
mente when we say that a person is bound by the precepts
·of the natural law. In the first place we are stating
that 
�en person has a natural inclination to know and
net according to certain rules , such an inclination
usually issuing 1n action, other circumstances being equal.
S01 "'' 
In the second place we are also that a 
particylar person 
. A  ' 
( X) has such an inclination. And 7et it i s  a tact that 
a person may act in a w� which is contrary to the precepts 
ot that law , $hitiking nevertheless that he ie acting �igbtly. 
Ul time. tell', we ean only judge the particular peraon
according as to whether or not he obeye the dictates or
hi a conscience , the.t is according to the moral evaluation 
which he makes 1n respect. or the facta which preeent them-
selves for moral. appraisal. This does not prevent us
from �udging the acts themselves according to the standards 
of the natural law. In such a way it is poeeible to epeak 
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of an erring oonscience. 1
The assertion that there is a distinction to be 
made between the b inding force �f the natural law on 
members of the human race and the awareness o'f ita bind­
ing :fo:ree :>n the part of this or . that individual gives 
rise to a de�inite probl� H01!\' can an individual ,
1 t may be said, be "bound'' b� a precept of the natural. 
law of which he is unaware. Even if we regarded the
nat�a.l law ae dependent on the W1ll of God it would be 
di:ffieul t to e83' that a person who was una,atare of' the
Will o'f God wae bound in c onscience to comply with it.
One V'8.'3' out o:r this difficulty ie to say that the 
etatement '"All individuals including X are bound by the
natural lawu 1e a statement about X taken as a member 
ot the human raee. The statement in effect invOkes 
the standard ot the reasonable moral person who i s  eub3ect 
t o  the principles of the natural lnw. We mq find some 
analogy here with the perception o� PhV&ieal object&; 
're might say that al.l persons ought to see ob�ects which
1. Lottin, ?eucnolggie gt Morale , op. eit • •  PP• 415-417
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are within the nor.mal range ot visio� In aueh a ease 
we appeal to a standard of vision which we deem appropriate
in the case of people with normal eyesight , recognizing 
of c ourse that there e.re eome individuals who will be 
myopic. 
It seems that an analogous claim can be made in the
ease of the precepts ot the natural law. They can be
recognized b7 individuals provided that they have amongst
other things , a sufficiently-developed conscience , �ust 
�ae ob�eete can be seen by those whose eyesight is good. 
To take another example 1 it an individual wants to
play a game such ns football he must acquaint himself 
with the l'Ulee of tootball , just as a human being, to be 
moral , must ed.hex-e to the rules of moxaal1t7• The d1:tr­
erence in the two caees ie that a part1eu1ar individual 
ie not obliged to plfq f'ootbel1 while eve17 individual.
ee a mem.ber . . . .2t the hUIXl@n rs,g' 1s obliged to adhere to
the standards of the natural le.w. If', however , a part-
i cular individual, throuv,h ignorance which is not culpable, 
1 a unaware ot a px-eeept of the natural law the onlJ' 
judgment Vie enn make i e  that in the particular c ircum­
stances he is bound to follow hie conscience which i s  in
d1saccord with the nat llral law. 
It i s  unrealistic to regard the acquisition of the
knowledge of the precepts of the natural law in their 
ent irety as anything but a long and arduous process z the
c onse1encee of all of ue are to a sreat extent alw�a
struggling to see the light , while new situat ions present
themselves which call tor re-exam1nat1 �n o� the baeic
interests involved in a moral s ituation. 
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The Sehoolmen recognized that evil pas sions and vicious 
habits often �ned certain individuals and even nations 
away :f'rom the natural law .. It is not very difficult to 
e ee how men fall into such habits and ways of acting 
through not bothering to make use of their eonee1encea in
appraising their eonduct. But suarez thought that such 
practises could not cont inue tor anJ length ot ttme without 
l. 
a aense of guilt. 
l. at Lesibua, 2 ,  a ,  7.
He attempted no anal7sis in his treatise on the natural
la� as to what the sense of guilt was. It eeems that
a sense of' guilt can express itself' in different WQJ'e,
perhape most notably in the weakening o:r the moral.
tibre of the group in which the practice bee omee wide­
spread e. g. the rapid decline of the Roman Empire.
As far as the individual pereon i e  conerned, the 
apel�ation 
of principles is perhaps just as impo�tant
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as adherence to them. A person may very well give assent 
t o  princ iples without applying them to hi s daily life. 
Acuinee sugge s t s  that this o:rten happene through the �
surge o:f so.ttle passion t we may add that it is often the 
case of a person be ing unable t o  discern the criterie.
�rh!eh are to be applied to an individual set of e 1rcum-
stances. 
This indeed brings up the \Vbole Quest i on of moral
:formation. And the virtue par excellence in this regard 
1 a  
�rudenee which, ns Aquinas puts it , is the virtue
which is concerned with acti�ns. It is ineutfioient ,  he 
says , for men to 
knQ! 
principles without knowing how to 
apply them. 1 The latter t,-pe or knowledge can only be 
atta1neet through experience a.nd constant practice. A . . 2 tutored c onsc ience ie the work or continuous endeavour • 
• 
1.
�-T, 
11-ll, q. 47 et seq.
2. c'f. a. Marcel , Men agatnst Huma.nit:£, p. 18 ( 1952)
whose er1t 1cism of a moral formalism which seeks to
bring all human acts under general rules is a neceesar,
ant idote to any belief that the sphePe of morale ie
exhausted b7 general rule s. There ie al��s an element 
In eonclueion we may point out that the prineiplee I 
o� the natural law must not be seen ae some type o�
panaeea remedying in an automatic WB7 the moral crises 
which individuals have to face. No doubt the language 
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often used by the Sehoolmen hne the effect of picturing
universal-type principles which are there to be recognized 
by every individual. But this cannot turn �ur attention 
away fr� the central �eature of moral activity, name17 , 
t hat it is 
thig 
person and 
tba! 
person who hold principles
and that the taek or appl1eat1on 1e  not an easy one. 
�f the unique which prnente �ne :from "taping" moral 
si tuat1ons.
See also �T, 1-11 , q. 94 art. 3t and 
P! Legibgs, 
2, 71 ll-i
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whet-e the Schoolmen, 1n d1ecuaa1ng the 
queet1on whether the natural law prescribes the acta 
":>f all the virtue e ,  make the point that the content 
of the virtues , especiall7 the personal ones such ae
courage and temperance, depends so mueh on the c1rcUJJ�o.oo 
stances in which the mo�al agent �1nde h�aelt.
Chapter 3. 
Natural Law : Change and the 
;t;ua Gentium 
I • 
. A feature usually as soc iateO with the doctrine ot 
natural law ie that it i s  an unchanging standard , valid 
tor all t tmes and places. As we noted at the end or the 
previ ous chapter , thie does not necessarily imply a univ­
ersfl.l standard of awarene ss of' its precepts in all people. 
In this chapter , I wish to c oncentrate on the as sertion 
l 
t hat the natural law 1s unchanging. In doing this I 
will refer to a notion whieh is closely related to the 
natval law - the 
1Ys. S!nt1wg.. 
2 
· Aquinas• discussion of the feature of change is to 
be found in the fourth and fifth article s of 0 94. In 
------------------� -
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1.  For a discus s i on o't the scholast ic not ion o� change , see
Cuevas Canc ino , 
J..! doctrine. . 
de 
Suartz §Ob£! e;t. dtreehQ 
natural, 
pp. 906-213 
(Madr1dt l962l. 
2. Por a d1eeuss1on ot the 
'u' g§nt1ym 
see 
Lottin, Le
droit �.,turel 
che z _ st. 
Th�ae, 
PP• 61-67.
Senn,
pe 
La 
Just ice 
et 
dy_Qr�1t (1927 
Appendix.
the fifth art icle he makes the statement that change can 
b e  understood in two ways : as an addition and as a 
diminut i on. In the ease of addition, natural law can 
be changed bec r.uF.e "many things for the benefit of human 
life have been added over and above the natural law, both 
b� divine law and by human law. "
ion 1e concerned 
But a.e f'ar as d1m1nut-
" the natural law is alt ogether unchangeable in 1te
r1rst principles . but in its secondary pr1nc1ple e  
which A S  we have said are certain detailed proximate 
concl�sione �awn �rom the firat principle s ,  natural 
law is the standard a.t rectitude in most caeee. But 
it may be changed in S·�e particular cases o� rare 
occurrence through some special c ases hindering the
observance · of such precepts as stated abOTe!' 
The example which he gives of thie type of change is tbe
ott-quoted one of the deposit. In the ma�ority of eases 
it is right and p�oper to return what one has deposited, 
but in certain cases it may not be right and proper, far
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2 
example � if the deposit would be used for some evil purpose. 
l.
s-x, 
l-ll, o. 94 art. 5.
2. Aquinaa mentions the ease of the return of a weapon
to a lunat i c ;  Suarez the return of a�s an1ch might 
be ueed �or the purpose of fight ing against one' e
oountr,y. The7 do not spec 1f7 the c ircumstances under 
wh1eh it is wr�ng to return the deposit. Clearly we 
would have to know more about such circumetancee. It 
might be proper to return the depoe! t to the repres­
entative of the lunat ie.
In the De Legibue, Suare z di ecusee e the twofold 
change and remarks that the change which takes place 
when something i s  added to the natural law by human law 
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i s  not ' true ' change, " s inee addit i on doee not constitute 
a change when the law 1s left in ita entirety, "  but rather; 
l 
there takes place "a per:f"eet 1ng o,. extension. " In this 
he is nearer the point. As we ehall see later, the 
natural law cannot be regarded as complete by any means 
in the sense that 1te operati on i e  completely specified.
Indeed, on the one hand, it s precepts are in need ot inter­
pretati �n and exposition and• !;)n the other hand, its 
precepts are not sufficient to deal with ever, p�obla.
which may arise. Conse�uently, it is inaccurate to speak
ot natural law as being added 'Q by positive law, �or no
change takes place 1n the natural law when a poe1t1ve �aw 
i s  enacted. Por the natural law itae1f 1 e  not chaagea. 
The addition which the positive law makes 1 e  in the realm 
2 or positive law and not or ethic s.
'::'hat concerns us in this chapter 18 the question ot 
1. See De Leg1bue , 2 ,  13 , �ass� 
2. ;n:r:ra, chapter 51 M '13"t41f1 · 
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interpretation. Indeed the whole question of ' d�ninut1on'
of the natural law must be studied in the light of this 
ouestion ,  f'or it seems that ��.·hen the Sehoolmen uee the 
phrase they are not thinking -�f the precept s of' the natural
law as being 
abolished 
but ae being narrowed 
down 
b7 inter­
pretation t o  fulfil the needs of classes of cases which do 
not seem to be rightly subsumed under the general principles. 
f•llen A quinas refere to the fundamental _precepts of 
the nat�al law as being generally valid but failing in aaug1or1by§ 
this , at firet e1y�t , seems to deny a fundamental 
t enet �f the natural law thes i s ,  viz. , that i t  sets up an
unchanging standard. now can we eay that the precept s
a.re 
somet imes 
changed? 
It may be of interest to note suarez ' s  approach to 
the problem. He makes a d1et1net1on between " intrine1ett 
and "extrina ic" change. In no part , does he g1Ye a
c omplete exp1anat1�n of theee te�s , but the examples whieh
he uses are illuminating. An 1ntr1ne1e change , he a.,e , 
takes place when a father ceases to occupy that status on 
the event of his death ; an extrins ic change when a father 
c eases to occupy that status on the death of his son. 1
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Us ing thi s model ,  he goee on to show under what conditione
the natural law may be said t� be changed. There exists, 
he says - a vital relationship between the precepts of the
natural law and the sub ject-matter to which they relate. 
Now a precept is usually fr�ed in respect of the existence
�t a number of c ircumstances which are quite common, 
l. 
and easily recognized, and not of other c ircumstances. 
For example the precept prohibiting killing pre&uppoaes 
c ireumetancee involving the commission of an act lead1ng 
to the death o� another , but does not extend to e ire� 
. . . . 2 stances where an act is perfor.med in sel�-defence. 
Suarez is evidently thinking of the precepts in a 
way which endows them with a certain openness� although
t his openness is confined within certain limit� for he e.,s :
1. 
2. 
3. 
"Since in 1 ts own set terms the natural law has been 
written not upon tablets nor upon parehmente but iJ1
the minde of' men it i s  not alwqs formulated in the 
mind according to those · general or 1ndef1n1te ter.ms 
in whieh we quote it when speaking. Po� example the 
law concerning the return of a deposit , in eo far as 
it is natural , is mentally conceived, not in such 
;[bid 
.• , 2 ,  13 , 6. 
,{bi�, , 2 ,  13 , 5.
The same phenomenon 
Hart , _!he 
in Essays 
( 1951) . 
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simple and sbe�lute terms , but with l1mitat1\)D.8 and 
circumspection, for reason dictates that a deposit
should be returned to one who seeks it r�ghtfB*ll and reasonably, 
or in cases involving no ob �ect ion based 
upon just defence , whether of the State , of oneeel�, 
or of an innocent pereon. Yet thi s law i s  quoted
simply in the following terms s A deposit must be 
returned ; because the rest i s  implied , nor i e  it 
possible to make in the shape ot a law humanl7 dra� 
up a complete statement of all the points involved. " 
It 1s in this wa7 that Suarez explains Aquinas• etatement 
that the precepte:. of the natural law mq eh&nF.e. A precept 
c annot change intrinsically e. g. the principle proscribing 
theft i s  never aboli shed, but it rna� change extr1nsicall71 
in so far as it is framed in respect of the existence of 
c ertain feature s and not or others. 
Understood 1n this way , the precepts o� the natural 
law are assoc iated with a certain degree of flex1b1lit7• 
The Schoolmen speak or the precepts as being inapplicable 
in 
peuc1 or1l?ut• 
Usually, the c onditions t o  which the,y
relate are of a sal.ient kind ( theft ; taking the property 
ot another , adultery s having intercourse with another' s
wife) but in certain case s the precept may be inapplicable
( e. g. is it theft to take the property of another in a caee
1.
�e Legibua, 
2 ,  13 , 7.
�f necessity or with same other adequate justificationV)
The question remains , however, as to the way in 
which we determine whether a precept will be applicable 
or not. Suarez suggests that it c an only be the result
of inte:ttpretat i �n applied to the various conditione which
arise from time to ttme. 1 He lists the common examples 
ot killing, and the taking of property which be�ongs to 
another , and says that the former does not c over aet e  of 
sel�-defence , the latter taking in eases of necesa1t7• 
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The criteria which he puts forward �or determining whether
or not the precepts apply to the exceptional circumstances
2 
are 
3ust ice 
and 
char1t�. The ouesti�n t� ask in the case
of thef't would be : '' Is it just , proper or in accordance
w ith charity to take in thi s  type of case ? "  However, he 
goes on to explain that the c ategory of the:tt does not
c over cases o:f' taking in extreme neoees1t7 because such a
1. 
�1g, , 
2 ,  16 , 6. He dist1ngui ehee interpretation 
f'rom equity , and etates that equ1ty i s  not applicable
to the natural law as sueh, because equity is in 
effect an emendation of the will of the legislator , 
and the �Nill of God cannot be amended.
See 2 ; 16 ; 7, 9 ,  10. But it � be applicable to 
positive law which contains natural law. This 
distinction is very much bound up with his belief in
natural law as precept ive divine law. For the purposes 
of our analysi s  we will assume that involved in inter­
pretation is the application of equity.
2. D! Legibue, 2 ,  16 , 7.
t akin� is �--
" not a matter having to do w1 th v�hat 1e absolute]Jr 
in another' s  possession since in such type of cases
all things are common property, ngr i e  it a ease 
in which the :mner 1! reagonabli unwilling to part
w! th hi s property " .  
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In this passage there is p osed a two-e1ded solution s
the factual criteria of the concept of theft are no longer 
present - on the aaeumpti on that in such eaeee propert7 
becomes c �on - and the moral turpitude or the action 18
lack!� .. According to hie concepti on of a moral precept 
or category� two elements are always present which specit'J'
the (!Uality of the action : 'factual. criteria and moral
FOOdne � s  or turpitude. Theft , for example , perta1ne to 
the ac quisition of what belongs to another, but thie alone 
i s  insuffic ient to endow the precept w1th moral e1gn1�1cance. 
The ta.lting muet be a 
wron.g!lll 
one. Not all taking& are
wrongful , for some are excused on the basie of the presence 
o� other er1ter1a. And the same is true of the k1lltng -
murder example. 
on the other hand, can we aay that the eategory or
the�t �oee not apply to a ease of taking 1n extreme neceee­
i ty not only because such a taking seeme 3uet but also 
1. �id
. , 2 ,  16 , ll.
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'becauee t:he fr-:,ctual cri terin themselves are changed. in the
light �f the m�ral evaluation o� the circumstances? At 
first sight , the anr:r-·�er seem� clear. The factual ori ter1a 
hnve not ohenged ,  that is t o  say ,  there is still e.e(;u1sit1on 
of property from anjther perf: on. It seems t o  be a mere
fictijn t o  say that ln this �1tuat 1on the pr�pert7 becomes 
c ommon. 
It 1e neeessn�J for us t o  re-eT.nmine the phra se e 
" f�ctual cri terla!t and ''moral goodne ss" . Certainly the7
w ere closely related 1n the Seho��en' e minds. In m7
opinion while they may be logically dist inguished in ex�
i ning the st�eture of the moral precept , they are tueed
in S j  �ar the moral precept is the subject-matter of an
individual' s  moral judgment. As we have indicate d 1n
Chapter 2 ,  the precepts or the natural law are equated with
moral �udgrnents which accord vd th right reason. In the
mind of a part ieUlar individual ( X) such a 3udgment would
be �ramed in thi e way "Taking the property of another is
wrong where A ,  B ,  and C circumstances are preaent but not 
where D oircumetanee ie pree.ent. n llhel'e in fact D e1rcum­
etance is present , the taking i e  held to be �uet1t1ed, not , 
A a  the �eb�ol.men' e language indicate s ,  becauge propertN 
becomes nornmon in c nses of extPeme need, but 
becnuee 
an�tl)er-M.tncil�le hvs_ t '  be taken int-?. acc ount. r; e  can
only ret ain the S eh:)':llmen' & lan�age in this context 1.r, 
a a 1e l ikely , they .ri.'le r:lnt that , in so f'ar as a moral
evaluation ( as distinct :rrom a factual deter,unati:;,n) 
wne e�neerned, p:roperty had become c ommon. 
Neither A qu1nae n�r Suarez 1n thi s context give
u s  aey ertteria f'or determining whether mn exce;pt1 -:m be
p ermitted beyond saying tbat , 1'f it is right and proper
1 n  the c 1rc'Ol'll8ta.nees, then the exeept1on 1e 3ueti:f'ied.,.. 
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It aeeme that what they have in mind is  the ,, conf'l1ct-�:t­
dut1ee" ei tuat1on. 
More 
than one preeept mq be a:pplic­
able to the situati on  1n quest ion. It is true that 
one must not eteal, but �ne must also live , and e 1'tuat-
1 ons will arise when not only the principle proecr1blna 
thettt 'but also the principle which protects bUlllan lite
must be conside�ed. If, ae in the necess1t7 example, 
the latter principle i s  appl1ed, what we are dolng a
working out 1n detail a reconciliation between the ditt­
e�ent precepts in oases where the feat�ea � be sub­
sumed under one or other principle , and we are also 
emphasizing the higher value. In doing this ,  we 4o 
not jettison the principle proecribing thet't ; we retain
1 t. At thie stage , a furthe:r dec1a1on hae to be made;
vis. , which of the principles is t.o be esteemed ae the 
mo�e important. 1
\ 
It would have been more eaJ.ighteDing if' suarez ba4 
app�oached the problem fram this angle. H1s emphaale 
on interpretation should have led him to consider the 
c onflict-of-dutiee s1 tuation, but he waa. averted :rrca 
thie,  preferriq rather to employ a f'1et1on to ex.Plain
t he  1napplieabil1t7 or precepts in the exceptional cases.
Howeve r' , his diecusaion has at leaat shown that the
d if"fioul.t7 1.n aaeert1ng that natural law · conatitu:tea an 
unob.ang1ng standard c an  be obviated, lf it 1a reaJ.1ze4 
what the Bchoolmen meant when tbe7 used the word "ouqe" 
to explain the phenomenon which we have diaoua••4 in
these pagee.. 
ua1qg the word "ohaap" to ezpla1n the pheD.a�Hn� 
Iaa�ead., we mipt . eay that the preoepta or the nat� 
law do not coaclua1Yel7 determine the caaea to which t.he7 
-w·-------
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1. ct. L. G. Mille:r, b.J.es �d E:xcept!sma, Vol. 66 , Eth1M
P• 262 ( 1956) . 
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apply but are »rima rao&e precepts the ranking of which, 
in the event of conl1et , lies in the evaluational hier&rchr 
of the rules themselvea. l 
II 
At the beginning of' this chapter, we set out the 
two ways in which the Schoolmen 'believed that natural 
law could change. It will be recalled that AquiDas spoke 
of uaef"ul. th1nse being ad(led to the natural law b7 poa1� 
ive law, and we had a few words to aq on this que•tlcm.. S
In actual fact. A.quinaa experiences muoh difticultJ'
in aeeommodating· th1s concept of ut111t7 to the previa.� 
outlined feature& o'f the natUl'al law-
dieouesi� revolves around a perennial question whieh :I.e
aesooiated with the concept or the &u! geg'tlJR1 IliON
part1ouiarl7 w1tb the inst itutions o� pr1••t• prop•�tr 
an4 elneJ.7• · .If nature endows man w1 th hll dom1:a1 oa
... _. · .  
aver hie libert7 and the 'l!ruita of the earth h?" can one
explain the ex1etence of 1neti tuticm.a ( eeemincl7 err a
1. I·., owe this sUggeetion to Prot'eeeor Bart. 
· 
-
· 2. euora. M !"t - 1. 
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per.manent nature) whieh interfere with th1a bl1aeful state'
Not Only that , but are there not aleo customs Qt poeitlve 
law ( eu.ch ae prescription) which ci�cumecribe the @\fbJ 
nttur&e'l 
The Augustinian •chool which f'oun.d :tavour wl th DUns
Seotus and V illism of Occam had propowa.ded a tl:&e017 wh1oh. 
seemed to take aw97 the ve't!7 foundation of the natlU"al la• 
as a continuing bodJ' o-r rules. This School inclined to
the vie� that human nature could be considered botb 1n 
its �t!tu� in!lqC!Dti�e and in ita tallen state 1 the 111 
n!t!lr!lim endured in the f'o.l"mfJr state, the .il&l Ull!bm 1a 
the latter. Such an inte:rpHtation, of couree , pHaeata 
a de:fird te picture of manlt:lnct 1 once upon a ti.lne a perfect
1dTllic state exiated wbere freedom abouade4, Where there 
was no coercion. and where man would .t)J.tla the tl'Uite ot 
the earth. Sueh a etate had been rad1eall7 · .  attea\H 
utlons 1 his lib•rt7 ie otten deDied htm · aftd the fruita o� 
the ear'h have been diYided. 1 
l.
A··:uinas tackles the que fi t ion in a dlti'erent m.an.ner. 
lc d.i etirl{n.ti ehce bet·: e�n a :p:r•eocpti'\ .. e f'Jrm :>f' natural law 
::aturr.l lat�r preeer1bee that one 
auat perform or abctain from pertormine eertain actions 
'ut it ale') �1ermit s  or recogni zes as valid oertain otl1e:r
1 thinge r.,·hieh benet! t mankind. suarez mentions a third
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category : where the natural la1r merely favours or incliMe 
to a cert·ain otl'lte or affairs. 2
The quest ion relTlains : what is the relationship 
._etween the �u§ gentiy.m and natural law? If" natural law 
�"trmit a c on:mon .:rm,erehip , while the 1nstitu.t1�n of: priYate 
property . has been introduced by the ,ly.e natiYm, aan 1t be
laid that the natural law ia changed or ie in contliot
with the 1us gentium? The an$wer to this question depe� 
on the et atue wh1 ah one attributes to the il!:! ge.Qt;ltllfla 
Aqttinas' treatment of the 1yg sen�til is no\ at all 
:•at1stactory. · tie waTers between the opWon which rep,l"da 
i 
the 1Q! _seat19; as those preoept s which are common to man
alone • and the opinion which aseoe1atea the WI atn£1• 
. ;1. S-'l!, q. 94 art. 5 1 ad 3 • .
t. De Lesibu�, 2 •  14 , 6. He speaks of a etate ot -��alra 
whieh hae ita foundat ion in a gonQ.1�1gne atm:llit 
for exsmple1 that a son ehould inherit from a rather
.,,ho dies intestate , and the practice of g1v1ng credenoe
to two w1 tneaeea.
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with the natural lav; ae a oollection of' remote eonclus1u. 
1 dependent on an existing gtat�§ CUQ• Iz.t art icle 4 o� 
Q 95 he comparee the vari �s w�ys in which positive law 
1e derived n-om the law and diet1ngui 8hes tbe �y.s u!Ui\JI 
( ooncJ,u§iq) trcxn the tue .. e1y1l! ( �termi.Qftig) .  
"i'o the law of nations belongs those things which &1'0
derived �rom the law or nature , a• eonelu•1oftl tro. 
premise a,  sueh as Just bU¥inge and 8ell1nae and the 
like , without which men caMot 11•• to.-ther ana
these are part or the law o!' nature , since man 1& a 
e�eial animal. But those things wh1eh are deri.a4
trom the law of' nature by way o't particular determi.D­
at ion, be1oftF. to the c ivil law ,  accor41ng as eaall 
state · decides ' what 1 s  beet tor itself. '1 
Bow�ver,  in another place he av1i tchea t o  "CTlpian' s det'1ntt-
1 on, aeeo�ding to which the 
1U! gent&Jm 
is equated wi-th
that part o:f' the natural law which is eommon to man. oalt, 
although at the same time he aseertt that the W S!Atlla 
In tile •• tan 
art 1clee at least three meanings ere given to the ccacep\ ; 
1 that. tt 1s the social part of' the natural law, 1 that 
it is the natural law 1n· so �*r ae \hat ie common to man 
alone. A that · it eons1£te or rules ba•ed on util1t7•
1. 
· 
senn, :QI ;La 3uel1se, �t .. P,:g, 4!"21!, P• 58.
a. s-a:, 11-11, q. 5 7  art. 3. 
'l'o the tteader, 1 t may seem ae 1r there are a JlUIIIber
of di stinctions wh1eh do not give anr precise etandard b.r 
which he may �udge the &u.l gent1JR• Let ua t17 to eee
wh7 .Aquinas emphasizee the teaturee mentioned aba.e.
In the �1rst place , it seems , be was drawing attentlGR 
to the development of social tnst1tut1ona which enabled
men to live harmoniously together., At the same time be 
,. 
was troubled by the "natuttaJ.istic'' view {which was olouq 
aasocicted with a picture o:r an o:r1ginal state O't lmloo­
ence) accordina to which a bo�, not so much ot PQlea ,
but of rights existed at some time or other , but had
given V:fX¥ to the h&reh realitie s of soeial interc ourse 
and even conflict when there was a need for the reeonc111at1oa 
and l�1tat1on of the se rights. Finall7 in att�1butina 
to the �ua s:t»tei:& the st&tus ot rathel:" remote concluiou
he was drawing attention to the s1mp21c1t7 ot the orl,Saal 
t!atut nUY.ra! 
a a compared with the oelrlplicated qa\.q
at rules to which social intercourse had ginn x-1a .. 
It is only when we turn to the diecueaion r4 the 1111. 
SWPII 
in th� De 
Ltg�bJ!I 
ot Suarez that we t1n4 a nataia­
ed attempt to get rid ot these em.bigu:1t1es and to gift an
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autonam�ua atatua t �  the 
1ue geat1� 
Suarez blataatl7 
refuses to aecept the notion, implicit in Aqulnaa' die-
cueaion, ar a dualistic natural law. we cannot , he •8.7•• 
conoe1Te ot man outelde of social 1ntereouree. Lawa 
and rulea , rigbts Jl4 dutiee , are therefore necesear.7 to 
enable him to J.:I.Ye in peace and �uat1ce wi'\h hie neiflib.-
1 
bour. 'l'here wae no need to set up a eeco.n4817 Mtural
law to deal with the " aoolal" qu.eet1on and couequentl.r' 
no need to ooaeider the 
1:Qe antl:a 
to be the reeul t �
a camp11eate4 deductive proceae. What wae importu.t wae 
to consider man and aoo1et7 aa the7 preaented theaeelvee 
to the Observer. 2
In aqi.ng th1e ,  Suares hlt upon two ver, �ant
featuree. H• was aware that aoe1e� had the capeoi'7 to
dnelop · and  had deYeloped and he reoo[(J'11zed the lalportance 
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o't various inatl tutions based on a eerla1n util:l t7 which 
facilitated the intercourse or the members of 8JV eoe1et7. 
Sueh institutions , howe.er , did not have an absolute char­
acter t their statue and existence wae the outcome ot 
social recognition Pather than or the demands ot nature. 1
Once established; the7 did have a certain degree or co� 
eub3ect�tter ot civil law on the ground that the.r were
not 1nat1'tuted b7 one nation but 'bJ" most nat1cma ._ . 
mutual 1m1ta.t1on. 2 
Aaong the •xamplea which suarez at••• to deaoe•trate
the existence of the 
'Jl! snt1w 
are inst itutions whieh 
perta11'1 to the law of the state ( euch ae preaor1pt1oa) 
and 1nat1tut1one which pertain to intercourse between 
nations • the Jal Wtr gq.tet ( sueh as the :r-1P,t 'to wap 
a �uat war) . 1  Aqainaa had paid attention ODlF to tba 
tormer tn• ·an4 had no conoeptioa or a Ju iaitt IUi!l 
because he was thinkiQ 1n terme o-r the Holy Romaa ZII.PiM• 
l. Dt k!db»•• a ,  19 , 2.
2. na:A- ,  2 ,  19 , a.
3. D&Q:. ,  e ,  l9 t e.
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B7 the seventeenth centur.y the Emplre was no lODge� the 
universal institution it had been. The era of the
national state had arrived. Suarez 1a one o� the firat
to recop.ize this second t7P8 at 
,. nmts 
and even to
attribute to 1 t a closer relationebip with natural law
than the for.mer tlP•• 
"C ommunt t1ee have need. of ecme qetem ot law whenbJ' 
th87 m&7 be directed and px-ope:t-17 or4e:r-e4 with Hpr4
to this kind at lnte�coaree and aaaoc1at1Gn. • • • •  
1101' 3\tat as 1n one state OJ' prOY1Jlce law ia in,roduced 
b7 cnuatcm, ao aaoaa the hwun race ae a whole 1t wae
poea1ble 'tor lna to be introduced b� the habitual
co�t or natlona. Thie wae more teae1ble bee ... e 
the matten found within the law in queetlon � 'f•,
'Yfl!7 eleael.J' related to natural law and 1110at uaUV 
deduced therei!om in a. ma.nner eo adTant.apoua 81'14 •• 
in harmoi)J' w1 th nature 1 taelf' that while thla &IP1T•t-
1on DUQT not be eelt-evident • that ie , .not eeautt.u,­
and abeolutel7 required 'tor moral. rect itude , it 1• 
DeYertheleea quite in accord with nat� , and UA1.­
e.eal� aoceptable �or ita own aake. " 
On the other haad., the tint tJPe ot 
&u aula 
embodied precepts wbieh did not. ha.. tor their �ediat• 
end the barmoa1oue t'ellowahip at utiou 'bllt ,_. 41Hete4 
t o  the internal oraanlsat1on or etatea. Bever�l•••• 
a.,-s suares1 
1. 
flft,hq are or such a nature that, 1n the poaaeeeS.oa
at atm11er uaagee or lawa, almoat all u.t1c:aae •pe• 
with one another; or at least the7 resemble one 
another , at times 1n e. generic manner, and at timea
spee1'f1eall.7, so to apeak. " 
It ia clear that this type or 
iup gept1»m 
1a in no
way founded upon eomethina which has alwqa ex1e-ted.
It is the product of historical deTelopment and muat be
eeen in this light. And pt Suarez asserts that, once 
these cuatome are eatabl1ahed, natural law would seem to
incline to their recogniti on as bene�1t1ng the exietinl 
state of mankind. But this doea not 1mpJ.7 fUll' perraan-
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ence 1 �or circumatancee lllsht change and a new l'U.le de'f'el­
op. !for doea this 1awl7 m9n6 rectitude 1n the ppeo.pte
2 of the 
iue. ant�J.p. 
The one qual1f'1cat1on ie that 
the !!!1. ·1uer ge:g.tts is more pel'Jil&nent in that 1 t reQUlree
3 the ·eonaent of uarl7 all nations bef'ore 1 t ean be cbaft8e4. 
J.. 
B. 
3. 
� ttslJ?u, 
a .  19 , 10. 'fake the caae . or ooatnot. i ta 
pneral aspect 1 t 1a an t.net1 tv.tla 'Wblch ia
round. 1n the leaal e7eteme o't moet u•lOM, but it 
41ttera in ao 'tar aa 1 ta florm or detail ie oonoene4
in these nations. 
1)14. ,  2 ,  ao, '7. Suarez ment1one aa an exaple ot
a oOBaon ouetom the to�era'tioa ot pi"'atituwe. 
1)1§. 
, 2, so, s. The 1nat1 tution o:r the 
tat war 
mq 
g1 
.,.. ...,. to a ccmp\1lao1'7 e7at• ot 
u-bi 
ua:t1oD.
Barela Tx-ellea, Pi c& t.  , PP• 4'70-4'71.
7'1 
Suarez • e approach would eeem to ow1ate the problea
whieh disturbed the minds of earli�r wr1tere , namel71
the growth and development of soe1et7. By re3eet1ag 
the distinction between a prima17 and a eeconda17 natural 
law, an 1nd1v1dual and a aoeial natural law, a natllPill 
law baeed on inclinat ion and a natural law baeed on
, .  
1ntr1eate deduction, he hae paved the ••7 �or an approaoh
t 0 the natural la1f and the ue . gen�ilD which preeenea
their autonomoue eharaot.erietica. Based on cuatom
and ut111t7, the iua R!DtiYI has no longer an abaolute 
character : it is the produet of hietor1cal d .. el�at ,
even though it 1a tl"'tle to say that looked at :tram the
point of 'Yin of · ite uaetulneea to a present state at
a�iet7 1 t ia apprOYed b)t the na\'t1H.l law. 
III 
There remaina one :ru-ther 1eaue to diaeuaa.
doea apeak ott natural law •• be1na ehanse4 lq the .lU 
••nt1• 11'1 80 'tar ae the 
we ant1]p t.Qrod:o.cee • ·� 
1 
in the n"b3ec..,..tter of the nat\U'fll l•• 
The context ot thie aeserti �n 1a his d1ecuea1on ot
coumon ownerehip and l.ibert7. Aqulnaa had ottered the 
opinion that ala'Ye1'7 ( and  private prOpert,-) was a bene­
tieent inat1tut1on which had a sem1-per.manent atatua. 
In one article, �or example, be had eaid:
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"Considered abeolutel;r the 'tact 'that thia putinlu
man ahould be a alave rather than another. m.an 1a
,_.ed, not on natural Haa�n1 but on eome reaul tat
utilit7, 1n that it is uee� tor thte man to be
l"Uled 'bJ' a wiser man, and. the lattep to be help•« 
by the f'ormer. l'Jbel"ef'ore alaVe%7, which belongs 
to the law � aatione , 1a natural. in the aeecm4 ,.,., 
but not 1n the tiret. ul
suarez , o� couree , drawe the line between what la �
and what ia natural.. Aceord1ngJ.7, 1t might have boa 
expected that he would expla1!1 al.ave17 on the 8lt1IJ14 that 
1 t waa .. rel7 a uee'tul custom which need not .neceeaa.rUV 
be �t itled b7 recouree to reaeon which Aqulnaa attriwtea 
to it. Bowenr, he eeema to approach the probl• 1n a
41t1'erent ...,. .. 
It wUl b• reealled that he mentioned a peNS.a•l'M 
or ooaeeaa1ft :toN or the natural law. · e�n owner�p 
. and llbe:n,., he IIQ'a, must be understood •• paPt ot the
ll•fl 
!:lt q. 57, art. 3 ad 2.
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natural. law in thie way. 
'", 1th respect to these th1np-- the natval law lqa 
down no precept en�oining that the7 ahould remain 
in tbie etate , rather doee it leave the mat'ter to 
the management at men, such �nt to aooord 
w1 th the demands or reason. " 
It 1a thus perm1aa1ble , he aqa, for •n to tntroduo•
rulea and 1net1 tutione ot· their own malting to replatta 
the exeroiae ot those thi:nge which natu:ral law p..S.ta. 1 
It seems to ue that Suarez le here makiq a cUetlnet-
. ' 2 ion between :u.tural law and na't't.U'&l right•� Il\d.eed in ,  
the V'el"J' open1q ot hie d1ecuaeion of the ,,, ansa.. 
he maltes a diat1nction between b• »SUI and &»• iiU:U. 
The tol"Dler he points out hae to 4o with a raoult7 or 
3 right ot doi.Dg acaething. It is not un1.1l. he tacea
t he  libertJ' and couaon O'Wl'ler�hip Qlleatlone that he HYer'\a 
1. D! Ltlilty· s, loft, 6. 
See R_..n, � lfa\JJi:!l X.., if ihe B•WilMt' bd!ft 
24 lfotre � a.,..r P• 480 a PP• 483 et ••fl ( 1948-� J • 
Gierka, . E9Jf'Hf. Theor1t• Jf th! 114Gt Aal• PP• e1-a
( c IUil'brld.p, 9 • . 
' uae·� 
e,  1'1, 2.
!ue n 1nurct. s1gn1fteat moralem tacul:tat•
ad r.m al.iquam, .el in re ,  a1T• ait vel"llll �,
•in allqua partie1pe.t1o ·�u• • quod eat. prOpr1•
ob�eetUJil 3Ut1 tlae. rt 
to this Mstinction. The natural law or dOJd-Dt.on, he 
sqe ,  hae conferred on man the power onr hie llbert7, 
but in ao far a& man thereby has a claim to the en3o7-
ment of" something, nothing ia aaid ot the oonditione
1 under which the right .may be exercised. !he natva.l 
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law or d(Bin1on ia dit:terent to preoept1ve natural 1••
e ontinuee Suarez , 1n that "it cona1sts ot a aenain �aet, 
that 1 e ,  a certai.J'.l condition or habitual relation ot 
things • .,a such a oondi t1 ':)n lld.ght cha!Jp, as dla"inot · 
tram the precept a ot the nature t which may n..,.er ch.a.qe. 
Natural law protected eoomon �erahip nile propert,' 
wae he�d in ccaaon. When prOpert,- wae divided the 1111 
pp.turaJ,t g."tJ.e 
wae to that extent modified. Aa tv aa
slaver7 waa ooncerned, thia waa not even an 1natitut1on 
o-r the 
1M UP:\l!a 
' 1 t was merelJ' a part ot poa1 tift 
penal law. Ccm.aequ•ntl7, libert� wae at1ll poait1ftll' 
part or the natural law. s 
1. 
a. 
3. 
Sua.HB 11aea the WOPd iiJ. here 1nterohll1)8e&blJ' Wl th
f:u:ql!ae and 1et1sa.
pe Lls1�a, 
2; 14; 16 , 17, lB. 
lhl4L, s .  18 , 9. It ia clear that suarez 1e *Yerael'O&itributing to alaTel'J' the statue o-r a Ullinnal
aute& 
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The fundamental poe 1 tion 1 a  that the 
a.us antilg 
may detract �rom the plenitude resident in natural rights.
Perhaps we could say that SW�t.rez wae on the brink of
recognizing the whole qa.eat1on Of' natural rtpts and
their dependence on an ordered a7etem of relat1onah1pe 
( e. g  .. reatr1ct1on o't l1bertr a£ on� 1n the 1nte"*"• ot 
all} . Thia would naturall7 lead on to the queetion at 
natural rights and poe1tive righta. 
ltoweYer, he apealt-e of natttral riahte onl7 in the
context ot 11'bert7 and p:roperi7. 1 Could 1t not be ea14
that natval r:lahta are aleo existent aa f'ar aa the 
othel" preeepte of the natural law are concerned f I:t
natural law forbids JIJ'lU'IIder, ought not we to Ncolft1•• 
a x-1gbt to l1:te t In one part o� hie work, �•• aaite
that preecript1on and concesa1on are Nlatea. Bat he
doee lllO\ car�7 tbie thought to ocaplet10D. It �ed.
we aeeert that other preeepte ot the nat�el law are
connected with �igbts, it would eeem that euch rllbte 
a lao would be eub�eet 'to 1111.1 tat1oa. ltore needa \o 'M
1. Although he hints at a .. ,..11ht to lire•' "Jfam ett• 
natura ded1 t homin1 T1 tam quoad uaua ettta ae
poeaeestoaem''· e ,  14, 18. 
eaid on tbis question : we will take 1 t up again in 
the following chapter. 
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It seems that even if' we do admit the tu.l� catego%7
of' natur:-al rigbte ,  the problem or 'i chanp" or ot circum­
scr•·ptto-,. can be taekled in the eame Wa:a' ae we tackled 
preceptive natural law - on the eoll1e1on or 4nt1••
pattern. In many oaeee there will be no queation ot 
the non-recognition of these r1v.hta. '!'he right to 
lite S.rwu1abl7 euba1 sta. In a rew cases one or other
of theae rS.pta IlK not be applicable in the c1rc'88tano•••
'l'ha telon :I.e depri'Yed af his libef"Q', beoauae the
cCIIIJluni t7 baa the right to be protected f'rom hia aot1ou. 
lD such casea, a dec1a1on has �o be made as to wh1c�
right :te to be aeeo�ed su;per1or1't7• It 1s pree1eel7 
this deoielon which the 
�� S!Pt1um 
and; ult�a�•lr•
poa1 tive la• makee. 
Chapter 4. 
Iue 
and 
Ipati\Ja 
I 
Our anal7s1e or the word "law" 1n the preeedin&:
c haptere haE shown that the phencraenon ot natural 1a, 
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ia accorded a d1t:rerent etatua to the.t · whioh is aoeorded 
the word ''law•• . 1n the cperdz:ta �hapte:r. The natural law,
as •• have seen, may be 4eaor1be4 b7 etatementa which
indicate A 1 te dependence on right reaeon and the nat�
lnel1nat1ons and l the manner in which an individual makee 
a moral �udgement in accordance with it. In the stricter
uae , bewever, it la uaed in re'fer-e»e• to the actual prin­
etplea or pi-eeepta. 
· 
':• 414 po1a:t out tbat the word 611. and the wor4 Ju 
1 were uaed to 4ea18ft*te the Eng11eh word "law•. •QW•
1 t la DeceeaQ7 to aecez.tain whether the word � \1.H4 
1n aaeoelat:lon with the ad.3eet1Ye Mtw!ll! bean the 
eame •an!ng ae does the word 1U. u.eed in aeaoci,atlcm. with
'that a43ect1Te. A curao17 exn:l.nat1on ot the 
IR'I a4 
P, Leg1but reveals that aAUallz the phrase lex U�!U!!J.il 
1 e  employed to designate the natural law, oecaeionallr. 
1. ip na;turale. 
One point 1 a certain. If we accept the interpret-
ation of 1!1 ae indicating merel7 a rule of conduct while 
!it refers to the goodness ot the rule, no such aeparatio� 
c an  exist when these •ords are used in the context o't a 
d1ecuss1�n on natural law t  for that law is bJ deftnit1on 
righteous. 
Is there in this eaee any distinction bet•een t� 
uee of the worde lu. and JJ1D. 1n a d1ecuee1on ot the utval
law? Aquinas oceae1onally emplo,-a the pbl-ase &D• n,Uur!J.,t 
in d1aeuee1ng the R3UU1 oategories �'91 aatwaJte, i91 0At6!11 
But th:l e discussion is to be flOUD.d a
a d:ltterent part or the SJUU to that in wbich the queation
c.t law 1e raieed. I't is to be tOQJld in the d1ecuae1oa:a. of 
1.
1 the vil'tu.e ot Ju,sttoe. 
ln 11-11 Q 57·. rt1ole 1 ad 1, Aqu.iaae .-entur a 
a brief eolenatton or tbe dlnerenee betnen 11l8 ana J.& 
'\!.&"• he 8878 "non est ipsum ta.e, PJ-OPI'ie loqllel'ldo� A 
all(fl&lia "tie luJrta. ft In coaenting &n this li'Qaeag 
and en tb.e eonwd 1n •toh it 1 too4 (in a 4ieouee1en 
O't lll•tto•) SUHa "'a to that Aqu!Jaae. besldee u&q 
tht woftl D.& in he 'Wi4e sese no'hcl abo.,.• as meanirJs 
what 1a pod�, uats the ..-ct. ill a narrow aeu:e an4 WlAe­
eta:nde 1t w be eqtd:faltnt te a l•l!l Eisa! ott tuqlg 
{IIJilM ftmllt.aua>• 
2 Bu.' ae sees tufthD \baa AfllllM•· 
The :aoma.n a'l a-tee 1M MtUJ!lt. &us aatig, &Mt c·l!lle 
oan, b _,,.. be oonatwe4 1n e1the» "l•sal" <UJ.t) 
•• a "tlae• (Dll.e) •- s e1ther tNa •h• potn." or •s..w 
or ••t they Pft&Oribe� oJt t'rom the :point ct1 T18Y of 
th• ... osa. ea�otment o� tbetr 8\tb� • .._,._.. ae 
woM .&u. •• Ct4 'ill \b.e latwr &en��• baa "'enno• ,, 
1. 
1 
the 
ftcgltag 
o� the user. The question Which presents 
1 tself' 1e this. Ie Aquina.e thinking ot .bl in the wq
that Suarez asserte that he 1st
In the opening chapter ot hie discuseion ot !ga and
!Jtt11!! 
AoutDae poeee the question "Ia 1Ya the ob�ect of' 
3uat1ee'" He replies ln the rollowing � :
"It 11 proper to �ustioe aa compared with the other 
virtue a to direct man 1n his relations w1 th otrbeH, ·
because 1 t denotes a k1n0 of equ&l1 t7, as 1 te Yfll!'6 
name 1m.pl.1eaJ indeed •• are wo.n:\ to aq that th1aga
are e.�uated when thq are made equal, ror JJQ\l8l.lt7 
retera to another. AccordlnglJ that whloh la •llbt 
1a t!ua wo:rks of: t.be other virtues and to whie the 
intention o't the Tlrtue tends to as 1 \a proper o!IJ•ct, 
depellda on ita relation to the agent O!ll7J wbe"*• 
'the PitJht. in a work ot �ust1ce beaidea ita Nl.atl• 
to the agent is Pet 'b7 1 ta relation t.o othere.. Por
a ean' a work 1a eaid to be �net when 1 t 1a relate4 
to some other bf wq or aome equalit,., tt# s.u•me•, 
the p.,._eat at a wage dona tor a ••�lee reade� 
. A.n4 ao a thiDa is ea1tl to b• �ut as havina the reot-
1tude or �u•t1oe when 1t 1s the term o'f an .. t � 
�uetioe. without taking into account th• ...,. in which 
· 1t ie · done b7 the ap:nt , whereaa ln the other Yir-lue
D.Othinc ta 4eela:red to be ript tmleee 11: 1• done 
1Jl a oert.ala W8.J 'b7 the qtlll't. ?or tM.• Naaoa
�attoe bae its own praper ob�eet OYer BD4 ·�
the other vtriuea and th1a object 11. ea:u.a \be ; au' 
( tu•t•) W)d.eh la the same aa JJ&I. • 
Thte part1fl\1l;u art1ele ep1 tCllll zea Aqut.ue' •1n o� a
1. Di4- ,  a, 1,, 12.
s. .1:::%- ll•ll' q. 67 art. 1.
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particular virtue which is pr1mar117 an inte,...1nd1v1dual 
one. However 1 t requires elucidati�n. In particular, 
it is neces sary to see in •hat way Suares considers that 
juetice has as ita ob�ect a f,agultag ,tor it doea not 
aeem that Aquinae hae thie in mind. 
In the �1ret place , Aquinas draws 011r . attention to
two aspects o� the virtue o� �ustioe 1 Relat1on&bip with
l othere £ Equalit7. He ia thinking o� the contex' otI . 
action or aba�ent1on tram action which artecta eame other 
person. The example which he cites ia what we know to-
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day aa a contract of aerYlce ; the perto�e of an
action b7 one part,- to this contraet enTieagea perf'onaano• 
It 18 1n thie aenae 
that. Aqu1nas suggeEta that the relationship 11 ODB ot
equal1 V• It one part7 faile to tulf'il hie obl1pt1cm 
we wou.ld aq that 1nequal1t7 exist•• and that there waa 
need or reet1�1cat1oD. Bo�perfor.manoe or the actl.a 
1••••• the c.ther pel-eon. uneatiatied. 2
· , 
1. :Lachu.ce , 
IP•·· ei!• 1 PP• 209-210. On the 
c�t Of 
alter1tae eee 
Del Vecchio, iUili!l• PP• 
n-a� (lMa). 
2. ct. :Da'bllt,
DIAAit Clln!rtle du 
4J'91"' -.sao (191&) . 
Doee th1e state 8Qggeet that one party 1a eDt1tle4
to require the other to pertor.m that action� 1n order 
that the balance may be re-establiehed? In 11-11 Q 58 
article l , Aqutnaa mentions another w� in which �uat1t• 
ma.7 be viewed. Juat1oe, he 88J'e, mq be :repl'de4 ae 
the �rpetual. will· to render to each hie own.
'!£1b1J£t 0!11 qutsme 
1e a pbpaee whieh we tind in1
It 1a 
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o'f'ten ueed in con3unot1on with the phrase na1DR, l!I.Qin. 
Aquinas 1s looking at th• poet t1Te . aepect o� the nnu
ot �uetioe. iiYt to a person What belonca to � 
The eQbae1e 1e on the "dut7" 1 or should we � ,  t!Ma 
"active• �eature of tbe situation 1D wbieh a relationehip 
between pereone exiete. 801lle £!1PQDI• i e  requ1re4 on
the part o-r the person who ie under an o'b11pt1011 vlelal 
out ot thia e1tua't1oa. Althou;h it 1• tru that AquiaQ 
oone•ntrat•e Gn the "4utl'" aapeot nther than the •rtata.'" 
aapctot. hie U•euea:lon Smpliee that the nrt•• ot ,._,te• 
dltrer• tram �h• other virtue•· J'or ie there JJ.Ot a. ......,. 
. 1 
to be temperate, courattaoue and pn4ent'
1. ot. Pieper, 2Ra cit• , pp. u-ae.
HoweTer, some modern cc.anenta'tore euggeat tbat
Aquinas does not enunciate anything which relates to 
8 9
the • modern' notion or J:!!!. ( in the subjeot1ve sense at
the term) . 1 In our opinion this 1s onl7 a halt-tl'Uth. 
The dut)' wh1eh attache s to the virtue at �uet!ee 41ttera
from the dut.iea wh1eh attach to the other ,.irtuea. Jlo:P
the notion or 
lt!J.S 
ie lacking in the otber vi:tt uee. The 
dut7 whieh attaches to 3Uat1ce ex1ate pree1ael7 because
a person baa a r1R}lt or tacultJ' which at-lees tram the
e ituatlon which existe between the parties. The 
B1B 
ot 3ust1oe refers t, tbat sphere or aot ivit,- to wh1oh a
person ie ent itled, whether it be the ro1ght to be proteot­
ed tram actlona on the part ot the other peraon1 or the
right to nqulre that otber parson to perform an aet.loa. 
In oerta:ln pueage• .or t� I!W! AO,'il1Dae Nf'ere to
In 11•11 q. 79 art1ele 1 he
a peaks ot a pereon 
l!il'b�!•M.u the equll \J' ()t 3atloe 
b7 reMerina to aaother hie due and RESitl"!iBI the 
ext at tng qual.1 t7 b7 l"ei'ratnini h-ccn ln�ing hi a •J.P'-ov• 
Par IIlaH impot-tut ie bia CCIII;pariaon Of the lepl 4U
l. D � !:nt:reYea , t Law and II orals t 
RQQ!iWI!D Sty&•l• Vol. S 1
23& at 243 ( 1949).  
and the moral due. The dut7 or 3uetiee creates a legal 
due. There is an obligation, 'for ex�le, to p� a 
debt which has been oontraeted. But the duties of grat-
1 tude and benevolence ( to which A�1nae re:ters as the 
"t'irtuee annexed to juetice) tall short o� the legal due. 
One !l!l speak of a "right to benevoJ.ence" w1 thou't think­
ing or &n1 queet!on or ento�eement attaching to thie 
r1ght. 1 
While Aquine• hue in the main concentrated on the 
dut7 aepeet ot just1ce t Suarez bp!nge into l"eliet' the
notion o't 
Dlllb 
the f'acult7 or :right wh1eh the individual
has o'f reau1r1ng the duty to be perorormed. To thia
extent he has brought into relie� the characte�i•t1e mark 
ot 3usttee whieh eeparatee 1 t trom the other virtues.
or c�ce ,  one can imagine a '"dut,- moralitr' where righta 
are not recop.lsed., ror example, where the dut7 1s owet 
to a del t7, even though 1nd1Y1duala 11187 baneti t rram 'the
pel":tormanee or the dtt ;r .. But the dist1nct 1ft muk or 
---------------
l.
.J:t, 
11-11 
t 
q. ao art. 1. · · ()t"eou.rae 1t 
mq be ob3ected that entonement and 
!'ight do not go hand 1n hand. · We oan apeak o.t a 
"bare" right. But eT1dently Aquinae bae in mind
the 
RQ11ib16llf 
or entoreemant.
a "right-duty moral1t7" 1a the recognition or the clat. 
or the individual as such.
II 
9.1 
Ir 1 t 1e aceepted that there 1a a part1c1llar T1P'tue
which ie ct)n<:erned with the �fequ.al1zat1on'* of' a relat1-.. 
ehip between pereons and •h1eh operates throuBh the 
impoa1t1on .of duties and the confer-ment or right• the
further question 1e SU@'.aest.ed 1 what aroe the cr1 terle. tor
dete�1n1ng these rlghta and dutiee?
Aqmtnaa makes a 41et1nct1on between a coamntati.a 
and a distributive �uetlee. C ommutative 3uet1oe, he
s 9.7e ,  ia the �atiee which ie concerned with the mattal 
l 
4eal1qe b•t,ween two persona , while dlatr1but1Te �ue'&loe 
:l a  a rela't1oaahip between the caaunit7 and pri't'aW per­
sona and ta concem.ed with the ,.41et.ribu.tion ot ooaoa
goode proportionately••. 2 He- goes on to eQ' that ec.ad­
atlve 3uat:loe la based on an arit�tical ra\io while 
I diatributiTe �uat1.oe 1e baeed on a pometrieal ratio. 
1.
e-T, 
11-11, q. 61 art. 1.
2.
lb1z4. 
3.
l'bld, 
1 art. 2.
Bet�re we enquire into the Yalid1 t7 ot thia 41et1DC� 
ion between the two ttpee at �uatice, it 1s neceea1U7
to clarify the meaning at " a:r.-1t.bmetical'' and ''geometrical'* 
in thi a context. Properl7 understood, the " ar1tbaet1cal"
ratio or commutative 3uat1ce in Aquinas' work 1e t1e4
to a eonception ot equality between two indivlduala 
who f'1nd themeelvee in a relat1onah1p w1 th one anothe•• .
The". are two per eons , let ua a a,-, X and Y. The7 milbt 
participate in varioua traneaotiona. Y b�e an ..title 
f'rom x. Y owes somethins wh1oh ie equi:Yalent 1n yal.• 
to the aub�ect-matter of' the purchase. Y m1gh\ M a 
poor man and might not haTe the money to pay for the 
article.. . Such a ci:t-eulnstance 1e 1rrelev81'1t . to the •�aht­
dut7 relat1oneh1p which has been create4, v1e.M t'rclr4 · 
the point or 'Yiew cTl cc:aumtat1ve �tic• ( al.thcNih 1't 1a . 
relwaat rrom the point of T1ew of d1atribu.t1� #U'1oe). 
In thie case tbe Hlationeh1p which u1ate 1e \altea at• 
1 ita f'ace value. 
On the other hand the acholaat1c co.noept of dla:tri,_ 
utlve 3uat1ce look• to the context ot the 1D4i'Y1dua1-ta-
--------------·- -
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. oc1 t7. X le a un who he.� aePYed the a tate 1n maey 
o paottt•a, Y -pe:recm who hee ren4el'ecl no pablio aeft"tce 
a' all. ln a . l'dbt.g hon0t111s to 1ta o1t1zen , the state 
ought to "Prd X as havina a npericr olalm.. In this 
oaee, the bas to �• �· Which ;lut1f1•·• Q1Ueeat1� 
treatment ls 'the mft'tt o't Y. 
Br1etlJ', this 1 •h• attitude which Aqa�a ha taken 
tn .. ..,. �o the 41st1notton between oemmutat1.e and 
41et .. 1but1Ye �nie•• 110_..,., ._-. u• or th ph;pea s 
"ao1PJUtat1on" an4 •diat7tbu.tton" sugse t that tile coat xt 
ot �etiot t.e a nal'I'Ow on•• Imteecl. in &ome pl oe . , 
Aqat.aas W0\:114 MlD 1o �teatPSot �etioe tq the &PbePO o'l 
•S·•1a� tnt· eats wltb. �tnse n4 . lltqs and ;ven1tu1-
1oa tb• aPhere or oommutattve 3Qattoe,and 4iatrtbutton or 
b•nettt• the •*•• •� 41at»11ntttve �niee.1 How"e 
1a a lata al'\tol,•, th1e a. t-l'Ow intevpJ-etatton .la r �toted. 
� " " r4 #Q.etloe e�el to 'b.• whole IPh .. ot ••• 
.,ao\a an« obleo•• s -.�at.naa (Jteele»at1on) p.ex-aoaa (XB�tea) 
wfte (ltallou). 2 
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If we accept thi� wider 1nte�retat1oa1 the w� 1a 
open for a more penetrating anal7sle of the virtue ot 
�uatiee. In eo far ae the ari tbmetical mean 1e emphas-
96 
1£ed . t �  that extent our attention i e  drawn to squal1t(. 
In eo far as the geometrical mean ie emphasized, our 
attention 1a directed to met&t· fheae two qualltle• allow 
one to judge the situat ion in which the intereata ot 
1nd1T1duala are 1n1rolYed, and accordingly to h8J.'I:Il'l041se 
And lndeed, ae Bl"\'lnner poin"• out , there 1a no 
cleal"-Cut s"pat'at1on of the two t�pea � �t1oe. Both . 1 apply to the sphere of private and eaamunal relat1� 
For 1natance , the priee to be pa1d for the purchase o� a 
particular article can be affected b:r :.ther 1ntenata 
bee idee thoee of the parties to the co.nt�aet. 2 to the 
extent to which A�ulnas meant to 1toloete one t'r<aa the 
other - the pr1T&te hom the eOIIIDUI'l81 - to auoh a •xteat 
'for indeed ean we ner iaolat• a .-..l7· 
1 nd1v1dual relationahip? B7 th1a X aean & oaa we take 
t•o 1n4i'V'id:Gala and make a moral �udpttnt on their relatloaa 
1. 
. D. 
�runner, QP• ci$• , 31. 
A eyetem or pPlce control 1nterterea w1 th the contnct­
ual arrangements of two 1nd1v1duala. 
with one another without taking into account their poait-
i on in and dependence on soeiet7. Vie .might sq "All 
men are eq11al and ehould be treated equall.J'" but this 
does hide the other aspect : equality 1s not aoh1eTe4 b.r 
treating all men in the same we:,. 
'r'hen 1t 1a asked "1!2!. shall men be treated" ! and 
"r.bat rights and dutlee do thq han" ?  1 t is at this 
stage that the eoncept of' the ill• nat:gra].e ia S.D"'''ke4. 
It 1e only 1f' "e invoke the concept of the &'YI M\RW 
that we can go some way at least towarcls 1nd1eating the 
bae lo rishte and dutiea of' men. It will be �ecalled 
that the Sehoolmen considered that a atr1Ying for 3ust1oe 
waa one o'f the basic 1ncl1nat1one of man. 1 In f'ac'ti, 
it wae a more d1gn1:t1ed inclinat ion than othere beoauee 
1 t vrae the property pal" excellence ot man aa a rational 
being. In another wq 1 t c ould be deurl'bed aa tbe 
eooial T1rtue the purpose of which was to allooate to 
1ndiY1dttala a ephere of aton.CIQJ 1n their peJ-eoaal aotS.ona 
which wae x-equired tor the proper �1oa1aa o:t eoelal. 
. . 
relations. The tnvooat1on of a Dfi!r!l eqqalitF 1• an 
. 1. Supra, Ch. a, "'- �.1. 
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indiepensable prerequisite for the �ecosn1t1on ot a 
relati onship of equal1t7 between human belnse• Re1pec' 
for the human being as such ia the vi tal concern of 
the tue ne.tur!Yr•· 
Recourse to a doctrine ot natural eq�it7 a� 
c ourse takes us �her than the poe1t1on at whloh we 
arr1 Ted above. It equal1t7 i s  �ne ot the charaoter1et1e 
marke of �uatiee it ie a further atep to zay that equal• 
i ty eonaiete in Mcog.biz1� $ll&.1 or �he.� tJPe Of P1P,t. 
It ie clear that AqUinas doee take this further step. 1 
'l'be · natural law torb:f.d.s , tor example , mlD'der- and '-hen 
because moc1al relations can onl7 be properl.J' ma:l.nta1.De4 
- it it 1e recognized that 1nd1T1dualt1 because or theb 
n�ture , are to be p�otected as tar a� their p•rsona aDd 
property are eonoerne4. 2 
l. J::L u-u, q. 64 e't seq. 
F or a coats-aey lnterpretat 1� see Oh. Pe"J•n• 
e l.l i»ttiQI, {Bruaaela, l94J,Y. Perelman.· 41.t1qulau• 
iween the :rormal notion or �uet1oe an4 S.ta ooao� 
mantf'eatatione. \'he ttormal Mt1oa of �utlH, u 
aqs ,. can be def'1ne4 ae treating the ...,.._ at a 
detemine4· oategoJ.T 1n tlle eeme HF• The allocation 
ot members to one eatesol'7 or u.ou.r 1• the work 
or ""norete :tuat1ce, whieh 1• dependent on the yaJ.u• 
tmpl1c1t 1n the qetem 1n which the allooatla 1• 
11184e. 
see also Berlin, 
i9M+t tz1 
Vol. 66 hoceedinas ot 
the Ar1atotel1an oo1e 7 \ 1966) p. !Ol. 
One may ob�eot that a societ7 can be lm.atdntd 
where people are treated equally but where a baeic or 
tundamental right is denied ( e.  O:fstem :ror instance 
where no liberty is permitted) ,. 
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this is that a -.retem wbich contained sueh a practice 
would involve a complete traTeat7 o-r aoe1e.l relatione. 
Indee<t v1e ·woul.d wan� · tt> · sa� of, 1 t that 1 t wae eub-buman. 
Although there m� not be a logical connection between 
the eon�ept at equalit7 and the concept of natural 
equali t7 , thex-e ie a very real moral connection. 
It ie diffleult , at' f'irst eight,  to see how the 
me�it aspeet f'1t s into a doctrine �f !S§ D@tB£fle• 
' 
AOllinas' opening article on the c ontent of d1str1bu.'\lft 
3uetice deale with the Y1olat1on of that tJPe ot �t1oe 
bt impartiality in the con:terment or honoura OJ" bene:rs-.a 
(f'O!' instance where aert9Ml :te.vour ie mown to one 01' 
ot�r . of the parttea) . 1  And ,-et in hie 41•ouaa1oa 
O't· the content of oOQinutatiTe juetice he em•ial¥ ' 
t'"eeognizea that there ia no a'beolute right a la�tl• 
would be created if the wrangdoeJJ were treated .la 'the 
l. See B-T; 11-ll , q. 6:.3 arte. 1-f.. 
same W&)" as the innocent person. 1 
The concept or merit ia 1n etrect not foreign to 
the · 1·ue pa't;yp�ll• For a person 1Fho hae abused hil 
rights hae plaoed himaelt in a pos1t1on where prtmf 
1-:e&1e he deeeme · ll.eea respect than one who baa behan4 
. 
· .· 
rishtl7. As ncb, ·a natural. riaht cannot be eoz.uJ14aM4 
absolute ln thtt sense that eve17one must be treated 1ft 
the same Wfrl and at all times J 11bert;r and prope..,. 
may be lost 1>7 a man who doea not deeel'Te to retalrl 
t o  the full. extent the :ripte which are com.onl.7 aoool'4e4 
to eveey human being. 
III 
Following Aristotle , Aquinae discueeee a s"OD.4 
.. 
type o'f jutioe, 'W'l.iversal �utice, which is N8v4e4 
as " the queen ot all the v1rtuee" in eo ta.r aa it �ote 
all moral acta to the .scgmmon S,g9Q.. Let ua loc* at the 
article 1n whieh Aquinas epe&ka ot �91t&Sil �!lllllll* 
"Juat1o•, ae etated above, directe man la hi• 
relations w1 th othe� men. 11ow th1• _, .  � 
in two W8J'8 : til"st ae relfllPdS hie relattcaa wlth 
1nd1vi4uale ,  eecondly as regarde h1• relatione 
1. In 11-il, q. 64 art. 2, he reeognlsee the r1pt tit 
�api'tal puni ahment. 
with others 1n general , 1n eo -rar as a man who ael"'t'ee 
a communi\7 aervee all those who are included in that 
COD'.I111lni t,-• • • •  Now 1 t is eT1dent that all who are 
included in a community stand in relation to tha1; 
comnru.ni ty ae parts to a whole. A part as euch 
belongs to the whole. Therefore whatever 1e the 
good o� a .  part can be directed to the good or tM 
whole. It :tollowa that the gOod o� 07 vinue 
whether au:·  vutue direct man in :relat1oa to h1 .... 
eelt, or in relation to certain other 1nd1Yt.cblala 
is reterable . to the cammon goOd, tt which 3Qatloe . 
d1recta • • • •  It la in this senae that 3uat1ee 1e calle4 
a general virtue. And sinee it belong• to ln to 
direct to the · common good• it tollGws that the �tie• 
whieh 111!1 in this way st,-led general ie called .l!!ol 
3uat.ice, because thereby man 1e in harmolq' wi� 
l1n! which d1Ncts the aete ot all the Titwtuee to the 
c omm.on good. ••1 
In analysing thie paaeage ,  it 1e necesear,J to note that 
Aqu1na.e speaks of �uetice in its universal aspect ae 
including the acta of the moral virtues (prudence, tol"t1 t-· 
Ude, temperance and particular justice) . It 1a 1n 
this sense that he usee the woJ:'Cl "universal'' • Rowe"•• 
thie is not what he cona1det-s to be the more ialpo�\ 
teatlJI'fe. The s.portant feature ie that it le d!.Hetd 
to a plural1t7 o't pereone conetitu,ina a c0illll\Ulit7• %.a 
thia aenee, 1t directs or orientate• JllOJHll v1rtMa to 
other people. 2 
1. s-T, 11-11 , q. 59 art. 5. 
a. n,a. . an. 6. 
If' we turn to that seet1on 1n the ��b"91 in wh:lch 
Aristotle dlseueees thte type of: �etice , it 1a easy to 
see wby eo Dl'lch importance ia attached to it. A man, 
saya Aristotle , � be courageous or temperate without 
l taking into account other people. Now Aristotle 
lOl 
thought that senice to the rr:/, r was one o't the highest 
acts which the individual could perfo� C onsequentl.J', 
an act ot courage offered up fo� the cammunit7 was more 
laudable than an act of' courage performed by the 1nd1Y-
1dual in his ow.n interest. 2 
But he goes further than thi s. He regards the 
z 
e ivil leg1alator ae the eervant o� general justice. In 
th1e way Arist otle usee the word •tlegal" 1nterchangeablJ' 
w1 th the woPd 1tun1Yersal" . Seeing that the voro' are 
enacted f'or the common good; universal justice ehcml4 
be the •lrtue par excellence o� the legislate� who 1a 
concerned with directing all the virtues to the ea.mon 
aood. I� 1a the virtue ot the citizen or nb�eet in a 
l.. 1'11fb.9m19l!•!!D EthAst§ ( Rackham Ed. , ) V ,  i ,  · 11. 
*· {bid. , v t 1 ,  17�18. 
3. Ieid. t v, 1 ,  13-14 �d v, 11 , 3. 
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subordinate way 1n that he obe:ya the law and in ao doina 
1 
fits h�self for ruture governing. 
In the Synpa ,  this assoe iation of .,general" and 
�legal� 1 s  rollowed in almost complete fors. Universal 
�ustice ie the juatice par excellence which direeta the 
conduct or the citizen to the common good. It is legal 
in so �ar as it ie the task or the legislator to work tor 
the common good. 2 It is in the leg1elator pr1ncipall7', 
I 
in the eub3ect in an administrative or gubordinate -.,. 
It is our task to determine whether Aquinas real.l7 app...,.a 
or this association, or 1s mereJ.7 remaining loyal to the 
language of the Ethics of Aristotle. 
This query ie suggested b7 the follOWing retlecti� 
We can, it mtt7 be aaid, evaluate t.he relationeh1p of a 
n'UIIlber O't 1ndi'Y1dU.�e in a eommun1t7. Clearl,J, one 
1ndlT1dual mq p�actise the 'V:lrtuea without reguct tor 
1. PQJ:J.tJSit ( Raekham Ed. ) ,  111, 11,  6-U. 
2. s-!, ll-11, Q. 58 art. 6. 
-
�03 
othe�e. It 1 m ,  however , mot-e laudable it a person "hae 
others at heartft , that is to ee.7 •  if' he sees his moral 
life ae artect1ng the lives of others . ae being involyed 
in their lives. Ari stotle euggeets that this is moet 
tmportant for eu( h a lite would place moralit7 in a " eooial 
setttng". But in Aristotle ' s aind the aett1ng ie not 
any t7pe o� eommunit7 but a particular �JPe of eomman1i7• 
the c 1vie community. From thie,  it is a short step to 
••ring that general �uatice is the virtue which bef1tl 
the legislator in that it i s  hie task to guide the deat tnles 
of the c1t1�ens. 
It doee seem strantte that Aquinae should incorporat• 
this view into hi s treatise on �uatice , despite his 
strong attachment to A�istotle ' s language on this qaeatioa. 
For indeed there is a distinction between &�ins tha\ A 
aeraJD should orientate hi s moral life in •uch a war 
that he takes into aec ':>unt the needs ot o'thera and aqi.q 
that the .Qtat� has t�e task of doing ��t that. One 
might have expected Aquinas , the Christian, to haYe recoa­
nised thia diat1nc t1on in comment ing on th1e part ot 
AP1et otle' e Ethiea. For is not man a mMber o't more tha 
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one communi t7? l la he not more than a citizen? 
In our opinion the uee ot the phrase "legal 3uatice" 
can lead to much eontueion. In the sense in which we 
interpret Aqutnae• thought the •ord "charit�H 1 e  a bett•r 
wo1'4 to denote the moral 1'1riue which rocueee all the 
othel' virtues in the light. ot "he deaande of other peOple. 
2 
The relationahip whieh it denotes 1e an 1nte�personal one. 
t.'hen we apeak o-r the relationship 'between 1ndiv1duala 1n 
the context of the p�i; tical. cOIIIIBWli t7 we are apeaklq or 
something different : we are aeking a quest ion whioh 
centres on the relaticmahip between clti&•PI ad on the 
task which the legislator hae ot malting laws to Hplate thla 
relat1oneh1p. 3 'rhia ie the Question ot the interaction bet­
ween aora11t.7 and poelt1ve law to whiob we turn in the rolla.. 
1u ehtPttr• 
1. 
2. 
·e-r. 11aonabb , ' St. Thoma.a and Law' , Aguinat Paper 
l'o. a. ( Blaoktr1ara . l.956 } , PP• 1-6. 
o't. Campbell Gamet , Df'!Hf y4 la'brll htY•. Vol. &a Ethiee ( 19&1-11 · • . 
Del vecchlo. aw le -antt.M» •esare Rftl"S.M 
�· Arohivea de phUoaOp=e du 4rOi; 
i , P• 146 at p. 119. 
Por a oonts-e.r,r interpretation e-r. Thca.as• approach to 
legal �uet1oe eee J. Newman, J:!'Jidl'tioU S!1 iM!S.II 
( Oork, 1964) , paaatm, eap. , PP• 97-115. 
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Chapter 5. 
Humap Poeitiye LaJ. 
I. 
In the previous chapter we pointed out in our 41aouae-
1on that Aquinas reaarded "legal" 3uat1ce ae the nrtue 
b7 which the c11"11 ruler governed bia cc.mmit;r. A." thie 
stage we ha•e arr1 Yed at one ot the most iq)ortet teatvea 
ot the Schoollllen• e thoupt ; the relat1oaeb1p 'between 
natural law and poeitive law.. Urlf'ortunateJ.7, the eonhe-
1 on which we noted in Aqulnae • treat.ment ot un1 ver•al �Uet.-
1ce caueea him to overlook thie relationahip to some ext•n� 
He gl14ea � 1f1rtue , the pl'O'Ylrloe ot aollal1t7, t.o leale­
lat1on, the prO'rinee ot po81t1•• law. In thla obQter, 
I propoee to •xplain and elucidate the relationahip wbioh 
the Sohoolaen cOlUiidered to exist betw".n natural law and 
. 1 poa1 t1 ve law. 
1. on this qneetionl see generallJ Messner, op, t&$. ,  PP• 
20'1-212. 
ROIIIDen, 2P• .. ci,. , PP• 247-263. 
We noted that Aquinas speaks or the common good in 
the context of law, and 1t is in order to ask 1 what is 
whic.l. 
lOG 
thatA diat1ngu1ehee political eociet7 from the inter-personal 
relationship in whieh the moral virtue o'f Juat1ce m&7 be 
practised? Ir we turn for a moment to the opening chap-. 
tere of' the J2t L!l! section et the llJI!ma we f'1nd a def'1n-
1tion o'f poa1t1ve law which Aquin.aa seems to put forward 
as a definition ot all law. Law, he eqt , la a nle and 
measure made br a peraon who hae charge of the oammun!t7 
for the eommon good and promulgated. He plaees great 
emphasis on the eoneepta ot auth�i t7 end the eoaaon sooa. 1 
Indeed, if' we eone1der ,A qu1naa' thought aa a 'f'hole 
we f'1nd that the concepte are interwoven. In Q 90 BP't1ele 
3 he speaka o'f the polit ical PUler as the •loenpnt or 
the people ant., ae eu.eh, the Hpreaentat1ve ot their iateren•• 
It. 1a not; hatreTer 1n the SJPDJ but tn the Re hllmtnl 
?P�DO!I9rll that this rapport between polit1eal •--h�1� 
and c�l ia\ereat is :f1rmll' propodd. In that work; 
AQuinae aeeepta the baaic Ar-1atotel1u poa1 t1oa. ·•• 11 
b7 natUPe a social an�al and cheriahea a dee1re to 11.-
l. J:t, 1-11, q. 90 art. 4 J  aleo q. 96 art. 1. 
10'7 
in aociet7 without which hie needs and 1ntereete canno' 
be euff1c ientl7 eat1s�1ed. The yery demands or l1v1q 
c oq,el men to eeek the aid and ccrnfort ot othe:rB without 
wh1eh all hUI'JUUl activity would come to nothtng. 1 
HoweYer, deapite the ract that the Schoolmen thOUibt 
that aoeiet� was the context in wh1eh man �ound b�elt, 
ther were not anarchiete. They did not think that the 
1ntereets ot society would be prcaoted .MHlJ' b7 leav1q 
ita member• to work out tor tbemael.Tes the rulea bJ' whieh 
' they were to 'b• BU1de4. suarem bJ��iqa this out torciblJ• 
''It 1• 1mpoaa1ble to conce1Te or a un1t1e4 poll t1o&J. 
boc!J' without political government or d1epo•it1oa 
thereto J since , in the :tlrat place , this unt i7 ariaea 
1n a large meaaure r:rom eu.b3eet1on 'to one and the 
same :rule and to some common eu;pertor pOhPJ while 
turtherm.o1:'11 if there ie no euoh ���nt , th1a 
boeb" could not. be 41ree-ted t•a1'4• one ceoanon end 
and the general weltal.'e • • • • •  ttl .. 
'.l'bere wae a need, therefore, tor the merzibera ot a partioular 
l. 2J! IDu"f PP• 4-6 <. true. Phelan
. 
, Toronto 1941) . 
O't oovee · heH are people Wbo wt thdraw fi'OII •octal 
1ttte•oour•• t the hermit aa4 �Phape acae artiata are 
nata�Plea 1n point. But eyen tltOUJh not P¥e1call7 
preeat 1n a eoc1al milieu. euch peOple .a87 be preaent 
in a apiritu.al wq, or thPou.gh the1P work. 
2. J2L;&Js1)mt, 3 ,  2 ,  4. Also aee 3. 1, 4. 
eociet7 to be directed to an end or ends. It was 
conce1Table that pr1Tate interests might conflict ; 
therefore a particular end which suited the major1t7, 
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()r took account of the needs o� as marQ'., ae poeaible , was 
neceeaa17 • .  And eueh an end could onl.7 be accepted 1t 
the mc;mbere or the aoeiet7 aoeepted the statue o1: ac:ae 
superior author1t7• 
Suaret goea on to d1aeues the var10UB to:rrae whieh 
political author1't7 lJia3' assume. B• l!'eoognizee that, 
although author1t7 1a derived proxlmatelT from the o� 
1 t7, 1 t may be triU'l&terred to aome peraon or boc1J' wbi.oh .. 
would then have the power of making lawe. 1 Boweve!' 
both Behoolmen ahow a 'biae towards the mo�archioal rOl'm 
of goTer-.nt, as ie ..,.14enoed b7 their- tl-eque.At uee ot 
8 
the wor4e ltsia*atgr an4 RrW•RI interehaqeabl.7• 
Althoqh t�Uarez considers llW�QE&tag to be the 
eharaotel'ietic lll&rk or pol1t1oal. eoele"tr, be Goes not 4eftJ' 
L 
2. 
Ibid. , 3 ,  a. '· He reguda •9!!;r&tl{ aa • quaal• 
moHl property which ata,- be trau et-H , •• a 
title ot OWDer•hip m� be tranaterred. 
See ,. tO't!' exwnple , ae L!S&bJJ, 3 t 9 ,  2 et eeq. 
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that a particular form ot augtoritt! exiate in other 
eocieties. Following Aristotle he distinguishes leaia­
lat ive authorit7 tram economic autho�1ty. The latte• 
is the author1t7 which exiete in a privat• eociet7 euch 
as the houaehold. 1 Be euggeete that one or the d1s­
t1nguiah1ng marks ot le5islative authorit7 ie tba' tbe 
power ot compuJ.aton ie moM the prope!"t7 or the head crr 
the st ate than or the head ot the household, tor tbe 
state haa 3v1ad1e\1onal authoJ'i ty (�!11ft• 3ViiMttJ.om•> 
2 over ita sub�eeta. Ult 1matel.7, he arrive& at the 
ori ter1 on which .snarks O'tt one autho�tl t7 trom the otbe:r., 
'l'he polit ical head hns the power to enact rul.ee ot law • 
1. 
.. Keo enim poteet corpue nisi e1 t monatroe'Wil et 
mutllum, alne capite • • • • •  constat 1g1tur po\eatatea 
1'erend.1 lepa h\Jmanae sal tem ease 1n aup..-o oapl '•, 
qtto4cnaq'lte 1llud a1t , quia nec . poteat · prooecU. 1a 
1nt1Bitum; Dec in alto eaee poteet aa�o.P poteetae 
1n lllo ordine. tt3 
The head ot the h�aehold or of a similar community baa 
the author1 t7 only O'f' lqing down a prt!8Q�, a rule which 
l 
binds the membe:re o� his household. 
It m_, be a�gued that the distinction between a 
rule of poe1 ti ve law and a precept doe a not real.l.7 take 
llO 
us much 'turther ae the effective results in both eases are 
much the same : the member ot the household is still obl1&e4 
t o  obe7 the dttatea at hie maater as is the e 1t1zen to o'be7 
the commands of the ruleP. 
At this stage ; suarez tollowa Aquinas 1n ••••rttQs 
that the c ivil legislator 1a concerned with the c� 
good o-r the pol1 tical communi t7, which d1ffere trora the 
private good o� another eoclet,. 
l. 
"A law, properl7 apeaklag, regard• t1ret � t�et 
the order to the coa:mon .good. Bow to Ol'd.eJJ- e.rthl:rw 
to the c aaaon good 'beloqe either to the whole peOple 
OP to aoae'"'e who 1a the Tioe:reaent ot the whol• 
people. Aad therefore tbe Jlaktq ot a law beloqa 
either to t:b.e whole people o� to a pll'blic peP.eon who 
hae care of the whole people, e 1nee 1n all m.att•r• 
the dlnctiq ot Ul'th1nt2 to the end concerne hia 
to whom the end belo.nga. 
or oovee a leaislator ma,- also lQ d�:>wn a pNMPt. 
See &ntra Chapter 6 . /...J., I 1 1 - 1 .  
J::f, 1-ll, q. 90 art. 3J .PI ,k!s!l!ut, 1, a ,  "• 
It is at this stage that we get a slimpse of the mark 
wh1Cb differentiates public author1t7 frcm other t7pee of 
111 
attthoritJ'. I t  is concerned with the good ot a bo4J •hich 
is .more extensive than the good which pe:rta1na to a priv­
ate aociet,-. 
II. 
The thomiat1e notion of the political common good haa 
otten been advocated as a notio·n which helpe ue to 41et1np1ah 
those matters which concern the good ot an 1nd1Y1dual t�oa 
1 
those which relate to the good of political societ.J• With 
othere , 1 t eoneti tutee the "brtdge" between moral.1't7 and 
positive la• in that it demarcates t.hat field of' .ao\lrltr 
to which the leatsJ.ator ie ent:l tle4• indeed o'bllp4, '• 
P8J attent1ol'4 2 
1. 
2. 
Ae we mentloud at the 'beatnntq or -th1a ob.apu� ACQlua 
Messner, OPt til• ' P• 163. 
D• Entrevee ,  P• 118 ( l9il) • 
also 
· ·  1 Bat1JMJ. 
Law .P• a P• • . . . 
eugge ete that the na · · law lt.ael:f' le the tt'bJ.tlCJ.p"'• 
In eo :ra� aa the natural law 1s eo-extensive wl th the 
moral law, this ie not correct. 
lli 
was inellned to elide ovcu• the bridge without reallalng 
that he had done so. The cortcept ot "legal juatice" 
would eeem to be the ke:v to ow:- underetan41J'lg of 'the 
rel•t1onah1p which he had in mind between the natval _law 
and poa1 t1ve law. Aquinas speaks o't this virtue as moat 
bet1tting the legislator in that it 1e hie task to loOk J 
a:tter' the eoumon good or tbe au.b3eete. 1 
Suoh a notion as "legal �uatice" ean, in our ()l':Lrdon. 
be called a Y1r'U cml7 with great d1t'f'icult7• It might 
not be improper to deeoribe it, 1n leas fo� te�a, 
aa "pol1 tical know-how". A a eueb, Aquiftar put hie tiqeJ.­
on the po1nt when he said that it wae dependent on polit-
ical pl"'.dence. It 1e no-t eo muob the knowleda'e or "U' 
!I aooA tor aociet7 but the knowledp ot 'What is nedad. 
· 1n a part.1oular ai tut1cm and the ltnowleqe of how to put 
pr1M1plea .into pMot1ce. 2 However, it 1a no1_. png­
aatlo co:natno\1on. While prlne1ple 44r,p4tn.Ae on J)l"Mtic• 
tor 1 te ree11•at1on, pr1no1ple la 1n418fenaable t-o pne­
tlce. 
1. .1:1· l.l-ll, q. 58 art!il 6. 
9. Di§. • q. 47 fll't• lO ad l. 
While Aquinae believed that the virtue o� legal 
3ustice and political prud.e.nce was most necessary 'for 
the ruler ot the civic eommunitr, he wae willing to 
admit that it was to be tound in the sub�ecte in a 
subordinate oz- executory way in eo :tar ae the7 were 
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l 
obedient to the lawe ot the PUler. We tight ad4 \hat , 
in the context ot a democratic eoclet71 the aap 1a not ao 
wide. The more widespread the knowledge or the c1t1sena 
is o'f the government of their aoeiet7, the better equ1ppe4 
are the7 t �  participate 1n go.erntna. In thia wa:t , .  we 
c an  attribute tull foree to the Schoolmen' e statement 
. 2 
that au.thorit7 reat.a lllt1matel.7 with aociet:r itaelt. 
A a 1•t , nothing hae been said of what is tbe 
aub 3.ect.aatter o'f the political common 8ood or or what 
d1at1np1ahee 1 t hom the ge�d o-r the 1n41vtd\\al.. Aqu1aa  
esaaye an anawet' to th1a qu.eat1on in hia 41acuea1:m ot 
the a�e and •�•cte ot poa1t1•e law. Ia � 92 art1•1• 
1 he poaes the queetS.on whether 1 t te u. ef'tect ot law 
to melee men aoo4. Hia anawv is aa 'tollowa : 
t.}?1d. , q. 4'7 art. 12. 
In the same wa7, the notion o't a cCI!I'llon good can 
apply to a religious community such as a mo.uaat•l7• 
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''A law ia nothing elee tban the dictate at rea eon 
1n the ruler b7 whioh his aub�ecta are governed. 
Now the v1rtue ot � subordinate thing eoneiata 
in 1 ta being well eubord1nated to that by which 
it ia regulat•d ' thna we eee that the virtue ot 
the 1raec 1ble aad concupiacent �acult1es conaiste 
1n their being obedient to Haeon; and aocor41nal7 
jp ==u• ii !'"tt •l!'bjtll:li �onatata !!1 ld.l � iL;£§3ei:d .t. his ·nt: Pol tlee 1 - blato •>• t evel"J' law a a at be obe)'ed b7 tho•• who are 
nb3eot to it. �t� �it � 
��-� £924• •l1btr •imDll 9l in 1 tar\iQYlar E!!Q!9l• 
In thie article , it aeema that Aqu1naa ehitte hia pound. 
In the r1rat part he eU@I8ets that mere obedience is a 
s'Qfi'1olent mol*al effect of' poe1t1Tit lawJ in the eecond 
part he inclines 'o the vlew that sa.etbing b_,on4 actual 
obedience 1a required, before we would 8&7 tha'\ the rule 
has had a good effect , aad that is the educative effect 
ot 'tbe 1'\ll.e on the li:te ot the oitisa., whetller it be 
the etteot o't aakina the citizen pod almp4' or ln aoaae . 
partioular reapeot. 
COIIID.entlq on thie article, Buares re�ee'\e tbe 
1nterp"\at1on whteh regards mere l)beerriUltle ot tbe rule 
a autr1c1ent moral efteet of poa1t1ve law, and oona1d•r• 
1. Emphae1a added. 
that the second part or the article contains AqQ!nas' 
l 
real thought s law ought to have an eduoat1ve tunctioA.t 
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The crux at the problem he says 1a to be fol.U'ld in the 
meaning at the WOrdS SWPl:l Or 3,Q 10M pat-t!gul.ar l'!fHC;t• 
one cannot resard the etrect ot ooqpliance with poeltive 
law as the eame aa the effect .of oompliance with the 
natural law, and J•t ev1dent1y .A.quinaa does ertr1eaae 
some moPa.l ett'eat. 
It might help ua it we express the notion ot 'Hilla 
!tmRl1c1ter b7 aome aueh phPaae as intrin&il 112A and 'he 
notion o't a biD1JI uoYJidym aisl 'b7 the phrase iu:&ratD$11 
SOod. We o'tten apeak of an 1n.d1Ti4ual , Xt ae beiDS a 
good man. Intr1.n.e1o goodness is hel"e pH41oatett. We 
might apeak at him alao a.e being a aood artlet, 1n whieb 
case we are predicating inatrumental goodaeae. In tlda 
eecond oaae we are attribu.tina to a p�leular pereoa 
quali tie a which exist in ao tar as hie putinlar akll  
or apt1,u4e ooatorms with the standard which la es.peo�ea 
ot one ocoQJ'iq hi a poe1 tlc:»'l. 
1. 
116 
Ia the intended edueative a� o� pBa1t1ve law to 
achieve mol!a.l· soqdneu or merel7 to make the subject a 
go9d qi t1!!Df Suarez ie o-r the opinlon that an Jal;�lmate 
l 
en"· o-r poaitive la" is to make men good moral.ly but at 
the same t1me he reeopisea that the pol.it1eal or o1Y10 
2 
. 
good ie � a diftex-ent oPtter to the moraJ. � '!'be 
end ot the .c1-.1c boq, he SQ78 , 1e t!J.�tll!! R96itt.ql* 
!beretore .it 1a onl7 necessary that positive law ahadld 
aim at · reall2i.ng those civic virtu.oa wh:teh ted to � 
achievement of' woh an end, even though &Dd&reotll the 
sub3eet m.,- be led to the attainment at Jlll3ral. goo4aea• 3 
The moral good 1a a good §;lrqplJci�e..r and .  the pol1 tio-.1. 
aood a m•sund'!JI gg,1g._ It 1e P9tt&bJ.t �or a man to be 
a goOd c1 t1sen1 enn althotl.8h he m1sllt not be . a goOd man. 
Conaequentl,7., . the mol'al · effect at poa1t1.e ln 1a to make 
good o1tl•en.a aa 4S..at!.net hom mekln.g •it1aeu sood.t 
a. 
plf. ,  . 1, 1a, s. 
�:L.!�t1�1e;· e1•1lla] 1ntendat :taeer. h<mna bOma 
moral.it•x-, non temen almpl1o1t•r bon-. ill l!J.o ..-re, 
ou1a non eat tal1a 1 h:la1 careat amnlbus v1tl•s, qv.od. 
lex ciT111s eff1eac1ter non po,eat 1nien.dere, l1c•' 
poe set eonaulere. .. 3 J 12 ' a. 
Did• ,  1, 13• '· 
one result o-r this 1e that a rule err positive law m117 
be obeyed even . although obedience ie . not aeeODJPanied bJ' 
1 a pure mottn. 
W1th thi s in mind, 1t is now possible to examine 
ll7 
the Seb�olmen• e attitude towards the relationehtp between 
natural la• and poaitive law. In the1� OPinion poa1\1ve 
la1'1 was not indifferent to the ural. vinuea , 
"Human law i.e �d �or a m.aber r.rt hwu.n b4t1qa 
the ma�or-S.t7 ot 1fhom are not pe:rf'ect 1n virtu. 
v.�e�erore human lawe do not to�bid all vteee � 
whieh the virtuous abstain, but only the more ptn .... 
ou• Tieea ,  'tram whieh 1t ia poaeible tor the u�ontr 
to abatainJ and ch1ef'l.7 those . that are to -t.be hVt 
ot othera • without the pr-t:lb1b1 t1on er which hWJ8D 
eoc1et,- could not b• maintained. ftu• human law 
torb1de nrder the'tt and euohl1ke. "e 
And �am the positive side : 
"Human law doee not preeez.1be concerning all the a.eta 
ot eve17 virtue c but cm.l7 ln N8Vd to thO" that are 
orda1nable to the oOD'IDon gOOdt either iaediatel7, •• 
when eertaln th1nge are done 41reetlr to� the •.-.o• 
good or •diatelt, ae when a lawatver pPeeonb•• 
oertaln tblnp pet-tainiq to ��Qo4 01'4er, wheN'b7 thta 
o 1t1sena are directed to t� uphol«l;oa Ot' the edlllraoa 
good ot �attee and peace. � 
1. �&a. ,  1, 13, OJ  also e.  29, o. 
2. J:L 1-11• .q .. 96 art. 2. 
s. D$!1- ,  tl• 96 art. 3. 
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'!'he bwlioation 1s that the e.ub3ect-matter o't the v11"\ue 
ot 3uet1ee is most fit for 1neorporat1on into positive 
le.w , more particular�. the general dutiee which are required 
t�r the etab1l1t� or any society. Ext•�� conduct 
atrecting o:Ylerm is the tne o't conduct whiQh mo•' affects 
the wellbeing ot soeiet7. 'rh1 e does not mean to ·� that 
pos1t1n law it not at all concerned with internal moti"f'e. 
suare� reoognisee that positive law does not �e4,1t!� 
concern iteel� with internal acts o� th� m1nd. 1 Nor dote 
1t mean that it 1s only oonoerned with tmbliqlX-IIQf!U!t4 
aets. 2 However :l t does look to the ul t1mate pe�ormu.ee 
ot an aet ( even although this tna.,' never eventuate) and in 
attaching 1tael� to e sequence of aota it m., thePeto� 
1nd1:rectly preacl"'ibe or prohibit an 1ntemal act o-r the 
m1nd. 3 
Bowevejt, theN are cer-tain paesu.ag.,m in the R! Jd!si"PU 
which augpet that suare� beliwee that poa1t1ve law Ul' 
txtend to other •1rtues besides �atice : 
l. De Lestbua, 3 ,  13 , 2. 
2. DIA· •  3 ,  13 , 1-7. 
3. !!lis!- ' z ,  13 , 9-ll. 
�Leges c1v1lea non solum p�aec 1p1unt recta 1ft 
materia 3uet1t1ae .  sed etiam in materia aJ.iarum 
virtutum moralium, et similiter vetare possunt 
vitia eontra Ol!Ll'lee virtutes. ''1 
.And again: 
ll9 
••Leges c1Tilee intendun't elves facezae b()OA)I Tina, 
quia non poesttnt alite� �acere bono• c1vea. ft2 
He aaeerts that positive law mq concern :l.tselr with the 
vir�uee directed to God '*f'or obae!"fance of reltdoa co� 
cerne the commonweal, " 3  and even to virtuee which are 
more matters or counsel than o't precept - 'for example 
l1btra11i!l - altbough he admits that poaitlve law doee 
4 not ord1nar117 intervene in this field. 
We must aek 'Whether Suarez is qual1t'J'1ng hia cn-ip'Ml 
position. At first a1gbt , thia seems to be tbe oaaeJ 
and 7et when one examines the later aectiou. ot ohap'hl-
12 it 1e obv1ons that he et1ll adherea to hie o"ld,.aal 
poa1t1oJU although h\D&l't law can deal with the fJlll)�••._.. 
matter of al.l the virtuee , 1t ought not to preacrtbe all 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Did. ,  
Did. I 
Dis:&. , 
ll!ia. '  
3 ,  
3., 
3 ,  
3 , 
12 , 7. 
12 , a. 
12 , g. 
12 , 10. 
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the acts o� the virtue� or prohibit all the aete ot the 
vices. It ought n�t , for example, to prohibit eimple 
torn1cnt1on. 1 'rherefore 
" • • •  lex civilis debet aecomodata eormrun1tat1 humanae 
secundum ne.turalem oondi t1onem apectatae et ideo 
per leges e1•1lee non prohibenter amnia T1t1a. • • •  �t 
The original thesis is re-ae eerte� '.rhe intention ot 
the e1•il law 1e to make good eititene. This may be 
real1�ed 1� the legislat or concerns himself with the mo� 
virtues onl7 in so far as the7 tm,p1nge on the social gOod 
en(! in eo far ae they may be conven1entl7 incorporated 
3 
into this or that eoc ial sett ing. 
Both Aq_uinas e.nlJ. �UEU"ez ere aware that the ecnditloaa 
ot particular eount�1es are not necessarily the aa.e. 
What is  convenient -tor one may not be convenient ror anQtheP. 
Accoxad1ngly the legislator in a particular count!'�' wlU 
examine the euetoms and pncticesa of that oount17 'bef'on 
1 .. D!1� , 3 ,  12 t ll-12. 
��a. , �� 1?, � 
While tho Schoolraen believe that the eub�ect-utter 
or the Tirtue at juet1ee is most tl t tor t-eal.ieatlem 
thr<mgh positive law, the7 do not den7 that pealtlve · . . law mq p:Haeribe the aub�•et-matter at anotur Tirtu. 
In wartime • the state ma7 demand :trom 1 ta ci tizeu a 
degree ot eacrifiee �bieh would aot ordinar1lr be 
expected ot them. In aueh times, the c1 t1aen :I.e 
expected to ri se abOYe the or41n&l7 reQUittaenta which 
life in society �oees on h� 
l 
deciding that this or that provision ia euitable. In 
In such a W&T, he will not imPose a too stringent atand­
ard, or tax the capacities of hie aub�eets to the 11mit. 
liL 
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There 1s another �eature ot the Schoolmen' a writlnse 
whieh throwa light o� the relationahip between natural 
law and poei ti:ve law. 
ot poe1t1Ye law ae eampris ing both dete�inet 1one and 
c onclueione o-r natw.-al law. 2 In Q 95 article 2 he llbna 
the legislator to the artist or craftsman whose task 1' 
1e to determine the genernl f'oT'Dt or an ob�ect to &OI;fle 
effect in that it aoee suggest that the leg1elatozt S.. 
conce�ed with particular solutions �ua\ as much ae with 
3 general princtplee. 
--- --------------
l. 
3. 
1:!%.1 1-ll, q. 95 arts. 3 and 4; g. 96 art. l; 
ilio ·� ��=bBit l, 9 ,  17 et aeq. 
S-T, 1-11, q. 96 1 arts. 
s-'I' , 1-11 , q. 95 art. 2. 
�compaea indicates baste d1reet1�ee, but 1\ will 
not na'Y'1p.te. Onl7 a man eltilled in naTiptloa and 
uains the bae1c d1reet1Yes turni ebed bt a oompaaa 
can do that. •• Dav1 tt , It• Tl1g11@& AmPs ap.d '\H 
•uv!l Lf'l, Ox-1g1na of the Batural Law 'l'rad1tlon• (Ed. Harding) P• 26 at P• 40 ( 1954) . 
.122 
IIowever , there is a certain ambiguity which res1dee 
in the gQDc;Ly1g ·� sl!:kiU'lf.ljne:t.1o d1chotoaw. Aquinas hlmaelf' 
ie quite rea.:cy to admit that mo.ny rules of' positive law 
smbo4J conclusions or precepts o� the natural law, euch 
as the rule a which forbid murder or theft, o:r which requ.in 
proodses to be tul:f"illed. 
task of the legislator is merely to t�anelate into the 
language ot positive prescription the alread7 known preoepta 
of the natural law and to provide a sanction or pental.Q-
to cempel obedience. In Q 95 article l Aquinas inclines 
to the view that poe1t1•e law hae merelJ this aux111ar,r 
task. In this article , he points out that ordinar117 
parental advice suffices to dispose future o1t1zena to ob«r 
the dictates of the natlll"&.l law. 
uals , however, who at•e depraved ana prone to vice and not 
amena�le to ouch tra1n1� AccOl'dingJ.F, it is neceaU17 
to constrain these b7 f'ol'Ce and tear 
'' in order that 1 at least, they might deaiet tr<lll nU• 
doiq and leave others 1n peaee, and that thq •Mm­
aelves1 't7 1.'' tng ha"bituated 1n this ....,., m.iaht. 'be 
b:rough' to 4o w1ll1nglJ" what hitherto thq 414 f'..-
tear , an4 thus become virtuous. "  
· 
In auch ter.m$ ; we picture the legislator ae the .o� � 
ian wielding his sword to induce hie wards to o'bq -u... 
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directivee of the mora� law. 
On the other hand, if we examine the intended 
canpar:lson between a conclusion and a determ1nati,:>n we 
see that in both eaees the effect of a rule o� poa1t1ve 
law is . addJ;tt� to what is alreadJ' prescribed 'b7 the 
natural law. We might take ae an example a rule ot 
poeit1ve law wh1oh embodies a so-ce.l.led conolualoa, a 
gena:rall.J' recognized moral precept. Most c1v1l1zed 
Bttt the t'orme which a Jll'tU'c.t.er 
law may take m87 d1f'rer from one count17 to another. It 
ia the ta•k or the rulers of the different states to 
oonetnet rules embodying the moral precept to f'1t tu 
neede ot theee atatea. It 1a BQ1 a oaee o� •he moral 
precept mere]Jr being written into a statute. 
But apart f'l'Ol!l these hunuAn laws which are cOM ..... 
with the gene:t-a1J.7-Hoop1sed moral preeepte, theN en 
a great number which eome within the ea\esor, ot pure 
determinations. There ies no moral neoeesiv about �-
Ther ax-e merel7 11oet»J. rules 'tor a partielilaP ooa\%7• 
Aquinas does attempt to give us a picture of this eeocmd. 
eatego17 without really aueeeediq. He sese to be 
willing to accord a degree of independence to the A•ter­
&natig, bttt only in so 'tau- as it is a par't1cular1zatioa 
ot same pre-existing moral rule : 
In the DJ L!gibJaa1 suarez is more inclined .to 811Phaa1se 
the autonc:&Oua nature ot the atttm1p.atlQ• It ia, he s.,-a, 
the work o� the xolJQtte lts&§�!t9E11• There ia no 
1ntrtna1c reae on why one provision ebottld be prefe....t 
to another • the 1"\lle 1• 'brought 1ato 'be1tc b7 the aloe 
ot the 1e8ialator. 
tfJPor 1J'l '\hie latter s,-atem ot law oae of two .... u 
must oecu:'"' : either a merel7 artd.trtu7 . . apeettle 
dete�tnat ion ia made, ot the aort eonoeralaa �eh 
1. �, 1-11, Q• 95 art. 2. 
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it 1 s  said th�t ftwhat ple. asee th� prince hae the 
f'orce o't law, " not becauae hle wUl alone auff!.eee 
as a rational beets , but because the particular 
deter.m1nat1on might reaeonablF have taken one ot 
Tartoua :f"oNe � and because there is �.quently no 
ground on which one :f"orm should be pref'erred '\o 
another • eo that 1 t 1t said that the determinat.icm 
18 made by the w1U of the pr1noe z-ather than b7 
reason; 2r .  !l:!!• when the" exi ets &OIMI spee.ial 
reason tor a preference, that Haeon 1a we1pe4 1a 
relation to the partioular aJl.d ( as it were) material 
e 1rcumetaneea ,  ao that th• determlnation has refer. 
enee rather to the c1reumstaace s � a e1tuat1Ga 
than to the substance therefore. ttl 
In th1e paaea� , Suarez make• the point that the eubject­
aatter of the enactment oeJ'Jnot be said to M lll&llif'eet. 
berore the learielator makee his oho1••• for he Dl8J' baft 
more than one cOUll'ee open to him. 
pointing to the ggntiMen..u Qf the dtttrm.i:D•\iPNUt• 
t1nl1ke the ,20DQll!llOMJ, the determinations are t:t.ed. t.o 
practical considerat ion, which the legislator muat 
eyaluate ;  oal7 then coming to a dec1e1on. k1dentl7 
he la aware ot the raet that the natval law, taaa 1a 
the ae.n.ae ot being equivalent to the morel T1rtaa, &M• 
1. 
lBG 
for eyer7 rule ot poa1t1ve law, ther• 1e an equivalent 
" 1 :rule or natUl'al law. But he waYere as far as this 
question 1e coneerned tor he ocoe.aionall7 apeaka ae 
though there exiets an enlarged concept of natural law 
comprising the principles aeoor4in& to whioh pal't10lllar 
determinations are made. 2 
In evaluat ing Suarez' a contribution we may ear that , 
1n recognizing the optional nature o� many rules of 
positive law , be has paved the way.,, ror � l�ae re•trioted 
1nter.pretat1on of the relationehip between natural law 
and poe1 t1ve law. The R2D'Pm cravi!IYAI 18 in no ..,.., liad te4 
to the adaptation ot the precepts ot the natural ln to 
the eir�etancee ot political aocie\7• 
It �ollows tram what hse ·been aaid tn the preylOU. 
De U!A1Wit a • 12, 14. . . 
Also eee 8 ,  12 , 17 et seq where he adm1 ta •hat ._. . 
acts are 1n41fterent ae tu aa natural law 1• ooace:rned, 
bu\ not 1nd1ffex-ent ae 'tar as the o<amon goo4 1• 
eoneerned. 
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sections that the Schoolmen conceived o'f a relat1ouh1p 
between natural law and positive law v1a the not1ona of 
the political common good and the AfSe£1iaa1�o. It is 
not surprising therefore that the.r considered obedience 
to poai tive law to be mot-all,- necee•ll!T• '!he obl1sa\-
1on to obe7 poa1ti'Ye law had to be eought "outside" tba" 
law ' 
· tt'I'he notion of law eonta1ne two thlnga • t'1!'6\ that 
1t ie • !WUJ.e or human aete; eec<mdl.J' that lt 1\ae 
coercive pcwer. Wherefore a man D187 be eub�.et 
t o  law 1n two wqa. l"iret , as the regt1].ate4 1a 
eubject to the �egu.J.ator s and tn th1e way 'Wh(Wf.,. 
1e t�Ub3eot to a power 1e eubjeet to the law f'ltuled 
b7 that powe:r • ., • •  Secondly , a man 1a said to be 
tn:&b3eet to a law ae the eoerce4 ie eub3ect to the 
coercer. In this wa7 the virtuous and the P11h'­
e ou1!l are not eub3eet to the law, but onlr the 
wtaked. Beeause coe:rcion is eontre.J7 to the wUlJ . 1 
the will ot the good le in harmODJ" w1th the 1••• • • • "  
In thta paeeage Aqntaa� etates that onlJ those who are 
umr1ll1ng to obey the rule � law are a\l.b�eet to tbe. 
eanet1on which the rule impoeea. 
to obe7 1t are not sab3eet to the p«ft8lt7• 
on the other hand, 1 t cou14 1M arpe4, t'bat nen 1f 
•e accept th1a d1etinction. there still does run ••• to 
, 
tbe law ,  for a person may eubmi t to such a rule w1 thout 
considering that he l e  under e.n:r moral obliaation to ob• 
it. Suarez does examine th1e ob3ect1on. In h1a mind 
it is necessary to distinguish an �ediate tram a more 
remote er�eet ot law 1 
" Unde 4up�ex d1st1ngui potest effeotua lea1a, U!1lUJ 
qui. iumediate fit ab ipaa. et hoc eat praeclpere 
val proh1bereJ al1ufJ mediatue qui eet bene operarl. "l 
fhe important thing is that these two el"'fects .  1n euues' 8 
mind, are not separated :from. one another : executi on  � 
the rule !a bound up with good action. It is :tor th1a 
reason the.t Suares eonalders that the eanetion which acoarr,­
pa.n.lee the rule is ,. on 1 ts own, an inaut�1c1ent moral 
reason ror obedience : 
1. 
2. 
"Coaetio autem sine poteatate obl1g&Ad1 in couc1•nt1a, 
Tel eat moral.iter i.mpoae1b111e, quia coactio ,_,.. 
aupponit culpam, quod est valde prQbabUa • • • "Ml •wte 
eat -nl.de 1neu:rt'1cien.s 1 quia pert •• non poe•t Ia 
imlltie ea.eibf• .nece1 ea:r11s sllttlcten"er t-e1.Pll1tl1eae 
sGbYenire. ". . 
Ut�s�, 1,  15 ,  14. He poblta out that wen a 
pe a8Yi rule ot law ie 'bO\ll'ld up with obllpt1oa • 
obliging not o't cou.rae the pereca 1n whora the pn­
m1ss 1on 1e vested, but the sudse to recognise ·tbe 
exercise ot: the permieeion. 1,14, 1-. 
� • 3 ,  21, a. or eour.&e , authorit7 without power 
Il&leo 1nefteeiual as rar as goYernment ia eOD.eerne&t 
P?1st. 
In th:t� pe.esage , Suarez 1! maklng two important 
points. F1ret o� all he eoneiders that the eanet 1on ie 
an 1nsuft1e1ent m�rsl juzt1�1cation or obedience. A 
penalt71 he says , ought n�t to be 1mpoaed on a person 
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unless he is in taul t. Clee.:t'ly- when we ax-e �dglng f'aul t 
((Ulpa) the standards or the legal rule iteelt which �oeee 
lie.b111 t7 i-n this or that cnse do not determine the 1eeu.e, 
tor one must have ree�urse to n standard b7 which the 
legal rule 1 teelf' may be judge e.. 'l'he:re.f='ore, 1 t can be 
aeee:rted that something be7ond tbe penalty muet be preseu\ 
betore .obedience to a role o-r poei tlve law ean be mol'all7 
�uat1fied. 1 
The aec�nd reason to which Suarez has rec?Urme 1e a 
taetua� one , or pe�hape we c an  ea, , a ii91212!1St� one. 
In many cases , he points out , the tear ot a penaltt will 
not b7 1teelt eeoure obedience. Perhaps he waG th!nkinl 
ot caeee where the potential lawbreaker may conmi t tM 
illegal act without fear 0� deteot iODt an4 ot caaee Wbare 
,· 
. ' 
1. et • Dt'Entrn.e , tJle C!f f'p JJtt]U'al in . II:MPJMft 
i!(.J;.t�r0:·1: :! !iS:e�t or ��. rathe11 . .... � 
right. •• Roaaen, D! IUual lillh PP• .,._1. 
because of the weakness ot the law-enforcing agency rulea 
may be broken with impunity. On the other hand, it 
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seeme quite clear that in � eases the threat of puniab­
ment i s  a pract ical motive fo:r obeying the law. 
Perha:pe one �ould say that mere tear alo" while 
having an aux111ar,r erfeat in compelling obedience 1a 
merely the negative facet of the who�e pl"oblea ot ulaw-
abidingnesa". A sub Jeet' e m.oti ve in obe7ing a rule ar· 
law may be compounded of a mixture of self-regarding 8.1'14 
altruistic motives , ot which fear .., pl&T a great part.1 
·If however we seek a .moral 3uetit1catf.on for obedieaoe 
we ro.uet look to the norm.al good-intentioned citizen. 
What ought to · e.ttx-ac t him. to obedience ia -t.he value ot 
the rule 1 tseU and 1 ta place in the l•aAl •7•tem ot bia 
c ountry. 2 
1. For a dieeueeion o'f the mot1vea for obecUeaee ••• 
B17ee , ap•1 &P D&•tRrZ � lft•pnQMU, 
VoL 2 1- 9• and Appendix! 0�. 
Br,ree howeYe� does not eetletactorilT 4iat1aa-i&b 
between aot;.,e and �uat1t1cat1on. · 
See .alao Goodb&Pt, IM6l•IA La IDQ 19£_. � (1963) 
pp. la-28. 
It 1e interesting. to note that the word • •BMtioa" 
haa more than one meaning. tt 1a often 1Jt;tUpntea 
1n th!e context as meaning the penalt,- which 1• 
attached to the rule and which eampele obe41•.-•• 
But 1 t c an  also mean that the rule 1 teel:t ta aoo«. or 
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But there 1 a  eome di��ioult7 1n juetif)'ing this 
poeition in relation to those rules of positive law which 
are not directl$ related to the natural law. suarez, 1n 
places ,  1e ln.cl1ned to t07 wl th the idea ar a mere C'91RA 
gii111g; thex-e 1lf17 be eome rules ot positive law the 
tttb3ec�atter of which 1s so eoattnsent and �ated to 
tempOrEU7 needa that the obligation wUl be merel7 to 
submit to the penalt7 which attaches to the rule. 1 
It ts thia trPe � caeee 'Wbich cauaee us BlOat trcNble. 
It we adopt Buares' • &ll88estion, whePe are we to draw the 
line between this minor t7»e of' rttle Blld the 1"1Jle which 
haa more permanent value , al. though e\111 not a 1'11le relate4 
to the pr1Dtar7 moral precepts f In our mind :1. t would ••• 
preterable. if we accept the moral eYal.atloa ot poalt1Te 
laV'l', to reeogniae that .!11 rule a OU@'ht to create an
obligation 1n oonac1enee in eo �ar ae obedience te co�
eerned. For the moat ' millor' l"tlle of procedure , when
T1ewed as a rule tunctionial 1n relation to the lesal 
ayetem ae a whole, 1s quite Sllponet. 
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Although the Schoolaen pat torward thle moral bae1a 
ot positive law, the� did not think that o'bedienoe bad
t o  be accompanied b7 a perteot 110ral diepoe1 tloa in the 
8U.b3eet. The obligation wee not OD.e of obedienoe a 
1 
I!£Q ll.9ty. 
One 197 P'ttdtf1na'l7 obq a law 'becauae one 
does not like it or because it ie contPaP,J to one• e
personal interestaJ although, or course ,  thie att1'tu4e 
ot mind ie f'ar lese laudable than that o'f the publlo­
m.in4ed ci tiaen. we untet therefore take caM leat ,. 
aacribe an undeee1"'18d moral. status to the ralea ··or pnit­
i'f'e law. 'l'he SchooJ.men' s tb.ooPt .ut not be lrlta,ftt­
ed so aa to aaerlbe to the rtaee o't poe1t1ve law tM 
aaae •tatua ae the nlea o't "he moral law. For 1.ft4ee4 
the oj.j;Js!M oocuplea an 1nt'er1or etatue \o that ot thelu•o J!!Snllf. 
v 
F1nall.J', I w1ah to examine the approach C¥t the 
Schoolmen 'to -un�uat laws. Both Aqv.lnae and Su&l'ez are 
t1rml7 ot the opinion that un�'ltst la.we caJUlOt b1n4 in 
e onseience • 
"Human law haa the nat 'OPe of: law 1a eo tar as 1\ 
partake• o� right reaeonJ an4 it 1a ele� that, 
in th1a reepect, it ia deri'tfed from the 6ternal 
law. But tn eo tal' ae 1 t dn'iaue rrom reaaon, 
it la called an UD.3uet latr. , ani!. hae the natu.tte AO't 
at law, but o't "'iolenee. "J. 
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But the �at nle hae a s1m11ar1t7 with other rul.ea 1n 
that the intention or the person 'from wboDt 1 t :leauee 18 
2 
to bind those who are subject to hia. In chapter 1 
ot th1e work we did nl'aest that an e�a\ rule or la 
oould still be called b7 that name, but that the blportut 
q,ua"tion was whe'Uler the aub3eet wae obll1ed to ebq it. 
In the above fj'tl0'\at1on, it is clear Gat the 8oho0l­
bel1eve that a rule of poe1t1ve law which oontllota with 
1. 
s. 
I:L. 1. -11, q. 93 art,. 3 a4 9., 
�IDlJJI, l, 9, U. 
.!::f, 1-U, q. 92 Qtt. l ad 4. 
l 
the natural law ought pot to be obqed. 
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At first , it is necessary to determine what conat1t-
utes b.�uet1ce. �he Schoolmen d1st1nguiah two �orma o� 
ln3uat1oe. An example ot the first tJPe ot ta:uat1o• 
1a a rule of la• which violatea a preeept ot the natural 
lawJ an example ot the aeeond is a rule which 1e not 
directed to the common good oP wh1eb imposes an unfair 
burden on the aub�eeta. suares uaee �he word.a • tntr1m1e" 
'' instrumental" to 4ee1pate these forma ot 1n,taat1ee 1n 
e poeiti'" law. 
t:r a l*Ule trr poe1t1ve law Ti.Olatea a preeep\ G't 
the natUPal law 1 t is un#'t18t &ltd ••' not be o'bqe4 :t.n 
3 a!ll' c 1rc:waetancee. Ae -tor the second. t.JPe ot ua•t 
1. I' is 1nte"atinc to note at this etage that the 
'toraulation ot the queet1a ln th1a wq tloea talee 
aecount · of a problem. which Neat 3v1apndn.,lal 
\hoqht hae 'b�tought S.nto pram,...  Xll ou 
reepeet the un�. ·at rule ia l•sal 1n th• -• ttsat 
it le enaoted in aocordanoe w1tla tlle to-. aa4 
proeed.lu'e neoeaear:r -tor 1 te tonaal Ya1141\7• Jktt 
lt 1• a tiftet-ent quetion whether tbe ..U hae a 
moral fl'l�itr and la then:tore wort)Q' et e'IMJ41eue. 
or. Gierke, :rol&tioll D•vltl Qt tbJ JAMl&L.Aal, 
PP• 81-80. 
Pt �tts1}ue, 1, · 9, ll and 12. In;Suat1ee 1n nbl•ot­
utter i d1atil'll\l1shed tJ-0111 1n�uat1ee 1n maDDR flit 
exeout1cm. 
P!14- t 1, 9, 11. 
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law, 1 t does not bind tt except perhaps 1n order to e.Toid 
scandal o� disturbance �or which cause a man abould 7ield 
1 
hie �1sht". or c ourse in many oase s the question o� 
1n�ust1ce m87 be contused or unolear. 
seem to be tm.juat , but no certainty attaches to the app•a1aal 
made o't it. 
of legali t7 : 
In such a eaee the presu.ption 18 in ravour 
" .. . . partl.7 becauee the legislator ia in. posa•aaicm. 
o� a superior r1ght 1 partl7 also beoauae he 1e 
directed 'by aupe:r1or C0\1D.8el and aq be .f.ftO'V'ed 'bJ' 
general reasons hidden from h1s elib�ecte a.n4 part]J' 
because , it th1a pnsUIIPtion in hi a tayov 414 not 
ex1et ,  the sub3ecta would aeeume an excesaive p•1?-
1lep to diaHgard the lawe, etnee the latter can 
haPdl7 be eo unjust that 1t is 1mpoaa1ble ror � 
to be trea�e4 as d�ubt�, � some81Ddlv1dualat 
apparently for plausible reasons. � 
· xn modern terme, suarez 1e diecuaelnB \he problMA td 
recoDOilina �uetioe with securitr. 
be aa exnee tor Yiolating the natu:ral ln. M oO'O.'PM 
otten lea1elat1on rill be fa-amed in neh a W8.7 'tha't t 
while not d!Hc'tlJ' oontrayenin,g a preeep' o� t.be ut'!IMl 
law, 1 t _.,. weaken lte e:rteot or 1ndirectl7 ooatr11N.'H 
to ita oontravent.ton. In such a case a d1f't1cnsl:t Talue-
l. J:L l•ll, q. 96 art. 4J De Lts1bg, l., 9- so. 
e. pe Ltsibua, 1, 9 ,  11. 
�udgment conf'ronts the eub�eet. Be must make up hie 
mind whether the gbetyt1aJ,. effect ot the 1"1ll.e is to 
bring about a oont.ravention ot the natural law. 
In manr lesal e�ateme 1n�uat1ce 1a of the eeoond 
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tJPe l. e. 1netrumemal ln�uatice. The aub�ee\, agp-1.-..d 
b7 one or other ot the variety of modern laws which impoee 
unfair burdens or are directed to tbe good. ot � one 
aectlon or the commun1t7; might reel 1Dcl1ned to 41aob«r 
1uch 1'\ll.ea. On N'tleetion, howeTer , he wUl put blaeelf 
in the plaoe or o�her aeabere � hie aoe1et,., 8.D4 will 
reoQift!se the 41eaetroua et.reo�s \o aoeial atabilltT tr 
other members adopt his attitude, and the:rerore be will 
deem it proper to aubmit to the law, albeit in an umrUl­
ll'll manner ,  4eap1 te the taet that . hie u:MJ.\]• wUl h&Ye t 
no Y1aible effec� on the other hand., he •&:� do hie 
utaost to etteet a chaqe in the law. 
Ia peue1'111 aoeie'tiea , the need tor ••ev1tJ" riU 
prnaU. I'\ 1e only when the lepalat1'" au-u.or1" 
1ntrlnps the Y8J.7 baaie o't aooial int.enourae 'b7 eon4onlna 
murder 8Dd other acta depading to the h18&1\ pusoaali\7 
that the citlsan la entitled to retard such ralea •• 
"Tiolence wrapped up in the trappinge t:4 law. " 
Chapter 6. 
Ruman Poai t1ve Law : Some particular problema. 
1. Continuit7 and Cbaqe 
suarez regarded the d1attnct1on between a rule or 
law and a precept ae important, in that it demonatrate·4 
the dt'tterence between a continuous rule sip.if71DS 
genera11 t7, and an aet O't w1ll e1s;n1:tJ"1q partieulas-1 V• 
in hie opinion, although a l"Ule of law was n'b�ect to 
change and modlf1eat1on, there wae inarained in it a 
n �ion of: permanenee and cont1ml1 t7 b7 the f'ao't tbat 
it waa ot general �plication and not reetr1eted \o a 
tlngle act or event. 
In tbe tb'et plaoe, a !'Ul.e of law did not cease 
to ulat, onoe th• enactor ot S.t had 41e4, beoaue the" 
ex1ete4 more than a temporal. nlat1onah1p bet'Mea ftler 
alld ral.ed• 
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"Hee eum oatensum eit per lesem poaee � 
obligatlonem quae duret poet mort.. preeo1p1en•1a, 
et h\UiO mod'iiB praecipendl eaae aulme eonveaient• reajm!nt re1publ1cae et poteetat1 les1alat1,.., 
Mete f'1 t qu.:ltienscunu�ue pr1M1p1e decl.&l'at aS.,lioltv 
se etatu.ere '\"el condere legem, ponere preoeptum 
ita 6urab1le, ae eubinde tale preoeptvm e1gnit1car1 
nomine legis. At vero quando tantum praecip1t 
non statuendo, eignum eet, non pro tuturie tempor-
1'bua sed pro tempore praesente, aeu pro tempore 
gubernat1on1• euae praee1pe", nee uti propria 
poteetate lesisla.ti•a, eed t.ants praeceptl•a, at 
14eo Mete eenaetv hoc preeeptum ezp1rare morte 
praec1p1ent1s.Ml 
In tbe aecond place, a rule ot lawblnda not OblJ 
those ci tisene who are alive at tbe time at 1 te prCIIQl.-
2 gatlon, but alao their deeeendanta. 
In the third place, the rule ot law 1taelt �liee 
cont1m11 t7 t 
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"'l'ertla perpetultae, eeU1cet, ut lex dvet qumc\1• 
non revocatur, vel mate1'1a ejue mutate, hal>et. 14• 
ru.rtdaments, quia ad reotam. pbernationem re:lpubl1ea• 
neceaaar1a want preeepta hoc modo etab111a, quae 
a1nt oertae et perm.anentee l'egU.lae ae menavae 
operatlona a haec autem preeepta e1pif'1eaatv1 aomiM lea-, 3Uta uaum. 3ur1um et doctcma. •• " 
'!'be oontinu1'tl' and atab1l1tv of a rule � law la 
a pneHl element which has a neeeeeQ7 1'0lat1oneb1p 
with the other f'eatves of' the rule at law aent1oD84 1lr 
the Sob.oolmen. It etontaila with the notion ot the. 
l. R.LX.Bilm•. 1. 10, 12. 
2. D14· •  l, 10, 14. 
3, ll!iiJ.· , l, 10, 16. 
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c011111on good 1n that a rule of law tramed in aeneral teNa 
aamits o� the p�eeibil1t7 at leas arbitrar,v application 
than that 1'1-amed tton tbe apot" and tor particul&P persona. 
Ilaplicit in lt le the foaal notion at certa1n't7 a one 
knows S.n advance the claae ot aotione ta wbieh the NJ.e 
�a referable. 
disttngu1eb1ng between the two. 
the word "lawtt to denote a particular c._ani2 ( e1 theP 1a 
respeet ot the peraon• to wham 1t relates or ln rea,peet 
ot the time tor which it endUHa). But 1t le neoe•aar;r 
to reeopise that the emplOJment of the word "la..,.. 1A 
th1e context 1e dlttez-ent to ite u.ee 1a the other eoatm 
to denote a general rule.1 
Of couree 1 wen though we regard lawe a a pMral 
and capable tit euvin11 'there ia nothtDC to pr«Yeat u 
tl"CJJl resard.ias � aa capable of b411Dc ebJmSa4. Al.� 
rulee CJf law were not to be obuced haphaz� o» 
1. eee De t!sl}y, 1, . lo , 1e. 
�.�- ., q. tl art. l ad 9. . . !hi &ehoolmen d1et1npished 3v1e41ct1oa (ha). f'rom 
d0111eetlc authot-i tt ( deAA:Lft). While �ur1idlot1oa 
ie beet utilized by the malt ng ot lawe, domeettc 
autbo?1t7 accommodates itself to the command tor. 
ot author1t7• A rule of law muet be pr.uJ.aated, 
that ia to say, publicly revealed to the oCIDIIUJli •• 
If' the legiale.tw ttapeaks pr1Tatel.J" be does not 
enact a rule ot law. P! ;&t•ibUJh 1, llt 3. 
f3..-.tl', 1-11, q. go art. 4. 
14.0 
, 1ndiec�1m1nateq, the7 had to be adapted to meet the 
changing needs of different societies. 
"For 'thoee who first endeavOUPed to diaeover soaae­
th1.ng uaetul tor the human c0DIIn'ln1 t7, not beiq 
able b7 themeelvee to take weJ.7ih1q into con.aid­
erat1on, aet up certain 1ne'1 tuttona which were 
4e�1e1eat in many w&Ta; and theee were changed 
b7 eubaequent lawgtve:re who tude lnet1 tutlone that m1ght. pl'Oft leae tnauentl7 defieient 1n reepeot 
ot the COIIIDOn Mal. ".I 
suarez carries this thought hi-ther when he poiata out 
that chatlge ...,. re�t either bJ' an act or repeal on 
the part ot the legislator or bJ' the automatic lapee of 
the rule tteelt <s•••P�· ratismt J..•G!• Glft!U iRII lg). 
Aa rar as thie latter case 1a concerned, if the 
ob�eet at the rule beca-aea un3uat or impoeaible to per.-­
torm or aohiwe, the Nle of law, he eqa, will cena11Ur' 
lapae. 3 But a ohanle 1n the o��ect at a rule .., oocnu:­
ot aueh a kind tbat; although the act p"eort'bH •-iDa 
�at and open t.o p•rtonaanee, the reasoa tor ita ,..,._.. 
anc• baa d1eQPeue4. V.'hat ia 'the po•1 t1on 1Jl thle tJPe 
ot oaaet Here, suarez d1at1n,gu11Jhee 1Dtr1u1e ehanp 
1. J::l, 1-ll, q. 97 art. l. 
a. � J.!aibuth 1, ao, a-3. 
3. Di<J.. , 6, 9, 3. 
2 
rr• extrina1c chana•· Some rules ot laws, he etatee, 
prescribe an eaeentiallF virtuous tJPe ot act, othere an 
act of a neutral character. As an example ot the tirat 
be gives a law pnaerild.ng a �uat price tor the sale ot 
wheat, ot the tecond a law rep.lat1ng the O&rJ71q of 
l ·weapons. In the �ormer case a ehanp in the extr1na1e 
reason or plU'poae (tor example1 the pr1ee might hne been 
tmpoaed to oope with eiroumatances such ae a sudden 
inereaee in d•and) doea no'\ cause the rule of law to 
2 lapse. In the la�ter ease, a change in the oi� 
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etaaoea to which the rule rttlatea ('for example, the NJ.e 
might ha•e been made tor the purpoae ot a�ing the cl\lsena 
in a c�iaia euch aa an attack on the oit7 by enemi .. ) will 
cause the rule to lapse, ae the whole twW.e depen4e on the 
3 . 
turtherance ot that apeoitie purpose. One can ODlt 
aaaUIM that an exauple or 1n"tr1na1c cha.n8e, 1n the :toNal' 
case, would be where the price imposed- th• la• ha4 
become ao JIIU.ch out or touch w1 th the eeoncado e1 't'Ut1oa 
l. Ib14· , e, 9, e. 
2. DzJrd. ,  6, 9, 9. 
3. Ibid.. 6, g, 11. 
that 1t waa no longer a reasonable prioe. In such a 
case the p�1oe imposed b7 the law could no longer be 
considered :Uat. 
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In IDilnJ eaaee, tt will often be dlfticult to 4ee14e 
whether a purpoee or object ie eaeentlal to the extstenee 
ot the ru.le. If we are to eet up any atandaPct at all 
b7 which to �udge or evaluate the objects of rulea or 
law, our guide to whether or not an ob3ect 1a eaaent1al 
will not be found in any abaolute imme41atelJ-appl1eable 
rule of thumb, but onlJ' in a considered eYal.uat1on. o't the 
' 
eircumatancee which surround the rule ot law. In ·� 
caeee it will be difficult to draw a precise line. On 
the whole the drawing of that line ia the taek or the 
courts - the taSk ot lftterpretatl� 
II. Interp .. etatl• and Jhp.t1 V• 
It 1• pree1ael.J' when a nle of law �--4 lD pnel'al 
terma le to be applied to partlcl'llu oirc'OIIl8'aae•• 'Ulat 
there 1a a task tor the interpreter. A le81alator ia 
unable to :frame a rule · which rill meat fiV8"l7 1D41 v14Ual 
caae'a needa: 
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"lfam. haec est humane. conditio ut "fix poasi t homo 
tam perepicuie Terbia sensum suum explicare, quin 
�b1guitatea et dubia nascantur1 praesert� quia 
lex humana loqul tur brev:l ter et in general!, et 
in appl1catione e�us ad vuioa caaue in particula.ri 
or1untv ttrequente:r dubia, propter quae lwJ,1e1um 
prudentum et deelarat1o doctril'lalis neoeaearia eat. 
Den1qme ex hao neceaeltate o�ta eat �1• o1?1l1a 
per1t1a, cu�ua praeclpuue t1n1a est Teras sensum 
Yeramque tnterpretationam legum buman� tredere.•l 
one o't the main Naeons tor the need ot interpretation 
is that words in common uae are �ten extended or reatr1et­
ed in judicial. uaage (for exam:p�e. the word "moxae" ref'err­
lng to pl'q'aical death has been ext•nded to cover loea O't 
c1T11 rights)& It ie the task of' the interpreter to 
\Ulr&Tel the Pl8111 l!Si§l&�2£it Which iS to be f'CJW'ld in 
the analra1e o� the PUle lteelf,tor the mind of the lecie­
lator 1e revealed in the language or the rule wbic� has 
2 been p�gated. 
Suarez 11eta three methods which mll7 'be utilised 
b7 the 1nterppeter a firstly o't' eour•e examinat101'l t:¥t 
the eub3.et-..atter ot the rule,3 aecondlJ evaluat1oa ct 
1. Di§.. , 6, 1, &. 
2, Il!!�· · 6, 1, 13. 
3, tbid.' 6, 1, 17. 
the reaaonableneas o� a contraey 1ntex-pretat1on,1 th1rdl7 
comparison of the rule in queeti�n with otheP nl.ea.2 
fhe litera� rule ot interpretation is to be pre�erred 
to the "golden rule� f� �eculat1on on the rttlo lesl•• 
1Fh1ch is n�t app�ent tram the wordet can often lead to 
co!d'ue1on. 3 
The interpreter may ( l) adhePe to the natw:-al mean.­
i!lf. ot the worde, ( 2) go bQ"ond the natural •an1 q to 
the 3urid1e1al meaning,. ( 3) extend the meanlng bJ' ._. 
1mproprtet7 or ( 4) extend the mefllliq bJ' analog and 
4r 
a11lil1tude. l'on-reetrict1ve or non-penal rules mq 'be 
& extended as f'ar e.a the natural m•aning perm1 te, while 
rules ot law cozrteraring privileges may be extended bqcm4 
6 the natural meaning to the 3l:U"id1c1al .mtlnmtng. Where 
the o:rdlruu.7 JHaning ot the rule leade to altaur41 t7 or 
lajuetiee, one m&7 go be7ond the ordina.t7 and ,3ur141eial 
1. 11!14., s, 1, 17. 
2. Ibid., e. 1, 18. 
3. Ibid. f 6, l, 20. 
4. Did- ,  6, s, 2. 
5. n&� .  6, 2, 3. 
e. n1� - 6, 2, s, 
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1 
meaning to an improper interpretation. Extene10Jl bi 
analogy and stmilitude 1e permieeible to o�ver a C!!UJ 
2 omit§UI• But as tar ae penal law la concerned exteneion -
ia to be per-mitted only where the juat1ce of the case 
3 d•ands 1 �. 'l'he mean1q ot rule a ot law Dl87 also be 
t!lttiCt!d to &?Old inconvenience.• 
We have .aeen that Suarez considered that a rule ot 
law would not lapse, unless there 11ras some 1ntr1na1o 
change wh1eh rendered 1t no l�n«er reaeonable. Judloial 
interpretation perm1 ta the applies.tion ot maxw and 
rules or 1nterpx-etat1on which will m1t1gate hedehlp ao4 
1nco1'1Yenience 1n individual caeee. However it 1a the 
role at egv.i'tl and not of' inter.pretation to mitigate 
au.oh b&l'4eh1p or inconvenience where the words ol' lfi.DIWlP 
ot the rule do not permit or anr other 1nterpreta�1Q8 
than that which would cr-eate har'dahl.p 1n the lndlvldlaal 
ease. In the words ot Aquinaa "1nterp:retat1on le a&lla .... 
ible in dC)Ubttu.l eaeee where it 1e not permiseible \o "' 
ae14e the w�e or the law w1 thout the determ1Jt.at1cm ot 
1. n&d. ,  6, 2. "· 
a. Ib1Ae ,  6, 3, l et eeq. 
3. D&tt. , '· 4, s. 
"· n2.!1. .  6, 5, 3. 
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But where the caee 1e .manif'eet there ie 
need not of interpHtation but of execution of' the rule. ttl 
In a case where the execution of the rule would lead 
to lnjuat1ce, an equ.i table diaeretion 1e admiae1'ble, tor 
a rul• ot l.aw enacted in pne:ral terms 1& l1keJ.7 to fl&i 
in indiTidual cases which the leaialator did not haYe ln 
JDind. 
ttLegialatore . in tr••1n.g lawa attend to what cur 1 Qlll7 happene s althO'tlBh; 1f> the law be applied to eeriaia 
caaee 1t will r.ue\rate the equal1t7 ot 3uatiee aa4 
be 1nj'tD'i01la to the common good which the law has 
in view. '!'hue the law reqUire• depoaite to be 
retvned. Ye't if a mac1man wre to put hia nord 
in deposit. it ia bad to follow the law in theae caeea 
and it is scott to set aside the letter o't the law 
aad to tol.low the dictates ot �ustiee and the oa.mon good. ttl 
In auch caeee reoouree is to be ha4 to the _,1rit ot the 
rule. The euppos1t1on :le that, it the lealalator ha4 
t11J.'Ifted h1e a1n4 to the panieul.tu.• case, he would ha•• 
3 ude an aeeptton in that case. · 
l. 
s. 
3. 
Howenr• me:re 1n41T:ldual hudehip ia not llltf'lcleat 
J:%, 11-11, q. 120 art. 1 ad a. 
D!1A- • art. 1 ;t r· 1-11, q. 96 &Pt. e. See also Rt IA;.:§:� 6 • 6 • 4. 
pe L!st.Jm•• &, 6, 5. 
to allow relaxation ot the letter of the law. !here 
14? 
must exiet an 1nd1Yidual hardship ot a tJPe which calla 
ror the appl1eat1on of equ1 table p�1nc1plee. Even though 
a person 1e agar1eye4 b7 the application ot the letter 
ot the law and therefore does not participate tn the beae­
ri ts of the rule in a particular way, he doe a parilcd.pate 
in the general utili t7 which ia the seour1 tl' ot the law. 1 
suarez does augpet that there 1s need at the applioatla 
�t equ1t7 where the obaervanee of the letter ot the law 
is unjuet or where lt �oaea an exceae1ve b�2 
Indeed both Aquinas and suarea atreea the relat1.,... 
ahip between �atioe and political prudence on th• oa. 
3 . ... .... . hand and equi t7 on the other, although A.Qllinaa makee ....... 
point that, un4eratoo4 tn one w&:�, eqlli'Q mq exceed lepl 
�uat1c•a 
l. 
2. 
�., 6, ,, .,_ ht o:t. 1., 7, a, when .....  
11Ino11ned to admit that partioul.Ar' �ldp _, 
be atroas � to affect punl utU1tr'• 
J:%, 1-11, q. 96 a-t. 6. 
DU·, 6, '11 8-ll. see al•o 1, 9, lf et "q an4 
5; i9, 12 where 1mpraoticabil1 tJ' is reekon•d • part 
or 1n.,.t1ee. 
�. �. 11-U, q. 120 art. 2. J.)e Lts1lm•• e, e, a. 
••Equ1tJ' correepoada properly to legal. �u.atioe, and 
in one WlQ' :le contained under it, and in ano,her wet exceeds it. Por if legal �uet1ce denotee that which oompliee wi tb the law, whether ae resar<J.a the 
letter or the law or as Ngarde the 1n:terpretat1on 
ot the lawgiTer, which ie o't more aceount, then equi t7 1e t.he . mot-e important p&.l't or legal �uetloe. 
But it lesal �uetiee denOte m.erel7 that which eC�Q11ee . w1 th the latter wl th regvd to the J.tt�, then 
equ1 t� ie a part not o't legal �etiee�i or �uat1ce 
in 1 te aeneral application, and ie cu)nd1v14ed with legal �\18t1ee as exeeediq it."l 
Viewed in th1e light, it eeemra to ue that interpretatlOI'l 
and equity are the twin pillBPa on which the etruo\-.e 
or the tad1oial proceae reate. Indeed, equi t,- do• 
' ·  
not look meP8ly to the 1ad1T1dual. caeeJ it locke to 
the setting o� that case within the general �ramework 
ot rules and 4ec1a1one. 
to decide in wbioh eases departure � the strict let\er 
ie �uatif"table. In makbs h�a deo1a1oa he haa to n1P. 
the d-.nda ot the 1ndi'Y1dual case apiUt. the pD.U'ILl 
\ 
eee*t' qr t�e J.n. Am with the notloa ot oh._, to 
too with t�e · aot.i011 at equity. no ol•&J."i-•ut tol"a'QJ.a ean 
'be 4n1ae4 to 1n41eate to what oases the e(J111\a'ble 
r••cS¥ 1a applicable. An exoea•1ve reprd ror t:U 
l. §:T, 11-11 » q. 120 art. 9 ad l .. 
epiri t o� the l8.w ean have the same disastrous conaeq­
uences ae a regard tor the rigid formulae of the rule .. 
Nevertheless, there is some theoretical •alue ln 
d1at1ngu1shing eq:u1t7 and interpretation. In the caee 
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or equity the meaning or the rule is elear 'but lta appllo­
ation may create an injustice 1n a particular case. 
In sueh a case the rule ie said to tail. This meana that 
the 3udge will go be7ond the worde ot the rule and will 
have reeourae to pr1ne1plee of 31tat1oe and f'a.1rneae 111 
order that he might adapt the rule to the circuaetanoee 
of the caee. But in the ce.ae of' 1nterpt-etat1on the 
l"Ule doee not :rail 1 tor it can be applied to the c1� 
stances o� the ease. "'bat happene is that there 1a 
doubt as to the meaning of the rule (tor exeaple, doe a 1' 
include the case 1n question) which 1s genePated b.r eome 
amb1gu1t7 or opetmea'e ot the words or the ftle, or_. 
do·;�bt ae to the purpose � the rule, or br ":tlect1oa OJt 
the possible cemaequencee which 1187 occur fi-011 g1'fi.aa 
1 t one m.ean1q as ap1nat another. 
III. Custom 
It the Schoolmen recognized the optional nature ot 
rules of law, they were nt the same time fii'Jill.J' at the 
opini�n that a.ror change in such rulee should be Mlated 
to the needs at the communi 't7, the guJ.de to which wae 
euetom. Both AQUinas and suarez approve of Iaidon o� 
SeTille's dictum that law should be 1n acoordanoe witb 
the custom o� the countJ:7 'for ''euatom 1e a eecond nat\1l"e; 
and theretore, that which ia repugaan1 to cuet-om le hel4 
to be dec1del.7 repupant to natlll'e, and conaequentll'; 
almoet morall7 impoesible."l 
Aquinae aeeerte that a rule ot la ia 'brouah' b:b 
existence either b,r human epeech or b7 human 4eeda. � 
latter ie the province ot cuetoma.t7 law. 2 Alt.holaah he_ 
inclaee to the T1ew that cust08l8.17 ln 1• 1D:te1"1oJt to 
the WPl tten law 1n that 1 ta Yalidi t7 _.... Ga \be 
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8 1JDJ11e1 t or e.x;pl1o1 t consent O'f the pr1Do••- · he Heo8J'd.••• 
1. Pt :wes1bg, 1, 9, 19. J::%, 1-11, q. 9& an. a. 
2, J::%, 1-11, q. 9'7 a!'t. 3. 
�. 1-T, 1-11, q. 97 art. 3 ad 1. See De ld!lllr!Ja, 7, 13, 5. . . 
Janeeena eeema to suggest - it! J2!1tWa IOV''i!9J!Mll.t 
d! d£01t d' apr!§ §s nomag 't dsu�'!! !l.J!Uit � 
1.8. p. 681, PP• 700 et seq 191 .- • . 
that the co.ntliet between the "rat1�nal1e� AqatDae 
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that ouatom may abrogate the w�itten law,1 and 1t 1e 
not neoessa17 that the people should be regarded as p�t 
ot the legislative bod,v �or thie purpose.2 Indeed 1n 
this latter caee, the aete of the citizens muet, at the 
outaet, be invalid 1. e. in conflict w1 th the w1 tten law. 
It they were merel1 baoed on the excuse ot neeeae1t7 
there would be no intention to abrogate the law.5 
• Pinall7, custom may be used to interpret the written law. 
suarez adumbratee a doctrine or judicial precedeD' : a 
l1ne of 4ec1a1one haa the etreet of eetabliahing prt!! 
taeie evidence of what the law is. 5 
l. 
2. 
4. 
It can be eeen that the Sehoolm.en conetdered h-
and the "voluntarist" suarez is brough\ out 1A 'he!Jt 
diacues1on r.rt cu•tcan. We o81U'10t apee w1 th Uti .. 
suarez admits that the will o't the prilloe i• eand1al 
to the ..-al1d1 t;r ot eu.etom 7 • 9, 2 • lnlt • •fJ'Ulll' 
important, he considers tha-t an -.mreetu)na'bl• out• 
eanno� be e•etain.d v, 7, 4J 71 9; 1; f, 1a, ·&. 
Aquinas, recopizina the ialpo,..aaee or reaeoa, attrilnltea 
to the ,w1U of th«' prince a pH4alinan\ pl...  Bee l-ll 
q. 97 u-t.. 3 ad 3 where he rerere t9 the "toleration 
ot the prtaee". . 
J::t, 1-ll, q. 97 art. 3 
De Legi'bU!f 7, 16, 4. 
;Bld. .  7, 17, 3. 
mgm. I!! Jtesil?U. '· 
3. 
&. 
D14. ,  
Ib14· J 
7, 18, a. 
.,, 17 ... 
18, a. 
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positive law to have gre�t tlexib111ty. Rulee or law 
were to be judged p��arily by their �onr with the 
natural law and their eondueivenees to the earm'ln Hood. 
'!'he letter o:f the ln might be tempered b7 the 1ntenent1oa 
of equity. The guide to utilit7 was, f1ret and foremoat, 
0ustcm. But it 1s the attention paid by suarez to 
interpretation whieh pointe to the prima.r7 task or the 
jurist, who ia to be appraised in the light or hie ab111tJ' 
to master the art of interpretation. 
&u:rel •e \he las� peat •Xl>Ontnl f6. the -� 
la.w (lex naturall.:) �ad11lon. 'lo lee �cb. 1t'ld• .naw­
atnt •Sght •eea to be ve17 »aal\. eve]¥, 1t- te • taot, 
one •r · 'lol''&• tb.at the natu»all w 4oo\�ine eurJlvttd 
'tor •• -.ol'e., n$u.l'-l•a. �ta •• -.. 1n.aplftt1oa et \h 
soo!&l an4 POl1'1 · 1 lhhJ7 o� tae· etftn •th &J)4 
tlshte•tb. e.atun •• &�Oh an eb�•' ' tuisht thh so oa 
t POht te _.., $UGh 1 G.JIOttu., Pun� anA lhou iua 
to 8Qppeft hla. po,._,. 
Ir Oll .. tats-. �1$b »U&N . ._,._.1 law" at 
1-1 ftc �•• on: . Jalgb.t be • ....,. M O.Ol\Oflv.• ot lite 
l,.oot;r!nt et _.. ..... �- \lP �o - - 0'1 , .. •I.Sbt•en� 
••tlu7• att thte a�1.-1, Whloll. 1• too �ltel, te 
innt.ttol•-· rett •• taJ.na that.. ••ate • S..CU.'•l-7 
11 �- lU Pb.ool Dt ne.,.l lA.Y¥.,. ot tM •ttb't••• 
._. •i.fJb•MDth o�'hJI1oe te not t.AG1aatto ln Jn•pU.tloa. 
tnd•ect, the break W1 th the old. ph1loaopbJ 1• annottnee4 
1n til• Proleso••• of Gro\1ua' ma�OI' WOl'k, R! Ige BtU1 
fO Pto&f, wbieh 1$ a ..,.tty in.t lttta11ng JIL8l11t sto. In th1.s 
put of ale .n, Gt-otlu• obltcpel.J' ortttoues tb.oa Who 
aooQt Arietet•lUD. authQri '' u "aoapel tw�h ••, lll'tll0tl8b 
he te w111U, to reoosat•• tho !IIPo�ana• or Ar1·ato:t1•' . · 
wttn.1 lie 4eYOte a pa.rapph tG a <ltscuadon o� 
tb.e SOho01lita. Whf.le he praiaea �-�e.,. theil' -.oclnat1on 
1n ..-�. he ortwa the eP1n1on that thev ·�tU OD .,.11 
...  attentit�m '0 'tht claa,aioa, 1;0 \be werke ot the tu.an 
blat�iane an4 •ttere. 'bhe bow1oc!s · ot wbioh 1ul . �rlohtd 
th• ltD&taeaao• p.eJt1o4· B will not attaob. hblft:lt to 
�.n� one aetllod, but will nl)T on -.a�letJ' f/1 aou.J'Oea. 1 
Now th1e u:aifi eto hae been baUd aa 'the toundatlon 
4MWamlt et th• 1&7 eeh.ool Qf aa� lew., It h .. 'bea 
aa•.-t• ihat Gnttua pw$d th• · 1 to .. a aw:tioul, noa• 
thtOJ.ostoal appOMa wli.loh talshi b• acoete4 by au, 
meaP4'o'1 .. ot reltsl.ow.a bel.t..r. 2 to till•, othfJ'e UT8 
r.plld thal hit ,_.ll te J\Ot e. 'bl'-.k \ftt_a the aohota•tto 
4oetrtn•., JUs ·ta��ow� .... ,f>-.1 JIGJ.l O.n.a*' st t•aen' la 
tJPlloalll• on \lt gotUI!l that it 1t a ""'ta�ton �a 
T01atutat1o· app•oa•b to eYal and l•CGl obltpt10lb 3 
�-�----. l3tli•hfl.l, $ lt0-
D1�'i r:.w;.r.r.t,_.._.. 
k:lULHJiiiU:IMJ.al (ltH> -.11 " -.. 
��· (aat., ---� ... . , .... 3149) 
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The striking thing about Grot1us' De lure Bell1 ao 
Pacil, 1a that, unlike the works or Aqainae and Suarez, 
it is not substantially a treatise on the natural law 
and 1te relationship w1 th positive law. While the 
Prolesomena and the first ehaptar fWe dnoted to a etuv 
ot the dootrtne. of 'natttral law' • the remaining part 1s 
s1� over to a study ot th• p�t.noipleso:t an international 
c1Y11 law and pu.bl1o international law. Of course; it 1 
trae that he spnks o:t the possibility of ea1abl1shins 
tb.t truth ot natural law by an A.Jl£19£1 and LJJOattr!or1 
1 
metbod \ntt the wb.ol·e trend at his work is to emphaeiz 
the latter method. The Soboolaen. on the other hand, were 
oonoeDed wtth the yalidity ot natural law as an eth1oal 
dootrm.e an4 lts relationshiP with positive law. 
Koreover. a glance at the De lpe Bell& aq Fteo1g 
reveals an 1neutt1o1ent ana]7e1s ot the no1tlon of natlll'Al 
law. OnlJ' a oure.o17 •am1nert.t1on. te ude of .an;, PrOblmtlfl 
wi 'th . which tile seheo 11aen .......  eono .-.ne4, and no peat 
attempt is 11.846 to t 1e up th• lo(l)s ends, ae 1s 4�strated 
'by tht noUlation on the quftstion ot the Pelat1onsb.1P 
2 betwen 4.1'1'1ne law and natural law. lfore lJI.poriant is 
1, l)e .Ive Belli ac Pac1s, Ch.l, s 12, sa 1. 
2. Com"'&re PrQlUOMnBt xlv11, S 12 with Ch.l, S 10, SS 5. 
the phrase which. Grot ius uees to desisna te the natural 
law : 3p.s MiN!!!• Yl$ do not find the word ''lex" ueed at 
all. Jus naturae - l.ox nstualts. Ia this difference 
1n 1leage �1eient to justify the aPgumenta(ot the 
proponents)of thoa<t who aseeX"t t,he:t Grot1us removed tbe 
dootrtne o� natural law hom its th.eologtoal aettlng. 
As :ra:r as we oan �ge on tae evidmlce. thatxae ts aome 
reason tor making au.ch a 3ttdsment. GJ'Otius' use o't th 
•X'd n1us'-' Jtetleote the aP�nt ot scholas'iic t11'le over 
tb.e q:tleetion wheth4tr the n8tu.l'al law ie :pr-escriptive or 
ind1oat1ve. In •f'f•ot; it is a PfDognition ot the olaims 
of the 1n41cat1ve sohool of thou.gJlt .• , Grotiue strives to 
present 111 with a definitlo:n o� natural law which is 
o.cocrotable 1o ••non-belin•n'•. Aocox-diql,J, � natura11a 
with ita e-11gatafW oonnotatlon 1e an un4 sirable txPPeaa­
t.on. Ult1aa1el;', hollft'er, be b.rlns in QQd aa the eus-
1 tatner and author Gf the natural la•., 
It aeeme to us \hat there is a aon lapoft&n' point 
of 41tt·erenoe Jl)etweea Gr0"1ua' a�ch an4 ihat o� the 
Sohoolaen. fh.e eme¥-genoe o� the agt of l'eaaon and 
enlightenment demanded ot the acholnrs of the age a mo:f'e 
ooncrete and PCl>S1ttve apprceoh to legal and political 
institutions and wlea. A natural law doctrine whioh had 
been the pre.merv• ot theologians was diffioul t to 
aoco!Jl0date when medieval religious unity had given wa-s to 
the era of the natiopl state and diverse ayst«as of re­
ligious and PQ11t1oal 'bel1et'. There was a need to fo!'mnlate 
a aystem or legal nl.es which would b of practical use ln 
the new condition ot thing.s. JL,;eas stress ie placed on 
the emtonoay of th$ 1Jld1v1dUal and b1s moral nature ' m.o�e 
on his social inai1nota.1 so it is that the 1>$. l'Ul'e Belli 
ac ,f!o1s 18 a wo:rk on the D@ s•nt�;wc with this 41:rterenoe -
the general 1net1tut1�ns and customs ot the sohoolmen J1eld 
place to a system ot 4eta11ed principles. 
Ont oonseq��ene�e o� this is that th . d1Y1d1ag line 
between. the natu.rsl law and tbe tus gent1u bqomes blu.rr d. 
Grot1us :ts 1.nel1ned ta invoke na:tUPal N&aon to p� the 
Jlee.aonablenese of many ot the p:z-ineiples of the 1us 
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1 gentium. The aoooolm.en, 1n :parttou.lv.1�� �res, insist 
�n the bt1notion between the 11tatu.ral law ani the 1us gentium. 
In ibeir mind$, the aetu.al pract1ce o:t :raations is a guide 
to the ius BOnt1um and not so much to 'the natUl'al law. 
With write1•a 'Who aueceed Grotiu.a the oeni'usion is more marked 
and tb.e 1amdenoy is to ool7lb1ne bo·th eyatel!la of !'Ules. 2 
While the�e is amns austiftet'ltiort 1n G!totius• time for an 
attelllPt to bring within tu field of .. generallr recognistd 
legal pr1nCtiplean as uny matters as possible 1n ordf)l' to 
foateP and dft'elop a common stoek. o:f PUles, in late ttme 
the need 1s no lon�er so pressing; and 1et the OJet• -
bu.1ld1ng oonttnued. till the end of the eighteath oentu17. 
One � only or1 ttctze the tendeney to alu.r over the 41e­
t1notion between the na'tural law �n.d the Ius gentium to 
aohieve tb.1a reeu.l t. 
Tbe•e 18 still e third distinction between t�e �olast1o 
4oetrbie and the dootr1ne of the eev;enteentl\ and •1ghteenth 
1. 
2. 
It is true that in some plaees Grottua noopls•a a 
th.-n1oa1 41et1notion b•tw•n the &U MDI!! &D4 the ftt� .... Prelesoaena, pp, lxw1-1W11t s � - \Jilt 
i� ·. iia on "" J"�"';J aU• oaue•• abl 1n hie 
actual treatment ot ht� • ea o · tb.e tua g&'tl1ta •o 
3utu, saoh ·wti,ut!oas on t.b.e #OUD4 the' th� 81'e 1n 
:.�o•4 wi'b. natural reason. see tor • xample hie 41.,_ 
ouaaion ot promises, Book 2, Ob.Xl. 
se• Oelan ., Oo:tt1erez, Ius Natura! (1954.) 'P• 27&. 
16 ) 
oenturitEh �he latter school adheres to a d!tterent 
oone ept of nsturo.-. One can drieet Q t0!1A..-..&U to revert 
to th� Yin of a ate te o:r na �e mare liber�J remained 
$Upreme. ill! 'beco1nee assoc iated with ua M.gbt", and the 
nB�u·al law dootP1ne wlowly turns into a naturel rights 
1 l doct:r n•• 
lo doubt this move to\?al'tls r1-atva1 J!ighta is a mo-ve 
to reetrict the powel, of the new matiolllll  etate and to 
•euaert the tundamen·�al l1bes-t1ea of the 1ndiv:l4ual. But, 
ae with Boiu and KQ'bbes, it was v� em ey to 1! stl'ict 
"the J.e,wti t'  "he will or th sta te ;  and tho tolll.ll'e of �1gbta:n 
a 
beo•ea �.'rail• W1th .Eaat, 'thG :ruptue b �mea com.plet • 
1. 
J,egality and orality ar e  d ist ingttished, moral ity be ing 
a mat ter o'£ " internal legislationu, legal ity o� uexternal 
l 1 gislat ionu . 
II. 
In the ninet eenth oentur7 , there is a re-aotioll 
against the aeoond obare.cteriat ie ot the ius nature.J.e 
( pos t-Brotian )  school which we d iscussed bove, namel.7 ,  
the tendency to oonetrne sy st eas of na tu.re.l.17-k:nown prin­
ciples and rules. The re-aotion take tw toms. In 
England, the util itarians suc h as Bentham Yiolent].y attack 
� 2 Engl ish ius natvale eympathizes suoh a s  Blackstone. 
" 
In partieular, the Benthamite school reproache Blackston 
l. 
2. 
Iantt fhiloe� ot Law (Has tic trans, EdiDbvgh,. 
1187 J PP• U:, • 
and see Alexin Le 4Foit nael, Arch1na de pb.1loaophie 
4u4roit, oak 1-2, ( 34J p. l35 at pp. :u.,o-u.a. 
Burden, If!!} @V 1 t eTOlutioa 4! .la J1etl0ll 
de loi en bOil ='•· 
Aroh1T!S de phU080 1e du 4roit, 
oah 1-2 ( 1939 ) P• 7 at p.lO, 
Blackstone prefac e• hie d 1eouas1cm of t he  lawa o� 
lnglaud w1 th a general analysis 'baaed •1nl7 on the 
writing& ot the e· t;tunle aohool. 
Co•entari es on eLi• � Rpdan4 ( 7th Ed. , Oxfe7V , 
1775) fo1. 1, PP• JAm. 
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tor at tem,'Pt ing to 3\l.atifr a number or 1'\lles ot EngliSh law 
on the ground tbat they fall wit hin the permissive soop _ 
ot natural law. 1 On the Continent, the crit 1o1sm. ot 
the h1etor1eal eehool is 41reoted against the vast eystems t 
�iets eaoh as eavtgnr draw attention to the historical 
m111ea and national and cUltural 41tferenoes �ich oall 
tor not one alngle appr-oaoh , but d1:f'i»erent approao-hea. 2 
It seems to u s  tha t in. rej eo tins the na tttnl law 
doctxwine, the nineteenth oen tury soaoola are too prone to 
"throw the baby 0ut wit-h the bath-water. n In so :tax- as 
their cs-1t 1c tsm e'l the natural law 4eotr1ne· places empb.aeta 
1. Ben thaa, ( :IDYerett Ed. , 
Oxford, 
While Blae:tatone PJ.t& tol'19ard this orlterto:n 4e alao 
1n plao•• •»•aka or_ ut tl1t;v GJ' bene:t1t to aooittJ. 
see Q!JI!MDtaztt•• Vol. l ,  :P•42, 4.8. llowve, he 4o•s 
not �eter to· tbe aoholeatio n.otiGn Qt the OOJIIIIOrt good. 
For a d1seuaa1on ot Blaokatone • e a-pppoaob. e8e H. L.A .• 
xut. ��·••211·� 1 1u l' th• �" •·rm·  . . . 
Butt•rwor'�. soa1i Atr�., .. tilw�i•w �6) P• l69. 
on the 41tferenee be tween a oontlngent solut ion 'based on 
ut111ty and a universal solut ion based on rea son, their 
sts-ictures are juetit1e4. 
But we may juatly a sk if their o�1t1e1sm �eall7 pplies 
to the seholast 1c doctrine. In ans,_ing this queation, 
it ie nocessa17 to uaw at ten tio:n to the tact that tb.e 
!!I na'tJJ!QII ls pr11QB.P11J' an eth1oal dootP1ne, not a 
system tor aolylng partioula,. legJll p.I'O))las. Moreover, 
system-lmil41Dg ta a method wnteb is ronlgn. to tu 
Sohoolmen. We may reoall su.e»e.z' endeavour to defille and 
point t o  the utilitarian bee is ot the 1ue gen t1UJ also 
the not ion of the common good.. 
It m.iBbt seem un3ttst to teke to task the nine"een;th 
oenturJ Ql tic s  wt 1t 1$ considered proper that tb.ie 1111st 
b• done. In teet, one may a sk  eethexa Benthira tor eumple, 
ws a  awax-e of' "C.h.• etholeet1c c!ootrbe. I� we lGOk at the 
toetnot 1q 11'1 the Q.d.mgtp£X oa thl COUQt£1•1 an4 thea 
turn 'baok to the ggugane, tlunaae1v••• there l J10 sip 
or av :re:terenoe to the §81!. or 'to the At l.ei;I.DI• 
Oenonl.l7, tht u.tural law wittnga ,�.� to a•• lloaan 
and GMelt ao�ea; ani Gl'Ot1an ud. pOSt-Grotlan ao\uroea. 
I 
Ind.ee4, th.-.e bad been a oonsoioua ten4.noy s'Uoe the 
time or Grot iu.s to �etnee to mention the Sohoolllleaa' WPk, 
a s  1t c 11at1on of t he1� booke was a taboo. One may 
81ll'm1se that the rea son for this was the dislike of the 
eobolaet 1c method and its reltg1ous 1mpl1cat1ona. 1 
One 1s tore• to the conclusion that the nineteenth 
century or1t 1o1$1ll was not a or1t 1o1sm ot tn. lex natura�is 
school a t  all. To the ext ent to 11atoh !. the ne.tu�l law 
as an ethical �octrtne and !!. tho relat1oneb.1p ot pee1t 1ve 
law to na tuJ'8l lAw by means ot the oommon good, flQ'e 
negleet.a. - to thi«� �xt ent uY we qtteat1on the right or the 
nineteenth oenturry or1t·ios to judge the doctrine ot 
nat\ll'8l la•• 
III. 
Thte int1"04uot1en wae w.ggeatri tn orde� to •ulain 
1n a briet manner certain tea turee ot the period bwtween the 
De Lesibu..s end the e111ergeno e of ..tla t 1e OOlDJDOd7 mo• a a 
tb.e rev1nl of natural law.. ltow the whole sene• o'f the 
wl'd "revival n su.ggef.St s that eomething whioh t-emains 
hidden or in obaottl'ity tor a period of t ime 1e l>rought 
tnto the light agam. I t  will be ou.r task 1n tne following 
ohaptera to tleser1be the foa wh.ioh t.h$ �ev1val took. 1 
Wh n ene apeaks of tho rcw1vel of the nattu-al law 
dootr·ine, it is otten difficult te pinpoint the 111ae when 
this revi-val began. Not only that, btt  there 1s also some 
doubt a e  to th9 aavt or the �e1rtve.1. 
About the 11iddle at the :ni.uet ee:atb eentu.."�?Y .;  oertain 
books on th natural la.w doetr1n'=' appeared, am\ �hose eeetatc! 
to herald a re.tu.m t.e the eoholastio cloetrine• ln part1eular, 
2 mention may be made of worke by Tapparell 1 4' Azeglio and 
Boem1n1-serbat1. 3 lt sc;aems that two main taotors operated 
to produce this r\lYi"'alo ln i;he t'irst plaoe , there. IWB& a 
�1vel of tater-est tn eeholastie philosoPh¥ wbtoh was 
proapt•d bJ t.be onoyelleale ot certain Pcpea. .In th• · econ4 
3. 
Po» a discnesio.n ot tb.e HYival 1n bance. 'lbiOh. 1e 
uwens- too gencwal, see Habtes. lf!:1Df 1 J!tJ!l!l Lay ur.ma (� u . P. • aesaehtt .. tt�!J ), PP:211· 
iMIAA SM�*'ioo dl 4�it!o •:ta!ml.• ( Naples, 1850 ). 
P&loao(l! 41 4g1tt2. ( lfaple�:J 1861 ). 
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place, th.we wa s  a senenlly-fel t need t o  work out a more 
sabstsnt ial basia for the relat ionship between morality and 
law in the. light of the ninet�enth O$ltu.rw criticism o'l! 
the tue na �le ( :poet-Grot ian) sob.ool. 
It ie not long b$:tore the natl.u'al law doctrine i s  
1nT$ked by the 3U£1atg as a ba sis foP the study ot the I 
veluee o:t pos t.t 1v• law. The :Ph!losepbJ of natuftl law, 
Wbioh threughou:t the centuries had b en tht presene ot 
the thealogiane and 1b.en of the PGl1t1oal Philosophes , 
now beomaee a proper ri eld of UlV.�e t1s;ation tor the jl;lri$t. 1 
A.nd this ee•e to e.xplQ:ln the taot that the re.vival or 
natu.Jntl law 1e JWt a g,Gmp:L@te one. The modern j\U'ist• 
tend � J,tepl'd natural law merelY a s  the yeh1ole tor an 
e-.m1nat ion of the· relationship betweoh aorali'OJ al'ld law. 
i.1h•u oo:noern is with the second :part o:r the Sehoolmen' a 
4oe-t:.tn• ( in th• woris of D• mtreve.a ; tttne p0tnt of inter-
. 2 section*' between meJtQlitJ' ancS. law). !'he :rao4ern Wl'1tera 
ue 1••••• not m.oP&li�Jt.e. Their tafl]t iu to .-abe the 
tu.ada.ental basis Of positive lav, Gt wbioh theil' own o1TU 
1. or oourae tae ne:�ttral law ts still 41aO'Used. \)J' 
sahola•'l1c philo·aopher& and theoloP.aJU�. !he :uae 
or 'Miarltatn stands out 1n this olaaa. 
or. Leolereq, e•atfo�f tor Ol!£U7lf lfatural Lay, 
2 Na tural Law . rum ( 9 ) Jl• 64> at P• · • 
law is u.ppemDOst 1n their !!1nde. 1 
S1noe the CJ.e,,l1ne and demise ot 'he ius nat�le 
echooll1 anothe� problem bad com , to be felt important s 
not only to shQw that legal w.les had a rel.8t1oneh1p with 
tthioal �1no1plos but to 41st1rl8''-1sh tho legal ru.J.•s from 
the eth1oa l :Prinolplea .f:n.MIP�\-fl..Slt thia :Nla�1onsh1P• Tht 
mod�n 'W'J.'Ii tta!'s differ trom. the !U....�t school 1n that 
they d.o at t•mpt to m.�k off 'the rela.ttonship between etb1os 
and pos it iw law. And tlley ao eo ; · it se$\a; preots•J.J 
b¢caus$ thw; re�tln to that g�Jeat ion as the Sohoolmen $81f' 
it• 
Aa 1a eT1dtn t hmn Geny' s  own 'WORt the crrlt 1claa 
ot the n1nettenth oentury e�h.ools had a. profound eUec't 
1n this respect. !be S'l' stetn$ and appXtoaob. ot the tu 
:naturale sthool u14 not :rttlt, ..l tbe n•eds or a soo1etv th• 
taoe of wh!eh wa.s cban.g!ag., n()P indtt$4 the del8S.nds ot a 
3u,.1at1e tee.bniqu.e. oenstt�ontlr, 1nsp1ftt 1on was 110\IP,t 
ela:nh.- • baek 'bey9nd tbe aevent•enth aenttuwa. 2 
'· An exoept1en; to a oeriain <axttnt.. is �· !hta 
'tb.MrJ of the 4oaneo is an e.tt-l)t to bNek 400 the 
ns.�ul'll  law tnto o-ertain muAponent parts aDd., to thte 
extat.,he 1a oone ..-a with the moral qtaea�io». But 
.hie traa ta.mt of ihe na-tural law in this WIIJ 1a aeHl¥ 
a Pftlbllnary to h1s 4180'Ua1on or t)le relationahtp 
b•twea natu.ral law and pos1t 1•• taw. 
see Rou:b1er, 'l'heol'tt rntrale 4u Dro!t ( 2D4 U. 1951 ) 
pp.18 e aeq. 
He7e 1n fsct lies cur jnst1�ieat1on tor discussing 
th• modern �1tt.--rs. �hfJir approa.oh throws ligh't on the 
mtul.n.Gr in which l!:gm:l s ee the d�t:Pina o� natural law 
�a �elevant. to their iU.ee ipline 1n i'Le m.c>dem setting. 
Finall.J', I \t'i&ll "to sey e few woJtds a'bollt the per1o4 
ot the 1-evival, and the writeP; wl't.Qnl 1 nave oh0ae,n aa 
the twentieth centa.n:7 that the r•1ftl wm.a qonse1ousl7 
Jleoogn1ze4. Chamont proclaiu it 1n bia RgigS@!W! 
dB V9it M:E»!$!• 1  But 1t wac not '.lnt 1l tll� t'Went1oa 
\bat the extent o� t.b.e J.J"11Y"¥1Val 1s ruJ.lu reallmed 1n lepl 
o1rcl••• �e e.ppe,aranoe � th� Afo,h1VS)§ de -p};l1logop\}1e 
fi1 dr9j.t and 1 ts contim1atton -ror a Pt!!r�od ct twelye Jl8rl 
to the seginn.ins art tllG f;eoontl woitld war 1nd1on tea Ule 
1)l'otound ett�t w.hieh tbii ·��.tings o-: �nv, Dup1t ana 
a othe:ra had ().ll tb.t losal wrl�'h 
Parle, 1910. lbl.en lf.»eaell Legal PhUoso� Sa-tea, 
p�. l06 trl{j lo� c�t seems to aiae tn:• 
:pelnt 1n attJ-1nt1QB 1 'te reYiTal to tbe intluenoe o� GJtotlU.a .. 
J1an.v or tlle anJeles 1n the �fY!i.1 aN 4eyo'e4 to 
a atu.47 e'f GeJq • 1 al'l4 �1t e l · eaa. 
A.aotbft �istmttlent!al ;J�l o't \b.e Pfb"ied ia the llftne Internet ionale de la �heon• 4u droit, 
1926-19}9. 
But thi s gives Pine to & furtheP question. In what 
way is 1t JAfi.aningf'ul to describe such vt.P 1te:tts aa ''Jaode:m 
natux-al la.wye1t"$ n• l $  inclus ion iiJJ:thin tbis category 
to be ea1�ed on tho ground tha:t :-; 'fihese lY.VitePs adhere to 
thtt seholesti.e me tbod? OP is the t1oket o't admission 
to be som�thin,g diti'et-ent weh 8. S  a gene;,ul coneem with 
the ethicul basi� ot poaitiVG la� 
I t  ic wtbmi t tod t.ha t tho 3Lt1. tt� �w :r- comes n.eares­
tb.e truth. It is not their enthue:J 1a a2tl  tor ·�l!e works o� 
ihe $choelmen Qut �ethel:' the- &.Clcop·tence Qf a Q.ootrin• o� 
the relat ionship bGtween mol"".a11ty ana luw whioh is the 
ohsraoteri&t ic ma1--k ot the modGrn vt.t'i ters. Dn.gtli t inil ed 
refuse& to use th� ·term una tursl law'0 • GeX\V allhees to 
no single auti:ui)r$.ty. Onlu Dabin fortifies his tan 91th 
oopious �fer$llces to Jiqu1llas.. But our evaluation of to 
''aode111Ji natlu'al lawve�sH is n<�t controlled by th1a t ot, 
wb.ieh 11ight se• 8ll�PY1siBg. Our ju.dp$nt o:t• the1zr. 
lJllitinge is cU.reo ted to and takes aoeQUn'ti or the tact tbat 
tluw Jto-:toa.ulate and diecuss tlle qu,eat1or.L w1 th -.bioh 'Ule 
S•hoohte-:n. •re &nlY ganwall� oollOOTJ,d ; the Hlat1oneh1'P 
between tat !ex Qf!tyalia n11d the , � pqoita. Whatever 
ep1a'ttmological approach they take, howevw vape and 
unreeolYO'Cl their philosophical poaitiona may 'be, OM th.1ng 
1e olear s they are re-thinking that cl'Qo 1a1 q11eat1on. 
ot tne -.hree wri tePa whom we have chosen to discuss, 
l aen: 1a perhaps the f,os·t wall-mown. .t\ jurist ot great 
repu.te, he endeaveu.red to cover as mttch materie.l as 
possible, and his Sc,.f!Me @t :Z�hJ.litJW 1s fUled 1dth 
refeJ�eneee to woPke on phU·osepJ:w, peycholosr and science 
as well a s. of course, to w&rke on law. Mloh of th 
§ci!p,qt, 1s devoted te en anaJ.7sts of vaPious theoz-iea at 
law ot the ntneteen�b. een1iury and early tventieth otntUJ7 
but the J>art with which we are part 1Ctllarly conoerned 
is his analysis or the ngiventr a:nd ttecnstruc tedtt elements 
1n positive law. UnfertunatelJ' , there 1e a "tenclenc:v 
on h1e pe.t-t to have reeouree to an 141oayo:rmt !c form o� 
eXPresa1on to describe the relat inshlp between utval 
law and positive law. Wh.en we d1scuaa hie works we will , 
whenevett we think '\hat 1 t ie n�ede4, tl.W' to qJ.aPUJ the 
language whiclt he usee. 
�it� a oontempora17 of oe_,, aas adOpt.-.! • difter­
ent •p1atftlolog1oal a�aca. a\u� tntluencd by 
Du.Pkheiln. ana the latte)'t" a sooiological b&nt; lw •• a 
vehement eritio \):f the ''metatlb7•1oiana1' who �Ut theories 
1. 1861-19..., .  
2. 1859-19 28. 
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In Dngutt ' a min'"1, the only va�. id 
apProach was the " ac i�nt iftc u one � the world o-r tttacta" 
provid ed the. sol$ re3earo h mat erial for t h e  jurist. But 
Dugu. it al so d.tt?er&d f!-01'1 Geny in the:·t'li hla int erests lay 
in the fi �ld of Qonst itut ional law ra ther than Qf private 
law, and hie ap!>:roach is tl.idlftt ed not so rrr�..teh by a des ire 
J' to unravel the £!2_nn�1 of part ic ular ·:rules aa by a desire 
to ex:plc,r(f the· relationshi'l') between the ata·�utorY law - y 
( �:.:!2i't. f'orP}!l ) and it s organa 9 on the nne hand, e.nd the 
g_91-; _ _2P_.jeotU, which aro se in the bosem of oooia1 inter­
eou.r.se, on t h$ othe� hand. 
Dabin1 1a oonct;�rned with both que st ions. He is the 
product of t he 'tW6ntieth centa"J'Y , and ha s had the opportunit� 
nf t ak!ng into oons1d.era tion the d<9Vel onmant ot tl:).e ideas 
ot the ma st.::ra in. the works o� t heir d ise 1:ple s. One can 
aay the t he i r.1  more 1.n sympatb..y w1 th Garq ' s approach than 
with tha t o'£ Du$U1t ,  although he eubjeeta both writcws to 
C'riticism. A a we ha�e ment 1oned previousl)T , he alone ot 
th• thpe� exhib it s  h i s  knowl�ge of the t exts of the 
Qwmma (but not ot the D$ Legibus ). 
1. 1889-
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In t he followu!g two ohapte�s , t� propose tv discuss 
tb.a ·l;wo pax•amount ·th.em�a in the wo!•ks of these writ el'\a -
tho not ion of the �1gi·V'en :>� anu the �cE.n:lt-;'t:r'Ucted .t' .,  w1d the 
not iou of ·�he co!1llllon goo&� 
Chapter 8. 
The "G1venn and the "Construct a..�•. 
I.  
It seems to ue that a great impetus tt;) the modern 
stndy of the relat1onsh1v be�ween ns tttral law and poe1t1ve 
law arose in large ••sure trom Gent' e employment ot the 
notions of oetain 1Preclueible *'g!T$tls " and "eonatrttot ions " 
et the jul-1ste. AccoJ-ding to Gen_v , the taek of the jurist 
is to study and apply to hie d1seipl1ne the "givens " 
l whio.h are acc essible to his rea son. 
aerw be lines that the natural law ts a phrase 'Wbioh 
refers to certa in "teots » which exist 1n the wottld aa4 
PJ'esent themselves fer recognit ion by the jUl-iet. HIH 
lists :tour tnee : the �o;nne r;el. the tonne higtorifll•• 
the donn! mttorm•l and the trume 14ia1·;L 
The Amm+ ritl could most PJ'OJ>Gr17 l:te summed up aa 
:tacta of the material and bumen W1'14 : the Pb.vsical 
o il'enlmatanoea, -.he JD.OJ'al end religious aapirations flit aen, 
" 
l. jo1enot tt T.eoytgUe tn d;ppit tr1ve�'1\t:• 
ar'£ 2, pp. )ti§e 8$q. (lt. Par s19�9� Paris ) .  
2. 2. P• l1l• 
the economJ.e an4 enYil'onmental oonditiou. The tnstitut 1on 
t>f marriage , for ins tance, ia grounded. on the d1:t'ferenoes 
ot sex of the parti es ( pbye1cal and PS7Chologioal ) in so 
tar as the deteJ��ainat 1on of the rights and dut 1 s of th 
part ies aN oonoerne4. 1 
socoN117 , OeDJ DOtes e donne hietor1qUe. 2 This ,  
he 88J&, oomprieos tact e viewed AOt in thelr stat io :ton 
but in a s1a te e'£ flux : the changing scene, the develQpm.ent 
ot human outlook$. The difference between the 49!Jbe riel 
and the tonne h1tttz1tst is that the latter imposes 
d1reot 1on and liJQl'PQee on the former �r the guidanc• of n. 
The inat&tut .&on or mar!'iage is built on the _"lu�tett :fBots 
ot personal and aelQlal character 1st io.s. 3 
But tbe 4olU'!li h1ator1qu.e and the donne !'eel are not 
l\ltt1c1 ent 1a tumselna to A.:l.J'eo� the line o� huma.n aotion. 
!he paet eantl()t oo•""l the .tu:ture, although it _,. ltave 
its iaprint Otl. it I 01t :prl8St Cf11 l)&l'tO.i·& eolalJ'e 
.ePYe1lltuaement le pr6e-mt ne 8flll1Ri'l ete!nbe 1 t aven!r 
4. �-0011 a an-ater """ propfa. • .,I. lt u ike �' ion 
o� the Apqpt ptlQ!l!l to appraise, �dse anti 41reot. 
1. z. p, }71-J. 
2. 2, P• 376• 
'· 2, ,. 377. 
.... a, p.,38o • 
The donne rat1onnel ooneins in those wlos of crinduot which 
are derived t:a-n 0\1!' r�etlootion on t� pu.ppoee of human 
aet1on. It d1ttePs :from the m-evioua dou's in that it ­
oentJ'el fee ture 1s cntr human judgment on how man gp,p� to 
act, 1 to :retvn to the marriage exaaple. th union 'betwten 
men ancl Ylt , eecording te tne donnt l'&tionnel. should be a 
stable and p�ont on •• 2 
P1nall.7, Geur stvea -1e d$f1n.it ion of the 4onne 14eal. 
While the tlonni rra'C 1onnol is limit ed to those f1ft PJ'1n­
o 1Plts .ioh Mn Sh$%'8llJ �eoopi2(9., the 4oM6 td•e.l 
ooQI'1sea "4ea14eNta". '-'b.ese include tttoutes lee aspi.Je­
t1ons b.uaatnes., en we 411 p.rOgee incessant dn <lro1t PG 1t1.f11'c 
ID tae't t 
" • • •  •n c.lehora 411 J,'eglement 3U�141qtt ; � t !mpeaent 
lea .--.11t•a de le. vie w lee ·��oes ·�• la raiao� 443& cp•l qa• Ptu. orpnistes PU l hltl'tot»t, •• pr:6aen\e un enaeJQble de oen 14eJ-at 1eu, a ' orcb'• 
])bt8l<JD*• PevCh$logiqtte, 1101'8.·1, Jtel. lfta; ticono.t(j\le, 
politlfll• •  Jill• . •t · , de · •- :t t 
• . . • Q . ' . 
It 1a 1mpol'tant to srasp tbo d1st 1n0t 1on '•"wten the 
4onn.6 14ea1 and the tonne rat tcnnel. 'l'he su\lj.•t-matt.- ot 
"h• 4onn6 rationnel is absolu.tel.J' 1nd 1spenae.bl e tor rtsht 
l. 2, p. ]81. 
2. a, p. • .]8a. 
3. 2, p. � 
aotlon, while t he sub ject••tter of tht donne ideal is not
1nd1&Pfnsable lN.t mwelu ciesira'bl.e ant oo:rutuc1ve to the 
realization of the tel"Dler. For eDtttple, although, 
secomtng to the 4onne J�alionne1, marriage ought to be a 
stable unie11• &·'Wi•t li.Ono,.. or tndtseelubility is not
preso�ib$4... These •l:u.es w-G pan o.t the t.onn• 14ta1, 
saaeated b1 Nrtectton. on the •ost effective w.v ot 
presft"Ying the ma�Piage bond. Gen11 1ntleed, c.r-1-blclzea 
94oonwntioDal n natual law -•�ts'ts to» e1ava,tng � tb.e 
ienk ot rational l;)indtna W1nG1:Pl.es aat are aoN 1n the 
nature ot ta.eal Ptno1)1es. Development ana retol'& are the
Oharaeterist ie maPks ef the donne 1dtiial. Unlike the doune 
l'a'tionaeJ. ,. lt ia nettber univ•aal llOJ- 1Jmm.ilable •. 1 
Ge!V' laue put a1tt"e·e on tbe taeultv ot lntu.1t1on
ln the :r too�1t1on o� the f.� t46e.1. lntuit1on. b.e aara, 
"baoka u,pu 0\l,.· :Ptaaon b1 $ n•ta.l 1'JQ'• lt .,Sl'fl.SP$ 'tl\ 
· 
rttal ...... nt ot 1�·- u rtloolh to tk:t ftltlU"t"' aft4 neeelle 
new patha. "l lllt "fdlct• tntultloas lulve no Place J.D. · 
<�eav' a 4onne �a.fhll. Tile latter ta ·•'objoot1v:et• in the •ena• 
that 1t te att etted to \lJ' eomnen eaeJtien.ct 8l'lfl J10t ortated 
1. 2, P•J81• n lt.J eee aJ.ao 2, P•l50•
2� 2; p.317� 
Beraeon• e t.nnuenc e is unm.1stakea�le. .see !oa.t�toh, L 'ft'WJ.t10JI1\1JIIafl llel'IAIIC 4BDa 1a
ili_ oaojite 
4u 
�. i 
· ANhlYea 4e p.tdl• 
080 . 
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• 
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bJ �ist1c Peoognition as suc�1 
Bo'd"rer , when it comes to assessing the oom.para tive 
importance of the four donn•s, Geny ranks the donn6 rationnel 
first. fhe donne ideal 1e aecondnn1 1n that the ;Jurist 
Ollght to recognize i'ts nb3tKrt-.mett P a something which 
will pe�eet the princd.ples of the 4onni �tionnel anA 
rill 'be p1ded 'bu tt in his fofti!JJit;lon � the l'ttles or 
pos�tin law. But tac t and hiet.o:py will also 'be u t111zea 
by the 3Uriet in hie determinati,on ot the role ot poe1't 1Te 
le:w. 2 
In his c1lecuselon of the t<mr donnea, oea,, althOtigh 
not 41reetly r-efC!!tl'�i:ng to tb , seboolaen, ehoVJS neYenhel as 
that he bas ia mlni the -probleaa with -.h1oh they wee 
ooneerned. He compares the donne ):'tiel with the t.ua 
natuele,3 the 4onne bistor!qg.• with 'th.• tus aen�1ua4. 
and tile d<;ume Mtiennel with th(r) i"$S1! nam£!111 of the 
1. 2, P•317. 
An ellll1Jlple ot the dorms 14eal wh toh ls ilsouaaed 
ia the 4eot:r1n• ot the "aooial r1ek"• so• �.}8a. 
saoh a 4ootx-1ne is u·t "slYen" 1rl tht eld.stlna laY 
of $he niaete-en'th OGtm'f� 
�. the Rule 1n Bylan4e and Fletoher tn Bngliab. lay. 
2. 2, pp. 389-390. 
3. 2, P•374.• 
4.. 2, p. 379· 
1 loman jurists. It is unforiunat.e tha t he takes no
fUrther steps to see just how far b1e aonnee do retleot the
notions with which he compares them , r-..ol' indeed to compare
his ,.iee.a with those ot the sehoollten. 
It seems to us that the demnes l'Ul, hiator1qae and 
ra tionnel l'eflttet the tU.eC1.lss!on rt6 the Sohoolmen. The 
1•1 netuJ!\lzlJih e e  wo have seen, !.a oom:pQttnded ot inel1na11on 
and jUAp.cmt and Oell7' s donne l'ati0nnel ana. donne reel, the 
toaer 1n so �ar o.a it eX!)'Pesaes human ludp.ent, the
latter tn so tar as it eXPresses the hu:man inolil:aat.lons, 
direct at-. «ntion to tb.eao features. 2 In this reQect, 
1ft can aee the wQntie:rtul 1nten'$et1on li>e�•en tact and
tm•n �U4pent. TM nete&l law teaches u:pon all aepeota 
ot b.u.Dlan l�e. 
llo•ev•• GenF' s us$ of �he "Ward tttaetn to denti)te not 
oill7 'Pb7s1oml ancl h1$ ter1cal. taets blili ·also �plea ot 
1� a. »P• 3$0-a.. 
2. au.,., Qh • . 2. M 1. �  .d� · 
But ,b. «&nne reel 4oes •xtewl ..,.,. th• bouniariee 
td tlUt natu.ral 1Dcltnat:t.ou, 1D that 1t ooaJtrl•••
»t¥a1ctal otrcmutfblCJes 8$ . wn. GenF has tn a1D4 
otUr 41801Pl1D.• ( eoonoa:tea, aoololep ) �leh ,_.
unlmc;nm., crt oouree, ln tlleir ao4ern tOJtm��. .  to the SOboolllen. Ae a �OhiU'llt 0eDt aeeae � bne bea 
wotw.niUJ 1Dtl:nenee4 ltv Xontes(fllln. wbo •• one ot �he ftnt to Clraw .-ttention to fb.e reld1on.ah1p 
l»et .... n' law ana errtiroaental oondttioaa. 
OP�AUet tatlSt 'be J-e-apprats.ed. we ought not to oonai4e 
sn.oh pr1nc 1ple.e se taet a  tn the aallle sense e.s 1Jhen we use· 
t.he wora. to r-efer to fi!Cts about tb.e wollld. !o he sure ,  
there ia a eonse in which the �d ·�aot�' may be use$ 1n 
,-.r•eue to Pr".t.notplee ot' e.onduat a.� tnt1t ie 'wb.e!l w 
881'; f:of! •8Jl1ple, tl:utt it is e. fa�t that ee�tatn peopJ.et 
$'-hen to -eeriatn PJ'ine.tpla. 
ln the "nte:n of natu,ftl lew, �-.'a, � ave not 
••·•lF tallt:bll a'b�.da pinc1plee in this w.y� Wha-. we ere 
aay1ng 1a that »eople, in aG flaP �a th• ere mem'bera o� 
ihe � nee, Otlpt to llehsve in a cmain war. Whil 
the pr!ne1ple that the union betw•� ma..n and ·'W'OJif,Ul alloultl 
'be e'iahl• 1il\1Bt be appl.unte(l � a ��atntmt or phJ'eloal 
tao't ( 1. •• tha\ hUJ.lan b•tllgs, in ec :ta,- ae thoir sexual 
oha:Pao'terietioe are o0neemeA, e.�� d1V1dtd into aale and 
teaale Q4 bM'8 an inellllatloll to tntero�U.Pse) Qtl 8 
eutaent ot hlsteioal taot ( i. e  • •  hat "he 1natit1lt10n ot 
au-rtsge le ,b.. Ja0,..,..l aeus of sivin!J meet to tltte 
inoli.natton}, th• �»let tna� tbe wdon shollld � a 
stabl..- a:n4 p.,..nat ott-e ls not a statfl\ctP r4 tact 1xl 
th:1e aenae. It 10. n a :f'Mt tie" J1fUlN people aot aoCOI'41Jls 
to �1• prln01Pl•• But Oerur is not �utns or the tun+ 
D$1tJ.Pl!l 1n this ,..,. lie is thblld.ng ot a JIQn]. 'PJ'!Mtple' 
ot ooDduot •toh, althftsb, it can onlY optl'Bte U the 
l&o 
physloal and his·tox>ical taots enot, o-tlght to guide human 
· beings in their a"-tttttde towards the. Uil1o.n betnen man
and woman.
oan we aa.y that eeny ' a a�proach 1s eigni�teantll'
cU.t.terent h-om that tll the schoolmen' Be� atbd.ta that
tt 1a \\1ft1olllt \o delin•:t• weetselJt the 'bound.al'lea ot 
the tour oat egc-riea. As vd tb the SOhoolmen, he doea not 
olea!']Jr describe '!Jhe J'ttlat1o.naht:p 'between tho lncltnatt.ons 
an4 the hmaan jUtlpent, 'Gut pe.-hcips they laboutd. llOJ? 
than he Ud to diet �ish the natuftl law fttoJll tbt tua 
gentium. lk>reG'fe!.'t ulike Gell.Y• thw """ l tll to aa:m1t 
an "Ueo.l " part at the ne.tul'£11 law. !hey come near t
to S4aittll1Bf A. 4orme ldfital :ln ':PGCOt)1:7,zblg a 41..-1810n 0� tht 
natural law into Pl'12rlal7 and $econdaJ7 PJ"eoepta. 
It aeems that !. t ls '.n this eraphaata on the � 
14oal tb.a t oe.nv ' $ �P · $s1ctm. b.euo!Ui �· SOb.oollaen is 'o be 
tou4. ID4ee«, ln tb1 eonoo-t, we haT.t ttl• aetcle 0'1 a 
oonewa �or •h• o...-lo]JIIlbt ot ,,_tl. No lot21J• .,. •
to ·oeelt or .. ,..., •• , pPeo.fpttJ trr ,h. natural law, tor theae 
aH �he � preeete wbieh are the active CJono.-n or 
\he •1st. \'he tllll'Pbae1s ls on dnelo}JJdnt and tnter-
Pretcatton. !heft and •l!der are a� ·COU!'" WHDBa wl\1ob. 
ought '\o be tnooJ!'PO:Pa ted into all .legal 8781.,.., bat 8Q
teo ar• the Jmltitartou.s Nles and J!'l'ino1J)l.ea 11bleh an
J.8l. 
need.ed 1n tlllf 4neloped legal :avstem. 1 
Gony himscelt conc eives 'the donne id,al to be the "link" 
between na'tl.tral law and pesit ive law� The natural law 
oupt to be inco:PPO�ted into pceitiw law - the 3v1et 
will 'be able to achieve this by resort to the pr1no1plee 
2 ot the AsmJJ! !Mil• so it 18 that when tht �ur·ist 
oeno-eme himeel.Z with appl.'y1fts general -pine 1plee to 
paJ11Clllar et"t'Uations and in gi-vitls a »N-t1o ulu ooutet 
'to a legal sYsta he 111 1 look to th• detailed prtnotples 
and rule$ pvem.s.ng haman aoti•1 tu and touehilll upon •n' e ' ... . . ' lite, l�ertr· al!a4 prepes-t7. And when he concerns b1m$elt 
ri th this process $f awl1cat1on he will find h1me:el1' 1n 
the Halln o'f teohnltp•• .._ 
a. a. P•l9-3• 
3. a, 'PP• )9·6-9. 
4.. 2 • pp.}Jil-9. 
II •. 
1'1W no·t ion (!II a juptatio t-chn i q_Ue P,8.e a "!fe"'!'' old 
beg1nn1DC• Tb.$ Roman 3U:r1sts epea}-.: of tb.e ¥1! 3ust1 t&ae 
anti 1t •••s ·that the no't1� Qf �uri.n�lJ.!. oan be 
11-aoed bG.ak to ltnan SfnWt.tts, whal'*� it signit1es the 
practical aqtirtty oz t ho  1nte3f�etex-s of Itoman le.w.1 
In moi7�ern iblelh the f1otP..hea!a on. tf;tChnique is to be 
fount\ in the ��ke of the Ger�.man wt�iu:rs,. :lavtan;v ana. 
lhet-·1nS• the t'ol'llGl: 1n hia diacm�sion �tt the t:ask ot the 
j\1r1et in 1:fanelat� tht1 Jslhs�!U into J.-pl teru1 2 
the la tteP 1n h,is; d.1$GUS.e.1on #!:1£ law as a mesne - $Jld 
dieo ipli..."l • 3 
In the !IJ•a9• !t W•t�ftt ae� bs-tnge thta not1oa 
to life aga in as the pJwnomen.en which oba.rac>:ter1see tu 
work of the �iat seeking to t;pansJ.ate the MDII. into 
tMt �ge at PQS1ttv� �escriP"tion. 4 flie c�•s the 
'IWk o� the $aft.s1 wit.h the e�t!y�:ty ot the BJ't1at aal 
1. ••• a.zm. kt mdMI dt la aptigQ It #t&Wim4Jnot (19a$ 
a. IM !!at 'YM!U£. �-� (1.892) p. S. Bet Ge!Wt }, P•'-
).. Ltz !I a 'If. '' M InA· li>dem l.epl PhUosol»b7 S.1•• (19 . . • 
,.,. 'I P• 12. 
tftlP't"�' who com.mtance with a general :Pla.ll of the woJ-k to 
be ecM..,ed. and iih�:n aet out to e.ohieve 1 t. 1 
�h� vltttm law - the J.oi acrit - is to Gen.y the 
the m.ater !al ot tha �ist, the maohine"Y at h1a trade, ror 
1 t alone ean rendatr ooncllete o"'J sp otr.ic 'lha t oth81'1d. e 
J�U.St �tema!n 1n the reahl or genual � iples, vague 
end U!l4en.ae4. 
"La lol 6o»1te. fl' On a, G!W'ltf1H ' le •e»b:e � tt 
du avott ' , qu!&it� autre choso, �'u pt»-o.o.a.f. 
lU{flJlt •t pe.r•et1oaa »ear 1 t uce!d.o$1 � de 1 'bll 
P� :t!u� 4tll :ttslss, de leu nature. flotta.Mea, 
eqt�1Yflp8 ... t•o•tainteat na 
' 
GeDF is or the opW�n 'Uult ''eo1enoe " !IU.St M 8\lt>Ple­
aen.ted - tech!llqae, trg th$ mb ject-matter ot rtatu.ral law 
oan e1'117 M tneo.rpeated tnto a legal aratea bJ" means ot a 
pantoul..a.r aetb.o4. Aooe1"41ns to this m•tho4, the jurist 
Q.kea ... ot oenau lnlelleotu.al ��· to 11104el ill 
doml4t to the r•qUJr·eaen:ts ot tlle �urt4.1oal erettm.3 A 
$Uoht ocnt1Jmos oenv. teohn!flle m&7 be 'rintd. tn � 
st•s•• fd ..,..lcna.ent• 
Jf' .c·•-= ·_I t  .I ,  .. , •. ..,_, • ..,usp s• 
1. � eou-�•, 'the plan mar have to be aci6.1fted h the
prooeaa ot aeotttioa. 
2. '· p. ll.
3. 1, P•91•
1 ) The 3U,r1st de termines tbe ne.tvf! ot the interests 
to be protec ted by law. 
2)  \fe:.ks out the r elationsbi:p of Pl'0!>11'-Ddorance oJ-
equivalence bet"Men �ee-e in;tePeat s. 
3 )  S,at&ma t1zee. $Ueh a "la :ti(.)ns,htp by �eans or oonoepta 
and toftllla•� 1  
At t.hia last s tag& of the olabc)l'a1$1o:r! �t NSit iTe law 
whieh is marked 'b;v abstJ'J!Qt CQfts:tw� ti·on, •'logieal reasoning 
r�ilw ,, lillll'?rib�Al lclt'as, in the 'l1sht or ge:nel\&.1 nee4s • • •
ideas � 1llO�t.ct i»to WOl?de, j'U.dSIA$.nta into·mfol'JD.tlla • 
!the qstcm CJf lt.\w io �J�eet E4 into tl. vaet acheme ot oom­
partl1lents· . ... n2
!he mil1glini; o:t ·�e !1.9.&! and tae go�}� 1e beat 
1llusi:re.teo by Geey ' s d ia01.1aai.on of w. partionlo.r mlt o� 
oivil law ; t.b.at wb.!O.h Mlatoa to ilueefUJttiun ·to an e,tatfl
oi' an atee• M• l:n ta!a �i tuatwn, tb� iWist ia taoe4 
nth oerte.:J.n 'MI"al wJ.nctples blEtnied 'd. th so.olologtoal 
ho't$1 ittclt as the unity o� the t.'Sl!l1l.1 and the olalme of 
vanoua 1JfJmbex*s t� ware tn th• soo4G ct th<tl inte.-te 
P81'aon. It is wlum theee olaims a��;t to be t1'lU1aJ.a.te4 into 
1. 1. pp. lll-U.J.
2. 1, p.ll�t-• se• alec 3; p. al. 
W5 
�ltl'1diea1 'Hrms that tho need f� �-lrid1cal conceptual1za­
tion beOOJne$ appa"nt.. A bi�rchy flf rights a s  tar a 
su.ooession is concerned ia creetecl - a h1�rcb7 mich may 
•nl7 ap�xiaate to \he acral. principles and eociologioal 
facts. But suoh a h1oravoily llUSt ens� U the various 
o�aims are to 'be reoogn!ze<l by law at all. 1 
aero- ausgesta ·tb.Q·� teebni que is tb.e wrk of the wUl . 
ra tn<Jr tl'UJn of ti'•u ro9.oon; 
11A of>t& de leA pienc.�, comple�tet.- oo mm.• i_. vient 
d' •tM 41tt "Pftll l.e. c!'Q.Yanee" 1 '  tnt�pr$t9 ( au  sene 
�l'p wemot ) trcm.ve 'Unti ant1"$ fr.rt•ce d�eb1ce 
aan oette te-chl:li�$ 4tt dl'n'-t - �.,l'n'e de volol'lte 
plus e.noore qa� d · O:tl'tGna:dent "!'< iont tout 1 ' ea.-nee 
u n�ne A. un• a6Jt-ptatton auss1 pal':faite �e 
POe.ai�lo. aos :racyens atn but , ntai.s Cf-1• . pax- --l.a . · , ., gra�e l cles 'PJ'Oo$4es inspiJJOe 4 1m ant itlent de 
telfelcgie .P):4t:aU,q\l , cvxwtitut , ell� &nasi. u.n ad3\lYtint m+thodoiogtt1!e a '  1m;p.$"anott capt tale. 
aans le tecl:uli<[Ue-. • •  le AX�Vit pQ$1t1f l"�J�toi'St1 r�1t • d•e li�e Ya�s ,  '�P gent�alea; 
n·t enea&.,etnt .,e d • un  ho.l.o :i.nme.l.�ble et �6t1n1 
le �7att 4e la vto -.oei�le. �e� 8 la t.ehnt�; 
tO"J.t se l.iln!te et ee Jireoise. i,;'2 
In \his �as:tsage , Genu ie dire�t i!l.g OlUI t:').ttGnt ien to th 
ehoice of means. lfb.�E onQiC @ ie :rslated by llCI1'41 to the 
facmlt7 � th.t will • Ouch o. ohcdce ia nec-o-saal';V 'beeaaat 
ot the lnd$'tendwtlon or the donn�s. � choic).e is aado 
of one pen1cul#!.r $elut ion out or a l1.11mbel' ot al teJ�.DAt 1'Yea 
1. 1, � 115 et aeq. 
2� 1, p. l88. 
wh.ioh presEmt themselves to the jurist . It is not a�b 1tr817 
I tor it mu.at take e.eoount of the donn.Ge , but there may be 
ldifferent aeans ot achieving tbe ends dea!red. 
The qttest1on whi�h we mnnt ask nt this ste.ge is this.
Does oen.v twve in mind the l�gi sla tor Q!: the lawyel' ( judp 
or interpr�t.er }'l !f h� is thinking of the �rmer, then 
it 1� c lear that his analys1B l"Bf1ec t a  th e q.!trg1nat.1o 
of th� Schoolln.en, If he b.a s in mind the la tter, then the 
count erpart 1n th.e schcolmen' s v10.rks is the 1r diseuaaion 
of 1Jlte:t:Pr�tet.J;�_o.!! .. 
I t  seetne that t he woras in th� parer1tbe6'-e - f:Jl sene 
lf!r.s.e du_]t_gt - 1n.d1c·ate that Gel.V ha s both in m1nd. And 
later on in his work, he e:r.preasly defines tech.rdqne a s
ecmrprt s tng both a leg1slat 1Te techni que ( ereat1Qll ot law 
by eta tute e:r custent ) and a ''j'urtsprndetut1.al � t_,hn1 qa.e 
( or-.8.t1on ot law by �td1�1al deo !eion and intervretat ton). 2 
We wet e.eeume that (Je:ey eo.netders that the element et
oho1oe ie present 1n th4t W'"f'k of the 3ud.ge a s  well as 1n the
wrlt at the legi1;1lato"• 3 
1. 3 ,  pp. a:> ... l ..  ef. SUeP&z t s discussion of th�t
detemtnat,t9_ §!.l!r8t PP I 2� - �l � .  
a. 3,  PP· 21-30�
J. ' thode 4,' Int e Itt a tion st aour�u1s en d!'o1t · < iT•
· 8  t , Book 2, PP• 74-190 , for his disousaian o� the 
ask o the int erpreter 1n relat ion to 'tree ao 1ent 1t1o
reeeareh. 1 1  
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I t  1e clear, however, that legislative teohni cpe 1e 
ot a d ifferent k!nd to the techn1cpe of legal dee1s1on-. 
The legislator, it may be said ,  is tl'ee to a mueh greater 
extent than the #mise, who is eo�ined 'by tlle llm.lts ot the
roe or ftles to 'be app11Ctd and inteppeted ( wb,ethe
statute law or ;!u41oial 4eel s1ens ) . The ;Judge, even though 
he may ohooae bttften twc contl1ot1ng JUles, 1e 9M1n.a.r1� 
prfftJlted from gotag eutside these rules. 
Ill .. 
Aec(ll'dlng to Gfn�J1 the tb»ee matn alms of lap]. 
teohl'Ufll• Qe : A n•nituae 4e det@'ldn@t1on. The 3ur1at
will eade&YClJU!' to 4•luie all eonoe1nl'tle al tua tiona wtthin
hla deter.mtnatlon. 
1 t;ftttRtlp 4' @dap)atiop. The ;tuiet
will ·na··� te 4tal wltb an the ' msaaeea' ot , ...  
e1 t;uat 1ou wh1oh JU.Y eecv. 
1 Sotsptti de :r'al1M)1on. The 3Ul'lat
wtU en4ea�,. to f'ol"'DDllate a nle whtob w.lll o".PeJI8W ill
r•apeo t o� •Ill' eventaalit7 whJ.oh 1ll8»' oocnq;. 1 It Will 
also at• atoeoonoa�J or etto� as all as tl71n8 to aeb.1ft'e 
e1Japl1o1t7, J'Bt1o1Vll1ty and &eOUJ'1'ty 1n the rol'blllatlen of 
the �·· 1 A1l nob ftl.u es are !nvol-ntd 1n the aearoh tor 
lS8 
prect1oab111ty , and although they m&7 otten eontliot, 
conduc e to the aohifWement of the desix-ed end in accordance 
ri th the technical apparatus ot the law. Often one lD8.7 
have to 7ield to another. A �tioular PQ!e will never be
perfect .  'but it least the attempt sb.�d 'be made to attain 
somewhere near�1peJ"fe:otioJb 1 
Ac cording to oexw , there are t-wo methods e� 1noorpora­
t1Dr the 4onnes into pos it ive law 'Whiloh he 4esc!"1bes a. s
"the re&uot ion ot tu substantial tlement·s of th.e law. •• 
The tlrst method is the "wbe'titution of! <l'lanti" for 
qualit7"• the aeeond ts the nel1lllin8' 1on" ot certain a spects
ot the donnea. 2 \base p�see need to be ex:plalned, and
the be st ,..,. ot aotng this is to take the ••liiPl• wiU.oh 
he on en o1tea, that f!J-1 suooession on the ft"ent ot tntestao,.. 
The "S1Yensn of this s ituat ion will be of a varte4 klDd,
ooapr1s1ns oertaln •ies of kinship. tho hieterioal in­
stitution of propert7 and the principle that the intestate
pePfJOa, tt he bAt.tl b••n al1Ye ; would. nave 'b•• abl •  to
direct the deYOlutien ·O� his prope"'• The 4oilntf 144al will 
IUIPfJt var1GU.S olaias ( at  next-et-kint he ira) • Among tbe 
eons 14erat1ons which presemt themselves to the aviat are 
1. 3, p.39·
2. , , p. ,,.
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the tollo"\t'iDg � d1scrtmtnat ion as far as the he1r 1s con­
cerned, bias towe.Pds J'ou.DgeJ' g(mera tiona; bresld.ng up ot 
poJ't1ons. 1 What the �1st wet do is to select ._he 
ex-iterla ld11ch he will tneorporate into the legal system. 
!his 1a a ·won Of " qe.nt11'1oation•t • 1n that, out o'2 a 
number of ooQeting olatma eaoh "18l 1d 1n its 01lfl right, 
the jt.u-1s' must uke hie obo1ee and establish a tbm 
or:l.terion toP cletem1n1ng Pi'tM"ity as taJt as the olaw 
are oonoemo.d. Viewed in another 11gtlt, the task r4 the 
�1st is to ename�te the oon41tioDS re�lred tor the 
operat iom of the legal nle and to presertihe th aanotion 
· ( uetq the woJ'd in a wtd.e sense • et:rec ts r , ·ognized b,-
a law). In som.e eases the "<flal1t7" will 'be al.Uet OOIIl-
pletelJ 1ranste.1'nd 'When, tor emQle, the law g1Tea .ttect 
to ae many olalms as possible, 1n other cases where 'Ill 
mb�eet.,..ttu is aore ooupl1oated, the " �t1�at.1Ye " 
. , asPHt 'W11l preyall. 
At thls atage, we may pau·ee to oomparo thia notion ot 
r.tttetlon with the SChoolllea' a  eonolu.a10;=dtld&IMU9 
diacms sioa. It baa . seme atrWt}' 'Wtth their 'ftey ot poaitl"fe 
l. ,, pp. 51t.-5· 
a. J, P• 57· 
J� s.e pnel'8117 3 pp, 59 et aeg; 3 P. it-98. 
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la• ea tn one respect declarat ive, in sn&ther respect
conet 1tut 1ve. In eoae JUles of law, the JlONl ele•nt is 
predominant , while in o ther rules ae, tor axa ple, a ru1 
of ev14tmce there is lto basic moral element pr sent. 1 But 
as we suggest ed in an ea:Plier part ot this thesis, the 
diohotom.v bas no abaoltte value. 2 we 1l8Y make us ot 1t
to point t• a mom ftatu.re of a nle of posit ive law and 
to distinguish this f eature fl'Om one Which is the woX'k ot 
ju:r1si1o eonetrnction. Wb.en, howevel!', w uamtn• a apec1t1c
set of rttles such as the law "leting to homic ide or t he  
law rel at ing to the enforcement of promises, we find an
admixture of both teatves. Geny himself draWB no bal'Cl­
e.nd-taat line of demareation between the two. 'l'o this extent, 
his ana3.7sis doee ilD.ProTO on that of tho SChooJ.Mn. 
Geny ' s second mot bod of the reduet ion. ot tho aubstan't1al 
elements 1s descr1be4 se the •-e11m1nat1on� or eertain
teaturee et the dGilllia. 3 In some oaeee, he says, the law 
1181 rehae :.eeop1t1on to so• teaturea 1n order to aohlne 
a 4ea1zte4 en4. POJt instance, the rae' that ••• te
absent tJ'Oa a partteular 'tranaaotton euoh ae a <!Onatlon" 
1. 
2. 
AlthoUgh vined in relation to the legal syst• aa
a whole ite 1m})OJ!Ptance is apparent.
SUpra, Oh. 5� j ... t l.3 · 
'· p. 9.). 
will not Pl'eYent the law hom l'etCOsn1J$11Jg the wa1141 ,,. o't 
� t.ren&a4t1on, tor the 'PQCt teal need of giving ettect 
to eu.e.h a traneactton iG peat.  �he la w111 41epense 
wl th the Jtequ!r•ent.1 Apin the lB. will atten recognize 
the 'f8.1141t7 br a tftneaot·it>n noh as the 'ranflf'e!' o� a 
obeqo.e wh-. some feraal l'equ�ement te aatiat1 , even 
when tb.e Dllh3etot1Te "..uls " or the pal't1ea cannot be l#Oft4• 2 
A &yetem er oommft'Otel l w cannot Ot>e1'8W on the re 
prtneiple ( 40nn6 ) tba t . �eemen's shOuld be kept. ln 
presor1b1Jis the na•Ul't of those apoement whioh ar �o be 
H008R111et\, th..-e 111U.8' l190$S&ar11J be establlahed ctJPtaflt
criteta oa the l'Jas1a ot which apeepts wUl be enfOJtOti, 
as 11011 ae Pl'OVieioa being made tor tnes of agreement 
which will au. lN eJlfofted. o.t C01ll'ee, w 1JIIJ.tn noogntu 
this. latW. case toP wba't lt 18 - e.n esoep\ton. oen· - 117t 
the 40DJl._ will 'be neoptzeA by -..he law aD4 ODlJ oeeaa1oaa117 
with 4e�a tr aotPt1-ou 'be ad1lor1at4.
o.n.v Nfera to the � ion ot the •nantlal •I•-"• 
•• the &a.\�Jml aapeot ot t"lmiP• � UMIIPI aapeo' 
ot '"bniqq.e 11 the creation ana a.we1o-.ent ot tbe 
toraal IIOU.JiCJ·ea ot law ' witten law, ouetom, au."hortt¥, 
••• law. 3 He �$ the tol"JJl8.1 &O'QIICea •• tbe "olot!Wis" 
1. 3, pp. 69  et •t•
2. ], pp. 77-78.
'· 3. pp. $1-93. 
ot the 1ntertoJ' :reduct tve p�cese.
"Ell.ea seuie.s, a pz-opPement perle, tont le 4n1t 
es1t1tt, en flxant les rigles 4«t leur nature - .  
�cons1ata.ntes1 que nous o�it l • elaboration 
aolentttt qae. u 
It might be ob j ected tbat we cannot use wch an 
analos;v in this oontext. It Gould be said that the oon­
orettzation ot: principles does not take the tOl'lll ot reduo 1ng
the prinoiples to oonorete tom and Q•D of pnttlng them 
into words 1n tbe ton of legislation or judicial deoia1o:n. 
Redact ion and formalization dovetail , or rather, legts­
lat1ng and judgillg are pl*Oe esses of d�ining end �t1oular-
1a1ng in the light a£ o rta1n pr1ne 1ple.s.
Aoool'ding to Genv, legal :torma and catego�1ee plar 
an important role in this p,-oceas of reduct ion and 
toftftlisation. The law otten makes uae of fo1'118.l reqa.ir ... 
menta e.a prerequ.1s1tes tor the reeogn1t1on o� a jur1et1o 
aot. 2 In a similar way ,  legal oatesorles a�e utllisel 'o 
provide a ooneeptual :tramewo:.k t�gh Which law 1187 operatt,
and may affect human aot1one.3 A bwun aot
1. '· p. 8.3.
2. J, pp. 91,.-122. An e-..ple would be the Jtegistn t ion
o-r the tnnster o'l propeJ't7. 
ttne peut ltre dtr1n1 qu ' au moyen de 1a oa t4!gor1e
qui 1 '  encaat-e et qQ1 renferme en ell l'  eft'et
speo 1t1�e, �· la lo1 a V<Nlu atteindre • • • •  
Loracp 11 .s agira de reoonnaitre eaotement qt1els
acws de 1' boue oom.portent les prescriptions dont 
11 a ' aatt , 1 ' art1t1ce oatcigori que, judioieuaement 
tntel'pl'e'W, sigDalera le trait d601f1:t destine a-.rep.- 1 • applieation de la rigle, tt . 
J-.m;plee of a catego17 would be the contract and the tort.
But the ca-tegories may be wide or narrow. Within the genaMl
cat egories there will b& more epeo itic categories ( tbe
2 tort o't negllge!f!e, 'the cr ime of lmn>· 
Just as lm.povt&W and closel,- related to the categories 
are general lepl concepts such aa aujet de 4Polt and
12!rsonnal1ti 1101'!1!• 3 The �ur1st can only ettect1ve17
''b:rlng tnto " the legal system the moral and soc1al givens 
'by ue!.ng such eoneepts to delimit the 1phere o� application
of the PUle o� positive law and to oblige or empower a
particular individual or poup of 1nd1v1duala to p.erton. tlu&
l. ,, »•147·
2. The seneral oa tegol'f188 would correspond to the lUB 
sat1wa ot. SWlHs ' s discussion. SIPI'!• Ch.l• A� 7 3 · 7 7 . 
3. 3, pp. l7,._ et &*q.
1 nte. Such oonoept a aa:r also be employed by the 3Urist 
to develop the law, . ae well a.a helping to keep the law 
well-oPde:rea.
2 
!be presaption and fie t1on are given as examples ot 
lepl conoepta w;lth a spee11'1o PQrpos.e. W1th the we-
aumpt ion, tho 3u:r1at UJ be taoed w!'th a cortatn a1tuat1on 
euoh a s  the proof ot . tacta. 
te.ete e.J-e dittioult to prove. Por ine,�tanoe, 1n s Olalm 
on the p8J't of e oht14 to share 1n bit:� tathor* a  •sta'Oe, 
it JIIUSt be established that the child ls leg1t 1aa•· Jn 
such a oaee the law OHatee a PNSll.'IJlP'tlon that tbe obUd 
is legitimate s 1n the race of the possible exist ence of 
a number of :taotst the law chooses tQ erect into a wt­
S'WD..'Pt1on a eingle onClt or a eombination of thea. This , aera 
GeDNt 1a �he wor� ot "qoan:tirieat1on''• ln an 14f&l uat• 
all taots ought to be pxaond but 1n the or41nat7 -world 1n 
wb!Oh we live, per.teotion is not always attatnabl • !be 
law soee even eo :tarvae to o �  trrehuttable preau.Qt1oa, 
where no ooat"-17 fi'V1tlence is admissi'ble. 1 
ln the case ot the tt1et 1en. the effect of the law is 
nen u:re cb'a stio. Fosa the lay may regard a person aotuall7 
resid ent in an.othe CO'W1'$J7 as res1d•nt 1n the country ot 
tbe rorwa tor c wtaln llU'POses. In 1t e endeavour to give 
ett ot to tt s pel1oy, 1t tufts 1ts back on tbe "eel �ect · 
( proeeh ot e11mlnatton}. 2 
Although 1n both oases Geny hae recourse to the notion 
ot reducti.Otl; in tht' oase of tb.e treswaption, rehet :lon . 
ot c;pal1t7 \o qu.antltJ, 1n th• ease of the tiotton, el.1a1na­
t1on o� concJ.1tlorus, it seetQs that oth.efl esprese1ona 'WO'lll4 
have been more SUitable to eXPlain hie ld e. When he us•a 
the qaal1tJ-�t1t� JSOtlon, he has 1n 1ll1n4 the tact that 
the jur1et is tao ei 1f1th e. mQnber of taots Q4 :pt-1no1plea 
from. which he mat Jl8.k• h1e ·select ion when 1� coaea to 
toraula\t1Dg a �·· Dr ttquan:tUtoat10n" GenJ uana that 
tile ;lurlat will e•leot olily oertatn prtnotpl a oJ- taote 
or a oou1nat loa ot t.ba. ttnlmtnatton'* 1s real]¥ tht 
,..,.,.. a1cle ot tbe aota, tor tb$ jUJ'iat.. 1n Jltld.q hia 
aeleo'tit'Dlt _,. •Xdlue or ipor one or a n:wah«r ot thea. 
1. ,, pp. 26ft. ... .., .. 
2. 3,  pp� )6o et ee q� or ooux-a•• the :tlotlon tt oan1e4 to ea:naea py · �ecome outrageotts 1 P• u.s. 
FinaU7, Ge� draws att•nt 1on to the important tttnotion 
wh:loh languge· plays in legal teclmit;ttl•• 1 It ie olosel7 
associated with the to!'!laltzation of the law, 1n making 
precise the actual operat ion of the ml • Th lan8Wlge 
emplo7e4 1ll87 often d1tt'w fl-om the languag of the ol'din8J.7 
pereo� Otten e 'WON will be extended w narrowed 1n order 
to aohi«We a desue4 end. wtdle prec ision ta a dea14era­
t1on., the rule may 1nelud• "opentt tofts in oztder to leave 
to a fUture tnt�ettng bod7 the taak of �illing out 
the C3on.oept. 2 
I have thought it ftlua'ble to present 1h this obapter 
an outline ot 08117 ,. $ v1eu on t ecUmiqa.e in ol'der to show 
how he appronohea the probl• ot the 111a11QeP 1Ji wb.ioh tb.e 
natural law� b ecomes incorporated into positive 1••• It 
ia eloer '$b$t hls 41aeusa1on of the qneation throwe •en-• 
11pt on the qU-estion ct 1noorpoJ'8.t1oD than 4oea that er 
the Sehoollien,. preo ise}J beeauee he Peoognlzes the �rtat 1c 
�o-l•s inTel?ed.. 
HoWYW tM question still remains Ylth ut : in ...Ut 
•;v does he ah� posit 1,• law to be A1UP!!! tNm natual 
1. 3, pp. 448  et aeq. 
2. 3,  Jl• 481. Por instance, a tea noh as old£! wb11-. 
1t)1 
laW'l Gen;r' s e.tf'ol'ts - 1n particultUt his ftpbas1s on 
1nCOl'P01'Bt1on - do seem to haTe the effect o-r blurr1lla the 
difference, orr ath.-, hia anal7sis does seem to mat• 
natural law a part of posit1'Ve law. 
' 
And vet, u we ttmn. to Book � ot hia wrk, we 4o :t111d 
that he Jleeogn1aea the poaa1bU1t7 ot a eontllot be'tween 
'the 4onU and. tbe oou'btli\.1 U there 1s auh a ooot11ot, 
tbe a.o.e. he 8&7&, ..s.n pr«f1l11. 2 The tenbn07 or the 
§91enee tt 'h!!m.l&! 1a to •1n1a1ze tbe poss11)111t7 at mch 
a eontl1o'• Prooedural Nblto law; 1n parttonlu the 
Pl'111c1ple 0'1 'llle separation of powers ataa at creatlDS an 
..m.rm.•t 1n Wlieh Peapeot �11 the natural law 1a ftNlr 
41111H144e4.l Vl11mate]¥, hcnr«er, 'there is a POI11lt1ll._ 
that th• struotu.re 1t&J oolle.pae. It iJ at thta etas• that 
the r1Sht 0'1 Jtuietance, as a ;J'U.71di8a1 1net1tutloa, ••t 
bel'M08D1..a.i 
1. ,., p.59. 
2. ,., p.60. 
3. .. PP•70-l• 
It-• ,.. p. U6. oe- cnttltnea the Y87 nr1naent oOD41 ttoae 
undn wb.1.oh the rlsht is adm.laa11ale • .ft., 1'Pe 12l-5· 
IV. 
ln th.• %bfil11 G!MaUJ.A\L.Dr<>�:L 1 Babin sub�ects to 
a very penetrating c1'1t1o1sm the notion of the "given" 
ana a "oonstwete-4" as co-existent elem.0nts 1n the rule or 
pesi tivo law. Ke is willing to X'E!Cogntze that there 1' 
elemen.ts which eld.st 0\lts:lde tJt ;tt:lrist1c conetPUOtion. 'but 
potnts te the 41ffieulty, from the point ot T11" ot the 
flUtist •xamtn1ns the legal Nle, Clf eepaMttns what is 
. ttgt.nn" �rom what u ec'Qeratru.otee. "• In general, aa:ve l)e:bin, 
eat is p..-en "1n tts -w statt't �� diffieult f61! the b.aan 
JD1nd to seize aa noh; t l9ast e oe:vte.1n Q.egree ot eon­
oeptual olabore.tton 1e neeeBeaJ'J'• 2 
lab1n .-ooogn.taes two types of conet�tiv ao'tint)t. 
It m� be Gt a teohnloal kind as •t�m th• '"ft81JI&n oP 
al1t1st brings ut,e e•letence a work b7 his lr.rrenti•• BltUl, 
o� 1t J1liiW ,-elate tQ hutltan aot1Vitr ot the 001'811 PO-litteal 
or eoonoa1o k!_..l 
As tar aa 1aw is ecmoene4, Dalt1n h-OP_. Qe'n7'a 
qaes'$1en 1n an. enua.vour to aseer-tala ft.ether law 1s "siT•" 
1. IIIII U. RM'•, Bl'WJ:Mlta ..,..., ... .,..,. atPe le a tJIAnalatS,on ot 
tile lat Jtttioa in 
e��ir m���=�culi M.4 .a.'ta. 20th Qen 
a. ao.ts. p.120. 
3. no.tt, pp.la>-1. 
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01' "cons'twotel"� He aaits that trotn QBe point ot vi w -
the hisioxatoal - le 1s "given". Whether it be the bod7 
ot ano1e»t law or ot oontempora17 law, national or 1nter­
na11oul law. the 3Ur1st is faced with som thi:ng whioh 
alPeaq enste, an4 whiob may be stud1t.d tram the point of 
Tift' of its develo�t ( hiatorioal) or from the point ot 
Tiew ot ita Wluenee on. the lives ot people ( soc1olog1oal). 
There exists, 1n ei'teot, a aoience of legal h1sto17 and a 
1 aoience o't the eoolol•mr of law. 
Jut law also P!-eaonta itself "in 1ta eaeeoe" to the 
"there is law Pttre and s11Jlple, clemtde4 ot aD7 
form et· coDCrete eld.st$:noe". 2 Viewed 1n this -�. law 
baa the nature o't oonstruot!ve ao·t1v11;J• savtp.v, �or­
ea.ple;· liet1�1shes the $01ent!.t1.o lahorat1on of th• 
3u71ste 1'Jioa the apontaneou.s o:r�tio-n ot law 1n the hearts 
ot the people. l!oreo¥'er, the tonal s<'JUl'Oee ot law • 
leaiala tton. eu.atoa, "jurisPl'Wl.encen - u• undoabtedlF 
eb3eota of oo.n.s-.�tt.OJl, perreeted b, the an ot the 3U1st. 3 
�ttl, all aebeOle ot t.boupt, whethe etartiDB troll an 
htaterloal, aetapb.veioal, or positiT.tst "SiTen", a" 'PJ'Opare4 
� oonoed• to '$he jlu'ist eODLe oreatiTe role 1n \he elabora-
1. •• 101. pp.l22-3 • 
2. no. lOa, p.l23· 
'· u.105, p.l2i. 
1 tion of law.
Bow Dab1n is Ve7!'3 c�1ti.oal ot the echoola ot thnght 
1fh1Ch ee.e nlaw't lilitima:rU7 1n the context .of what 1s ttg1ven".
O.RJ' a not ion• he &aN'S, is a oonfuaecl one. i'b.e netu:ral. law 
is ¥-tall7 a Jl9l!l notion which oom]'r·1aes the dut.ies ot men
'to1f8l'ds Oocl, to-.l'lds hlmSelf, and towards hie tallow b.umtn 
. . 2 .. . 
. . beillge.- Dab1n ta atJ-814 o� atlm1t�tns th• "maxtme.Uat tt 
oonemJ.on or na ttuel law.. aocordlnS to ldlioh not onJ.v 
geneJ-81 pr1ne1-pl$8 but lao mol'e tletailed prtnotpltts and
rules are 1no1ude4 ...S.thin. tta eoo'P•· In thiet O-onoep,ion, 
he tin4e tbe MOt ot the 41sea.ae which bae 4•bU1tated the
notion �m arotiu' time onwaJICl• : the ten4en07 to include
the "uaaru.l" ali4 "soe1a'bl•" within natural 1n.1 
Maitte4J¥, aa a aonl oonem, tbe natunl. 1aw diotatea
noaa of condue t whlOh are �oundel on the aoeial ne tQte ot
-� ODe canuot "allr eeparat• an illd1T14Ual acntaltt.r
btoa a aoralS.'IJ" ot poupa end inetitlltione aid aao:ribe to 
·ta1111]¥ ox- socd.al Ji0711llS a a•tue ditr•eat to 1n411'l4ual
110J'81a. Oat maN ��ore 4ef'tn• ncltural law ea oo111P1"lalng 
the socd.al anttn but limited to lndicet1JW tha ba•t.c
p:rtnoiplee (on wh10h the oou'btla1i·ve wrk of tho moN.l1st
J,. •• ].04., p.l,. 
2. s.• ••• n5-l12. pp.l38 et eev noa. 8)1-216. 
3. D.O. Z6, pp. 252-3. 
am. 
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While Dabift adm1ta that tbe:'P is a relationship between 
natural law and positive law, he 1s nevsrth.eless 1ns1eten.t 
on diat�iehiDs the two diaeipltnea.2 Natural law 
provides the mate1•ial tor the lUOraltst whoee task it la
to examine the natura 0f man. The aa.teria.l tol" legal etnd7 
1a positive law "which no dcmbt in 1Bl'se part comprises 
the dete.noe and sate�d ot the good and the �uat {�esentng
1\o�e �stiona o:t env�nt and technique.) but alag 
lll&ey c. \he!" meaWMa 'be &ldes, aiud.ng a. t thi.JJg .� 1 useful to 
human lUet:� and not given by natun.3 
Yet th·e IM M£u.r!;IS school ·xtend«J. the oonoept ·of
natural law to inclUde useful 'thil'lga; and 1t wae noi lo»g 
b.tore S. te members btt!l t up wstems of *'ne't'ural �vispru4.no• '*, 
even althou.sh � of �he mattes's wh1eh they 1:noluded wer
vu-ts£ble ana c·oa:ttna•nt su.eh ae P"Of, ft'1d$10t• In this
t�anatoraeci cono.wtton of na'WPal J.aw, mau P.P1�Wlplea o� 
�· tu gentl'Qlll a.M ef e1Yil law weN eleva1oc.\ to an 
un4eeert.a. statu.a. 
l. u.IOt .• W• 25·5-256. 
2. no.lllt PP-257-L 
3. u.m, p.258·
"What did natural law mean originallJ"' A PUle tn­
soribad in human nature. aiming at the absolute good 
and 3ust, at honesty. Wb&t does th 'new atyle' 
na tual law aean9 A quite dltf'erent concept : a 
ftle 1nvonted bJ' man, ahl1rAS at th1:m.s ueehl to 
bmaan llte ill a pven social ste\o.nl 
1o 4c'*'�• 1.ihe ''u"tul n is r•ln:an.t to tn. question ot 3uet1o 
and hoatf.lt7• But the diatinetion bet,.en th• goc4 aDd th.e 
usetul is cn"eJ'tbe• 
• ••• wb.eJt \mder eolWP o"f a.-nation ti'OII the natural 
law cw s1mpl7 � oe�ormity· to !1� th rules of 
posit!,Ye laY coa..-a"lna solutions ol soo1alv.til1t7 
ue arme.xed io natural law as lesaillg 4ef'1nl t•lr 
� tbe ,_.,l.oMl and aooial nature ot au.. "2 
the oo.noluslon 'to wh.ioh Babin le draw. is that there 
1s e 110"'1 and pel1 ttoal natural law, but no �14t.oal 
na-.ural 1a11 • .3 'lhe aoral natural 1 . w is the basi· of uPal 
aotion and � both 1n� an4 out11'Q'ct aota. The 
political natual law is more oollOBS'ned wlth the n .11un ot 
aaan a a a member ot eoe1 ty � and 1e akin to th 1\0tion o� 
the lielttteall OOlll'tiiOn pod. But both t)'lMts �tlla!A 1n the 
nala o� aoral and polttioal phJ.loso'-*7• There enete DO 
�d� netual law 1n the sene• 0'1 solutions or n-en ot 
4i�t1oaa given 1n a4vano·e to the authority oharpd with 
1. •. a,, p.26o • 
2. 110.�. p.2S!. 
3. no.215, PP•26J-5• 
�atabl1shtng the o1vU la •1 It 1e tor th�a :reason that 
Dabtn eons!ders t.Mt the dioht!'ttfYllW" natural 1 w - 'POEJ1t1ve 
law ehcu.l4 be Pe-plaeed 'by that of morals - law. 2 
Dabin. tndee4, contdA.exas llOSit1ve law to b e. matter 
ot "eon�ction�•. It is of'ten the oaee ( tmd here • 
may note the ln:tluenee ot Gt!lU' a th$G1a ct tteduotion) that 
the lepl ftle 1n aco-tng tho ngiven ot morale" will 
subject th1a ttgt'YeJl� io m.od11'1ou.t1on end; in c a a where 
tl\e seouJ'lty o't tne law dtman4o tt, will rev�ae ROh a 
"given". 3 Po.P tbe jute" ie taced with a o•l "S1v n.tt 
which ia o1,1t1onal vis-i-na &JlU partiou.la:r:- 1 gal olut1on, 
anA whiCh 1s only one ot the matte:re to b taken illto 
aoemtnt. It 1.s reall7 his oho!oe 'Whieh c�ea tes th ·nJ.• 
ot law. 'ro the eb3..,tion the t 1lbenever th ju.r1.st tetle to 
"f)QlUiee»attt" na�e.l :taw ha !s me!'el.v reeosnta:tq aa 
eatpti® nncl 'thfl� the Irinei»le 3ti.U reft&ln Da'bia 
NP11fat t:t 'the lqal onil«P hna 1te oa Meds oa�le or 
4tote:�1Dg ..-�!&lUI tQ the na�al law, then 1 t 1 , •n 
-�-.ems 41eoipltne� If. !hose 'Who aese.t't 'Utat t• l*'tnolPlea 
1- u.215, p.263� 
2. no.�. P.3&..-5• 
'· •• us, p.1J&. 
,... no.U5, pp.l39-140· 
of B&'tltftl law, reo·osniztng ownership, the entoroeab111t7
of agreements, and reparation tor damage, are taken oYer
1n that form into positive lew do eo from a supsrt1o1el
examination 0'1 the JUles of pos1t1ve law, which consist 
1n a TaW 1ntr1oe.te :Pattern of legal relations which do not
form a n.-t aohema o� deduotlons hem sen8J'al pr1nc1plea.1
!he· wol"k of the 3ur1et belongs to the realm of
pract1oal �•aeon - O't PJ'Wlence - and 3nP1SPI'tldence ts 
merel.7 prudence a»Plied to law. Even llh·ere a statute or
l"ll e eml»o41ee a pr1no1ple ot 3ust1oe, it ie tJ'Q4ence which
dictates the pQticml.ar solution. 2 On the other hal¥1, 
"oonstruotion" 1e not an arb1tr817 matter, for prudence
1mpl1es J'!8@0I@ble action. And the value o� the vork o�
pru4enoe w1U be 3U48ed b7 the ext at to whioh it taltea 
aooount ot the ngtyena" of the othe:r dieo1pl1n•a (althoue;b.
'·suoh "givens" are "P"-leg .1 ", "meta-3urid1oal" ), 
But Dabin is ultimatel)t 1'oPCeci. lnto a oar1oua l>Qeltion.
Be reoogni.zes that there ax-e 'he> particular "g1Ye!UI" whioh
are olose]7 asaeoiated with the work ot the 3U1at: '\he
pyen ot legal 8\lbetanoe (the ptlblio oomme po4) end the
l. no.ll9, pp.]4.2-150· 
2. no.121., p.l53· 
'· u. l28, pp.l57-8.
given or legal methed (towal techrdqtle}. !he ;Jurist esnnot 
helP -.t taking them into aeomm.t. Yet our authol' ·ugues 
that 'theso do not 41otate sel'Q.tions : 
"!hft bo�l4 4ettftl1nat1C1># ot facta ana method 
d.oea net preelu.cle the in&teteainat ion of tb.e solutions 
'fhleh, 'With1D the· �wol'lt outl!Jled, qe lett to 
the tHe Qbit»ament ot the Pftd•t; twrthft!more, 
that 4eepite the exs.ateno• ot bettt!.' atAPted aD.4 · 
th_.�_.. prettenb.:t• •1••• fTeeAcm ot choi.Oe ta tB.JJ 
� fRlPPl'•t884, tor it is al•ua a 'matter o'l 1 
attaira that imply more oP less iebate and oOttnsel. •· n 
v. 
At this atase, tt will be profitable tt we a eseea the 
theoJt1es .or � and D"b1n and see in wht\t �eepeo.t the1r 
theqht repreacm:ta tb.a t of the Schoolmen. I.n partieulu, 
1 t is neoeeean to ask 1f"hfthw the point at lsaue betwten 
Ge.ny and lla\tin. 1& teninologioal or substantial. 
Both wrttera ,.e3eot \he 'th$aie. ot tae ius utual• 
( poat-Groti.Q) tohool uicn enlar�:•• tllo aoope and oon�ent 
ot tb.e netual law and t.he.se me t'te\JS'a *leh aft. &P'JCU'tllt to 
8natui'Al Naaon•. They �etatn th.e •saential Solullaa�io 
tmJ)bael• 011 tile natural law as eont�tntna gtnQa1 Pl'blol»l•a 
which p14e pos1ti'V't law. They rtoogrd.P that noh 
PJ'lno.tplea aay beeou llo411'1e4 1a ,. p:rooeaa or b.oorpo,.a .. 
�loa into poa1t1ve law. 
However, they seem to 41fter 1n respect of their 
assoesm.ent of the nature ot these Pl'inoiples. Qen.y l'ete.1ns 
the notion of positive law as a determination of natural
law, while 1 t ie Da'bin who dems.nds fol' po$1 t ive law an
auton� wh1ob he repX'da as its lawt\11 righ.t. In the 
'rheorte ,Gtne.nle 4'\ :Qnlt, the raJ.es of J>Oa1t1ve law re
no loll8R' detel'JJlinat1ons of tbe natural law. They are
3ur1st1o acnst:Netiona - the work of 3ur1sta {and net ot
morallata) who ,  althoup th07 l!lU.St neoessar1l7 aoqUBi.nt 
themaelvee with tht s1-vtne of other d1sciplin.ee, 8ft tr$e
1n thelr aeleetton of thos·e eletttents 'Whieh finally to1'1D part
ot tb.• legal Nl•. This ie bl'OU.ght out strong1J tn Min's
41seue1on ot u.tUity. 
In the 11pt of De-bin's 1ntft'pretat1on r4 'he natural
law. this latter $em b ecO'IIlts ambt.poue. !te theref'ore
augp·eta that it be 'H.Plaoed by the v.or4 "moralstt� thbiktl&
'bat, 1t this 1s not d. one, t.he use ot the wrc1 "lawn 1a
'b1s oontext oan lead. one to l'eg-'1 it as 1n GOlll-e wav PlJ't
ot pea1t1 v• law. In OUP optJUon.. the ph.!ese "nattDal law"
may be used as referrill8 to 'the pneral ltod-J of" ethioal
prinolplfUI ( 1Dti -rtaual aDd eooial) on. the un4 ztnanatus 
that tbe won ttlaw" is used 1n a 41f':fereat aoue to that in
2:.07 
which it is used in "positive lawn.1 I em a re that thi 
opinion does give rise to another <lttetstion - Is "pos1t1Titrn 
aitained on11 when the nle of morels ia recogn1z d by the 
state - which I will t alte up aga.in 1n a later ohapter. 2 
one 18 toreed to the eoncJ.u.s1cn that Gelll'' s ooncepttoa 
of the J'81aticmehtp 'be'tlfeen na'ttU'al law and po lt1TO law 
1s olosfi.P to that ot the Sohool.men. Por Geny J'ecognim a 
the 9,PWa1te v1ew o-r natunl law: general prineiplea and 
more 4etaUe4 pPeoepta ae within ita scope. Min t&Tous 
the "m1n1ul1.at" conception o� natural 1 ; only gene-al 
pr1ne1�ee are within ita eoope. 
'l'h.we does seem to �e ecm.ethtns inadequate with tae 
"m.1n1Jialist.,. appreaoh. In a :recent art1ole.3 :Lotttn 
.ott1tio1.zes 1ts �eesa. Me dtsousa s the :familiar 
•••ple of the taking ot property in a ease rJt neoe _altJ' 
(;tor e-.ple. a a� man takbg toed)• Accol'dtng to the 
"ulin!D.tfll1s"t tt conception, tb.e precept "do not tak what 
belongs to ano1hel"" would belons to the natnra.l 1 w. Bu.t 
the detailed prined.ple th� t ff1n certain eases where a 
3uat1f1oat1on 1a :tortho$m1ng 1t is permissible to take 
� aaothel'" would no' belong -.o the natural law, 1n tha·t 
it 4epen4e on �ious ooneitl�tions which are not 1mmed-
1atel,J e.:ppa.l'en:t to a person whose taek it ie to judge tb 
moraliiy oZ the aot. The a.nswer to this attgum.ent, a Lottin 
poiats out, ia that (I'VfJJ!1 human situation whioh oalla for 
an ethical 3Wlsaent ls w1 thin tbe eoope ot the natural. law. 
and the moJ-e 4eta1le4 P!'O'bl-.s ( SQ;ob as th$ oa$e of tlUl 
stQ'viDg ��an) ar-e Qften as important as the major on••• 1 
ot course, the J'eaMn tor Dabtn' s dietaet tor th . 
"•xtmallst'' oon.cep,1oa la obY.ioue.. the. uraltst would 
4eo14e upon 'he J-lgl\tness or w,ronpese ot the aot whioh 1s 
to bo the amb;Ject-mattft o� the law, and the ttlak ot the 
l•dalator �4 be merelr to ecld the legal eanotlon to a 
JIOJ&l oonolitsioa al.J-ea4y JMlele. Whil• reo�gntz1ng thie 
I>Oae1b1l1'Q1 1• is our opimen "wat tbe au.touJJI' Qt tu 
lepl 4lao1pl1u and the 111l'P0rtan1 ,-ole ot teobnlqu _, 
at ill lae saf'esuaJ�«•4, even al-.hcm.gh the "•xtmal1st" 
tnterpretat ton ts x-teoplsd. And Dabin ••- to accept 
tate position when he speaks of practical oona1derat1oaa 
whioh may often tuvolv non-reoogn1t1on of ceta1n aspects 
of the moBil Nle. 
Moreove, Dab1n has recourse to the Taom1at1o notion 
of pndenoe, 'Wb.U Geny do·es not concern himself' wS.th thla 
notion. Dab1n 1$ theX'efO)!$ tnoltned to tum ou:r att .nt ion 
to the means and eq.d.Pl.B.tmt at the disposal ot the J.aw. 
IndeJCl the emvhasla on pi!'Wl$UCe is an emphesla 11h1oh cute 
aonsa any notton of a donne 1d.SS1. While omw •••• the 
problem o� the relationehtp bekeen nat�l law aJ24 tx>e1t1Tt 
law 1n the Me•aJ.'OiU.Oal �r 11.e� a a deduct ion ft01a 
general to :pal't1oulAlr :precepts, Dab1n··1a a_,.�of the 
ol)steoles which prevtmt one f'rom analtz1ng tb.e rel.aticubip 
1n this 1f81. J'osa Ge.QV, tlte -1no1ples Which aM to be 
inCOrporated 1nto law ut in some ft'3 to be t2Jm!\ bJ the 
3UP1et wbO has the task of formulatinG thera and r IO·l'Y!Q 
oontl1o\s. Jla'b1nt on the oth� bandl eena1dera 't!Vlt tbe 
3ur1at has a mor• eni''1V!t J!IOle to p�. Conae<fientlJ', he 
oone14ei-s the PJ"idll'lee ot the n�W.X'll  law te be ot a 
meal kind J\nd be eJll)bas1z<*e tho 41tterence 1n ttu'lotton 
'b etween the 3UJ'1et and the moJelist. 
J'mallt• JJBb.u in diseuasiniJ the question at the unjut 
1 law asaorts thelt mch e. law cannot btnd 1n OOWtetenoe, 
although he makes a distinction between &1'1 unjust law and
a law 'Wh1oh does not sanction the vutue 0'1 justice (�or
example a meMlJ' *'useful,. law). J.. In this 1' sJi)eOt, be 1 
1n agreement with the Bohoolmen, althongh he goes beJOD4 
them 1n emphasizing the tact tba t justice is only one of
'he Pl'Oblems with whtoh tho 3tll'1st 1e eonoemed• 
In conclusion, we wq inolin" to Dabint s 1ntepPt�tat1on
of utuftl law as an L\1110iJ. aottgn,, �� still reoognS.stng 
the ''maztmaliatn eoneeption or na't'Urel law. It th1a Yln
1s e.ecfpte41 the notion ot pesit1ve law may be aooor4e�
its, r1pthl autonoJII' provided tlmt we do not negleot tM
l'�lationshi]) between eth1oe an4 pos1t1v law on tb.t pound 
'that the ene'telWe o� the distinction ana that one o�
other 41aoipltne oa11 be etudiei wiihwt reoourae to tb.e
ot�. 
I. 
In the previous ohapter, it was ll\V pappose to discuss 
the attitude of the modem WPiters to the question of the
relationship between natural law and positive law. In
that chapter, I attempted to chow tb.e development of the 
not tons or t echn1 qtte and PPUt.lenoe es an OXPlanat ion � the 
manner 1n whieh roles of po 1t1ve law are oreat.ed. In this 
chapter. I propeee to examine th eptter!a offered b7 the
modern etters toP deciding pt rules or m.<n-al1ty re :tit 
'tor enforcement by positive law.
We have seen that the SchGOlmen employed the notions ot
02PJ1.9P. soed ancl beae:r1 t t9 tbe OO!DJnt:ll1tx 1n order to A•t .emin·. 
1 
what lllOftl ru.les Ghoo.ld be enforced by law. T� ,_. aoae 
iaonl duttea (one should not kill, steal) which by thew
veJ7 :n&ture were oonsidered to be or benefit to aooioy U
incorporated into law; oth•e depended DlOl'e on the tact o�
pract1oab111tr. 
1. suPn• Ch.5, ff ,,,_d �-
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Now the notion of the Bopwa OoJDlll!le 1a at the oentM ot 
Dabin' s theoJII)' of law. It will b� reoalled that he was 
unwilling to :recognize a 3ur1d1oal na'ttlral law but oons1dered 
that legal choioe •• related to a •given ot legal aubstanoe" 
or a "political» natural law. DeYelop!q thla notion 1n 
tb.e second Part of his work. he assets that the 110Hl ra.le 
becomes fit for t-eooan1t1on by poaiti"Ye law, not 1n 1te own 
r11Jb.t, b\lt because it baa aome reference to the good � the 
oounntt7.1 The 41n1nC'b1on between the aoral sooct and the 
publ1o good is to 'be :tO\md 1n the nature or these poda. 
''The lepl. rule • • • exiate 1n Yin cr a d1at1not aa4 
au.per1or end 'Which it oou14 quite ... n ratl •o aohl"•• 
which oould be attained alao 1n other �·· ae that 
a c;p1eation l8Q' alwava 'be a1sed as tb the ut111t)' of 
ita PNY181on or ft'en ot its 1nte:r•ent1on at an 1n 
the patt 1oular oaae. It has value aa a aeana 1n eo 
tar as it realtsea the end of the law. 'Jhe law te 
utU1tar1an; urals :I.e not. The legal JUl.• !a •'­
oM!nate to a .,..tem wh1oh had lt .. u th• nll.ut ot 
an inatrwaents 'he qstem. of the tapo:re.l publ1o 
soot.,. the atate·'a en4 and reason or beiJ:ta -while the 
aonl. nle dedu.oe4 :boa the nature fit· Ma, returu 
to mea. the BU.Pl'eme .-lue,. to 1lhOil tt 1D41ea'•• aD4 
weaorilMie the neoesae17 oon41t1ona ot hie ftiOa•t.a 
aa un. •2 
X'\ 1a preo1eel.J' 1n this YfiJ"''' rnpeot - .Ut law 11 a •eane 
to an end - tut 'She notion of i;he t•ponl or :po.'blio oouon 
gooc1 in'Yolvee the reooan1tion of the 41gnit;v ot 'the 1D41Y14ual 
1. Tht9r1e G6pfrale 4u Droit, no.l,32, p.l62. 
L 1Jp14. , p.l6). 
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and does not smack of a Hegelian t1a� at incorporation
ot the individual 1n the totality � the state. Dab in 1e 
eaNful to d1atinsu1ah bet•m the gute-socletz and the 
gH.tt. The common good is an aapeot of a comnmn1iJ' 'Which 1a
organistds it is not an attribute aole]lr Of the orsantsaiion. 1
Incleed, the 001111lon good 1a DO" eome'th!q aepara te ftOa
'lhe interests ot the aembera or the oommuniV• In Dabin'e
aSDd, the pol1t1oal or pablio comm.on good npr•aenta tile
interea ts ar the aaaa ot 1nd1Ti4Uala ancl groups within the 
2 state-soo1etr. lfoJrecww, it 1s ot a sene.ral nature aDd 
is no� ooutiaecl. as 'th.e laiasez-t'alre p.hUoaophera woul4 haTe 
it, to matters a-triet4r "pol1t1ealu. It cospr1sea aonl, 
1nteliecnual and cul:tural ae.tt•• as wen. 3 I't extes4a both 
to the 1nt•Uectu.al and uterial Qb.eltea, · One  f18l.U1oat1on 
1. no.l)5, P.l67 • 
2. no.l)5t p.167• A comm.on pod. _, be aa14 to peftain to 
&J17 PftP *l8h has a sufrleleatl.F defined ob3Mt rmoh 
aa a ....... , an teonOilio UD!t es- looal-so�t �. 
l>abm ,.. .. the woJ'd "Pa.b11o" or "po11'tioal "J�to 4tatbplah 
tU oOIIllon . .- f4 the aute ttOOiet7 t7oa th• oo.-on pod.a 
or tb••• aher bo41ta. That doea ., aean that it baa 
no Mlatlonahlp with these other aoo4as the ·-�· �t 
to proteot th• and foster 'he1,. lewlo]llent • ao.138, 
PP•l70-L 
3. no.l,a, p.ln. Eamplee 110\lld be prorta1on o't ftelteat1cmal
aaerd.UH and pa'blic 11'bftr-lea. 
which Dal>1n makes is that the spiritual and religiou. is 
outside ita scope tor they a�e something EJlp81-nDWral.1
However, althau.gb. the public eoli.llDOn good brae . oral 
and oultul'al nluea, 1t does not bring them into exist no • 
The State bas a right to intervene 1n these mnttex-s only
,men they becom a matter of PQblio oonoe!'n (e.g. when tb.we
1s a need for legislative aotion). It cannot gtye th theu 
2 Yital toroe becauae this is derived from bnman act1?1ty. 
Dabin is of the opinion that th pnblic. good is n oeae­
arUy subordinate to morals. He sees it as iaTolving the
reoogn.1 tion of cetain values 'Which he desoribes aa:
1 )  the pPim.&oy ot the spai t over ma,tw. 
2) prft'Qlenee of the individual pepson O"f't�r the ooUeot1rity, 
3) subordination of the state-socioty to society. 3 'the 
pt'bl1e good is the�etore based em a aonl Tiew of aoo1al 
relations. But, 1n so far as i1 is ut111\arian, 1t will
di.trer accol'd1na to the nature ot pariicular soo1et1ell
( b.1stor1oal, g4l08ftPhical, psycb.ologieal) and to thia ·extent
it will be prudence Hther than thG017 wb.1oh will diotat.e 
papt�lar solu,iona.� 
1. Ill14. 
2. no.u.o, pp.l73-l+· 
3. no.J.4,2, p.17'· 
•• ao.�, P•178• 
Positive law hae the task of fostering an envil'omnent 
tor the development of values. Oonaet:lUantl.y there will 'b
a mopal obl18ltion. on the part of' citizens to obey laws 
whicb a:re directed to the cotmon good, in se tal' e m · bePebip 
of society imE)11ea snch an Gbl1gat icm. 1 
In anoih.e):1' •v • the not ton fJt the common geed help us 
to ovel'Come the sburp d1ohotonw btttween ind1 v1dual nil 
soeial. p•tvat$ and publiC mattwa. DabJ.n, howeYWil eeeaa 
to so too :far in asaertinS tba.t the rishts of parties to a
lepl l'ela:tton.ahiP a� d etewined not so much by a "m1ne­
th1ne" rela.ti(i)neh!p onvioaged se.paratelu, as by an ttou.-su 
:Mlationsh1p .. 2 This 1s mE!l'el7 s 'WtlJ' o'E sa�ing that the
publ1o god im.pblges on the individual gooa:.
It may 'be enlightenina 1f we r-efer to a tiiaasei.on on
wh1eh l>abin ambaPks in respect of thf.t tnt �l  an4 del'D81
aspect• � a � l'el& t1onsh1p in orner � ehow th -
£Glat1og!1» betwa meralitJ and tb.e publ1c common good, on
the OA6 h&nd.t and on the other hand, the BOD.-UtnSWettign 
ot \heae peels. 
1. no.146, PP•119-180.
2• ao.�7, pp.181-2. "Oureu rote�s 'o the �sitton of tD-
41ri4uala oonslderetl as membePs or society. lU.ah"• ot 
OlP!Ull"sll1P or rtgb.ta ax-ising fNm oontraot are not 
abaelut•' pPeSOr1pt ion, on the one baDd, public pollq,
on the other hand., ·Mdttr th•• 
Human relat:tens oonsiat, among otbeP tb.inge9 of tri nd­
ehlp, understanding and tb.e exohtlnge � opinions by means ot
conversation, eoneepondence, artistic works. bam this
1nt.eroOJ:tll1lUll1on, eoc1al groups based on a stmtlari ty ot
tnter.eat.e arlee. Vlit.h Pe&PEaOt to 'this, the law ia powerlee · 
to tntewene. "A tT1edsh1p eommuuled or klr>e ed would be 
the nega-tion et tr1enieb1p.u1 
But the law ought not to be 1nd1tferen:t to these goode. 
It shcra,ld t'oato and aftol'd proteetion to them and 1a th1-s
s-esp"t it has an 1n41l'ect 1ntluenee. 2 What tbe law 1s 
aol'e coM erned w1 th 1s tbe exteme.l asl)ec't at the social
r le.tionahtp 'Whteh la d1apoaable to :ttegUlatton. and 1t will
ther�o•e attaeh tt.se.lf to e'bjee1t1ve op fQNBl obaracteP1st1ce
of t his Jtelat1ouhtp.3 In eYel7 08$ , tbe law is bee' able
to exePt 1ts lntluence �en tbe re1attonehi» tn �eation is 
tnnsla table .into scnnething tang1'b.le. In the tleltl ot
personal rolat1eneh1P$ 'he law dll !'8!' lv 1nt l"H!le because
or •he 41t.t1eultr of eetttns up ob3eot1ve w1 m:t.a.
1. no.76t PP•9•-5• 
a. no. 77, PP• .95-7 • 
3. »•81, P.P•ff-101 .. 
,.. 
�11 
At this st�e I wish to turn to th� other SsPOO't or the
relationship be-lween law and m0lla11ty with whioh Dab:in 1
concerned, and thia i.a the pesa�iv.§ emp�t. Although inter•
yent ion on the PBl't r.tt the jurist may be poasibl 1 it 1s
another question wGttter such in'tePVen tioa 1s w1 e 9.114 pru.dent. 
, :tt may of� be the ease thst the pu.bltc good will demand 
&bst�ntlon on his part. fhe p�ent man is Qo�er.ned with 
1 '\lha t is l'$&11118-blo. · �e jlD'ist mu.at WfJigh thEt argwa
. nts 
i.n f'e.vo� ot inte�ntion. ageinst those which Slgge �- nQn� 
intwvention. Dise1pltne, if too ext; naive, iaaY h.av the
effect ot blUU.'ttng individual ettos-t. De.J.lin pJ.uri1ps 1a tavov
or the view that the tt�e intfll� ot human activ1-.1ea te
tb.e YIU!fl!tlg.J 
"In the ohc1>1ee to be aae.e bet1Jeen tre�om. an4 th· · l'Ule•
the 1 w rill begia b7 18J1DS ·clown the rule of rMedO•• 
at E\1.\7 rate, as. lens aa 1t has not been sbOwn that 1n 
praoti.ce •• use o.-r ftteedom t1:u'ns gene�anr against
the pnblie �4. �'' 
A erlt•ion to• 3udging whether t:o inter.• is the
state ot Pttblie Qptnion. It may oflen happen that th ft are 
uome Nlea of eonduc$ eioh are beat left to eoctbt1 bald.ta 
and p.paetice, then to enfOPO.em•t br law. tho "1qaltaat1oa" 
ot such rulea bf the l$Blelato� _, onst a "1fUI"UbOu'"
dictated � a teel1ng or :.e-aetion against m-eWing b¥ thf
1. ao.l56, P-193.
2. ao.lS8, p.l95·
218 
1 
State. ln ms.ny oases, the legislato!' must consider ether 
public opposition to a pro-poe d law WQl..lld be of such natur 
as to make its enforcement difficult. In all auch case
on oannot oategorize individual cases 1n 1oh intervention
ia not desirable. The legislator will :preaeribe th e 1n1mwa. 
whieh opinion is abl to support. 
ot oOUPse; pablic opinion will oft n he difficult to 
ascertain, and on 1!18ny occasions it wUl be divided. Often 
too it will be restPioted to amall group (e.g. of witers) 
which swu'leeds in m.akillS artieulate what is only vaguel.J :telt
bJ the mass of the people. _ hoagh Taglle, it still xere1ee 
a strong inf1uence on the cieliberat ions of the 3UJ'1st. 
� 
At this tage, may recall that Ac;pina and suar.z 
eJBPhaeised pre.et1eabil1ty in their discussion � posttiye law, 
when they tollowed l$1dore' s dio'ium to the effect that 1 , 
l. DOe. lEo, pp.l97-fl. "Cedes of law are not th oataoht.ae
o:r � �taintng the 0Gn�'Plate Ctn"LmWStiOD t:6 1fhat 
to do and 111h.at to &Told. •• 
2. D0.161, PP•l98-9. 'l'ake the case of divorce. Once 1'\ has 
enteped 1ni3 the u.:£!1. th� leg1$lor may aelt h121aett 
Setiler 1ts altQl1tion b7 lay 18 4eairable. Thie cJ.oea DO" 
mean that; U he abite th$ ata�:J%.. he 1s ooaittM to
the u1'8l. conaefPGG&a arisiDg t e ; pp.l99-2oo .. 
Be ldgb1 vory well dec14e �t non-lesal eana are beat 
ftPlOJ'N W 0011bat 'the ft'il l'"HRlta 'Wh18h 111117 OOGIQl. 
In the oasca tYt alooholisJs, prohibition in the 1oJt1t7 ot
oaa•
. 
s . 1• Udealr&ble1 lnl� the. a'\at e 118J right the � b7 
TBriws regals:tione \ oloetns Mlll"St Ue nsing) oJt "en 
l»7 allotting au.baidies to prin.te groups to fight it, 
no.l62. 
3. ao.l&.., p. 2>4--
21J 
lwst be. in accord wlth. the one tom of the countw. iJHOTel', 
1n reoop1JJS!na th.at all the Y1Cee should not be pmh1b1te4,
th� b.e4 1n mind the gHa ter evil which 'WOUld resul·t 1t tlte 
lew 1ll'tl"tlded into the whole sphere ot mOJtalit1• Perhaps• 
ldlat is m.o1'e 11JlPOri&nt, tbq �ecesnized that poait 1ve law
414 m.1 have the PM!n&J7 ta sk of bringu.tg into being a
eommu.n! t7 O't moml betD.gs. 
In th1e rermeet, Debin is r�ally btt!lcU.ng on the
eoholaet ic f-oundation and retining 1 t in the PPooess. It 1a 
cl �r that h1e vtow ot tb.G nntltre ot the pa.bl10 eC�nmoa &fOod 
abraoes a good deal mtmy l!lo'i'e. oonai�we:b1one thM eottl.d 
ha-ve been bel'ore the mlnO.e ar th-e sch-<>ollaen. 1i1s d1seuss1on 
shows the YnriOtts c1re'WQ.stancea which �et b take into
aocoant � detem1niJls wheth.- a 1JJOJ'al Nl.e 1187 • ot benetl t 
to tru. OelQmuni•· But it also suggest ·a  anot� thbat 'ba� 
'the uPOint of tnteJ-.section." between morals d lay oa.nnet 
al•7• 'be cl-.x-17 be....,., although thEtN 8l'e crltola to fJl'ld•
the oholoe whJoh tb:e �iet malte e. Its greaten 'h.lU! 1a 
that S.t ulpB one t� &TOid the seylla ot tilt huan 821!1 
lesialater ana the ObU7b41a ot the � leglatato,..

1n that 1) the law oonoor.ns 1te 1f with int..s!'-ind vidual . 1 relation&, 2) s�1o�e.117, th� dut1as of just!oe with 
22.1 
their character1et1o marks ot object1v1t;r and clarity allow 
th• 3ur1at to SJ'&pple 'With a notion wbioh he can then reduce 
to the teebniqu.e of hia �as-t, a 3) the du. ties 0� juat1oe 
'1! 
oan be e:tteet1vely senetionad. 3 
Unllke O.w � bowwe-��. Dab in oeoms t.o at�eat that the 
moral Wl.ee (including the CJn•tritts of. justio _) mq lr aeverelJ 
modified 1n Pl'GCesra of their sub.o.rd.Um.tion to the Ptibl10 
good.. !the law nay refrain from enforcing a P11l ·of 3Ust 1o• 
'Where the CODllllOn good clel,nands it, and may also PQ.sb. beyond 
the ��iea et the vil'tue ot �stice� � and to tb.is extent 
�he olloiee ia detwmined. 'by political prudence. 
U we ngaN. #18 common good as the or.tteion or what 
is lesallr au.gt, euJt tliffieulties tJlBl be e.olved. we ean say 
tha-t the (J.U'1·•• ot pa�tio\llar (oonmm.tative and dietJ-1bu.t1ve) 
L m.253. 
a. u.255. 
3• ao.as6. t¥t .• L.Pet-.qolt11 I"'· !DEl lloUltU• mth oentan7 l4rsa1 philosophy seri.os ( 19�) PP• m;.:a;� • 
DOt261, »•30''* Dabtn �L."'ltS to the OJrBJ!l!lles ot Otl'taia 
lndueVial etl80taents whieh aupU'Sede '� anan,..ta 
ot oo�tattve �sttee. 
2.12 
l 3ust1oe became the sub Jeet-matt� ot legal just tee whioh, 
beoaua• 1t is duected to the eo:ncl'ete good of a pal?t!ettlar
eOJnlW.llity. wUl be ot a contingent, t empo1�y and u.t111taJJ1an 
n.stnr•·  noes this m.aan that tbe moral Nlaa of juat1c 
will be givEm a statu$ W:et-1� to that ot lesal ;Justice? 
D!l'bin' a aru&�P ie a.s tollowss 
l*'f.t 1a t'fUe 'that th� t• ;tnatioea, oommu.tat1Vi and
d.ieiribu:t.tve, whi,ob. rete• to �tne oommon sooa.., u• 
like fN9P'i P$Pt1ftlatJ ViPlue etlb�!'dtnatt to ltgel 
�ustiee, wiUeh te qq.alitiect $o � at th · content
t!l,e�lli th�t i13 tt:> IQ'; 'lh$ p�irmle:r- right o'f
ftVet'3'0D , • 
. 
aec.o�U.S to the zttqtt!Hmente o� �e �lla 
good.. Ju.t tut �lbtl'i11la.a't1t�n !e n.ot th� 'IIOI'k ot
o1•U la•• .
. 
It Halt�1 as haet . heen eau, bora. llOMla
1tetllr:� wb 1eh 4tmen4• �e atl�i:ne tton tn the tw• 
tola. oJ'der . � the :pavt;lH' Lis-tvate �to the
pu.bllc g0o&, oo thmt on 1hi� :90int til:. · u!lftlony bet .. n 
th• t'WO wlos la complete. n2 
What Dab:tn 1e t�ing to O.o bwe te tp :r1eoo-nc11e t-. 1ndiv14ual 
wlth the soe1al 111 aso,.ibing U\e aubjee11® of 'Wle 1n41V14ual
to the socU.al, not by ret� to positive law. btl' b7 
l'ttwenee�t to JD.Oftl&ll• But, t• our opiniollf he dOes no�
olearq 'brbg out the potnt wl'lieh we maae in tAll' die�•atcm.
of the 'rh.old.atic oono.-vt. of to.e�:i.Oe. 3 ThePt• ·•e snss••tfd; 
1. taere II8J' be s•• ob3eetion to the use of the Phl'an 
"l.ep.l juetle•u 1n ovin ot the tact tu' we uaau, th1Jilc
of' .tu.stt•• as ta. vatQ.e which ocmceme the rel t1eaab1p 
Wbeen ind1TS4uala. But thf action ot lapl 3Q.attet 
(which 1s •o 1te :fo.ud ol'tgiUUJ 1ft APiawtle) 11 !Jlpor-t.
The sub�eats ot a pal'ticul.ar stat• are iHate4 tu••�lJ U 
the l.av.1s o'£ the state ape d!reoted te their welftft• 
2. no.253, p.30.l· ,td. Allea, AfPJ!ti! ot Judlet (1958),
pP.l29 ... •q.
3. §1m., Oh.4, /II. 
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oon1Us1on wae gen.9ftte4 because of the emplopent or th
phrase "legal juet1oett in two senses. In the first plaoe,
the not ion at legal justice as guiding th• acts of all th 
rtl'taes ( inoludtng }lU"t1culaP ;Just 1ce) toward another person 
is bette!' desc�lbed by the word noharity". At th1e stage, 
we are in the realm ot virtue and not of posit 1ve law.
Jlnt the second meaning of 1 g� justice 1 dift&rent.
It presu:pposea the enatenee of polit1eal organization, the 
enetence of govemOl' .and 80'f'&"'ed. In th1s sense, 1t a1.7
have something of the ehaMcter of a pol1t1cal v1rtut bo.t
we wcntl4 pre.tu to oall it political knowledge. We haT
recO\U'Se to this notion only when • ask the <lllestion 
"Wbat laws oaght to be passed or ''What la are gco4 tol' 
the ciJ\mtn"t (aaked, at oourse, 1n a particular context). 
The trouble nth. l>al>a• e ane.ly&1e 1e that it ta�ls to d1a­
t1nQu1eh the t• cp.estlona. The tollo'W1llg di��.am �Y 
assist the readeP 1n tmderstanding the 61tfe�enc s 
A.
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The d1st1not1on will assist us in keeping intact tho· tunda­
aental moral not ions of ohN.'1�7 and just1Hi an4 1ll reoognS.:zlng
that, while the legislative function ls or1ented towal'cle& 
morels, 1t nevertheless baa its own sPecific fwlction. At 
any a-ate, we mu.et reoo·sn1ee that the cont •nt ot l•sal rules
may on11 partiallV correspond to tht content ot tAOl'fll wl.ea. 
However; thCQ'e e.� eolJlfl witers who regaJ'4 ta-. notion
of 3ust1ce alld. the· notion of the common good aa contl1ct1JQJ. 
Amons these is ladl>rwah who cou14ere that the ohara.otertatic 
Jn&Jlk ot 3u&t1oe - eqtal1'b7 - is oppos,ed io the obal'aotex-1etio
malk fd 'the eonmton poci • ex.peti1enoy. 1
SUeh a Ylew .$eeJas to divorce ,.be 1nd1Y14Ual tro1ll his
eoot.al •Uieu. and to s•val"ate what ie a matteJt of 1n41 n4ual
' 
just1oe 1'rem what 1s a matter of $0c1al ;tast1ee. Ani r•t
1f w "ake, tox- elC81J1ple, the organization ot a social seJTice
1Jh1ob. a4YerHlJ' e.tteets the interests tr4 an iml1'ridU8lt on 
w aau 'b.at h1e right• are. 1n conflict wt'tll 'he C)oaon po<l'l
Th• tl'Uth 1s. I think;. that we 4o not reocantae an
1n41Y14ul' a rights as b:eiq unHetrieteA. we aJte not w1ll!Jc
to a.411J.t, -ror ••mple, an absolute ,.1sht to propet, bu.t 
a l'ipt to property which is adapted to the needs of 'the
aoo1etJ' 1n which the 1ndiv1dual 11Tta. In eo ru ae \be
1nd1vidul ts a Jlea'bex- of the eociet,- tn w:b.1oh the aen!ee
!a organized he llttst bane:ttt as a member of tbat eoot•v• 
Ifo dou.b�, there 18 a con:tl1ct on the em.pt.rf.oal lenlt euoh
an 1nd1Y14ual may ftflftR o!" feel deprived ot some rtsht 
which he relfll'da as hie clUe• but, 1n so tu aa aonl or 
political benotit aecwes to the members 'Who uke up tbat
soo1ev, tke 1nd!Yidual 11111st also benefit. ot COUPae, 
where the r1gh t ot the 1nd1Y14ual are affected to an •••salve
extat, or withou.1 8ll7 reasonable 3ust1fiea'ttoa, tn Stlcb.
a case we oan _,. that the oommon gooA or that soote"l' ts
1 not hftheHd.. 
swad.q u]), t.he j.tnol:pel pctnte which I wtah to aake
are ae follow:
1. !here 1s a dlattnc"ion hetwen the 801'81 anct pollt loal
apheree. 
2. !he •oral Yirtu ot c.haritJ', tD. so tar ae 1' AUeota the
aota o� the �•• to othe.J:t people, 1a a higtun.- nltte 'than
the JIOJIIll Tintt• f1l particular "'sttc ..
3. Legal ;Justice 1a tho critt.rS.on OX' standard by wh!.oh 
detennine the content of rules ot pOsitive law. As su.ch 1t
pertatna to the ohe.e ef. pali t1oa 1. e. �o the �heJJ of
la.-malt:i!lg and law-o'bey!Dg. 
4-• In eo f&Xt ae the po1itieal common good 1a rel ted to
•thics, theH oan be no to:nflict between justice an4 th 
common good.
Whtle GenF and Dabia »&gard the :faetg. of pol! tical
eoo!ety aa a "Unt" between morality and ])Os1t1� law th.,
c\\o not aatis'tectol;)ur an� the qtUtstimu how do s b 
poliUoal c0m1aon aoo4 beoOJP.e tneerpoJ?ated into pGe1t1•• law! 
lM.eed., th-e emphaats which they plae:• on teehni<P• and
Pl'W!lene• has ,._n c:r1t1clse4 by C·tti'tatn w1ttra on � 
� 'that 1t is a nbmisrd.on to YGluatalt1ara.1 fhe1,.
blterw.-ation; 1i ts aa14, allhe the lorld to .oCJM�•t · 
ot na'h.Jtal law as m•relv a nau-eot1ve • role f!Jt ondll01a 
"poa1t1•1-.e" reate alo.ne oa the aot ot· wU1 ot th• braman
led alate. 
It a ... s 'ba" "the essential quation to be atu.H.ct h••
la tht .atatlls er the tol'mfll soureea o'l law. It 1s at tllia 
stage that I wish to turn to Dngu.tt• a theo17, for these 
same orit1oe Peprd it ae more in keeping with tb scholastic
tradition. It 1e said that Dugu.it's ·bree.tment or the rormal
sou.roes of law allows one to accept the dOotrtn of natural
law in 1�s 1ntegP1tY while at th same t1 · accepting a
"monist'" definition ot po 1tiYe law. 
Acco!'d.tng to Du8\11t, the basic nom ot the stat was
the aooial norm wh1oh •s tn. oatoome ot the tact of
l sol14arttv. Soltdar1t,- was of two k1ndaJ a) sol1darU�7 
by t1m.111tude (br wh1o.b. people haviDg common nee4s oould onl; 
aat1atr those needs by pooling reeourcoa}, b) solid rit7 
by the 41T1a1on ot le.bw.r ( b1 which peopl ha'Y'inS different
.oca,1ou and ctiver�e needs oould OJ1lY hllN realize tha
2 by co-operation elld exchange oz senicea). The social noa 
e01iprt•e4 eeonOIIlio, ural and �1cical noaa. 3 'l'he ecoDoalo
no:ra ,-egttlat.at 'th• ae�a of man which tOllcbed upon 'tb.J pro-
4uotion. ct�...Utien and o:onswapt1on o� goo4e. Ito '1he aoJtal
nona. Which 414 not res� on MW "ana'PbYaleal" prtno1pl.e, 
but a1111Pl.J :resuliecl tJtOJD. the relet ions between PtoPle 1n a 
dYen. oouat17 and at a g1Yen t!P, l'eplated the genwal 
2. DJ.l. •  pp.22-23. 
,_ D&A• •  p.26 .. 
,... �li- t  :PP• 26-27.
relations of the m.embe� e.>f tt� Sl?�P. l 
i'b.e 11ora1 ana, eoonmu1c norms became �r1d:&!l 
.,_ .. • � J�a mass$ de� tndJ:vtdus compoannt le �peoolJI.llrihenA et adaet qa 'une reae'tion oontre les
Tiol&'teol's de la Ngl.e peat ftn sooielement ol'gBniaee". 2
!he det�J'Jitn!ng el•ante in Pl?OdUO:ing 1M feeling tn the
group that e, senc•ion m1tJb, t be crrgnnized are tb.o of acotal
' 3 eoliduity end 3uat1oe .. 
· 
social eoltdax-1tv exists when the membel's of �e 
soc1et7 reali�e that the soctal haaony will be b»>lten tr
' . . � . . a moral norm oJ- an eee-nom1Q n$l"m ia not sancticmet!::. sueh 
a feeling may oocnu.- at etffe*'ent 't1mea in ditfer:ent sooletiea -
the mat.n m..eth" of det�� lta ensten• •• tha._ ot 
stloial pqchola§.5 Aoeoritns to Dqu,tt, the 3V1a' ms,t
be a person wll e �J)pEJ(}.. to eumiu the eott1o1es1oal
tounlatione o� the soale'W ln wb.1ek he ltv•a.
,_st4u t.he stntment of seeiel sol!AaJ-1"1• anoth r 
sentb.\U.t eentxt!bUtes tQ tnf �eNEr\1Q:ta. ot tat I'Ule or lew -
the aem.timent .r tusttee. 6 FolloCna A4Gbata, --lt
1. D&f.. , pp • ••
a. Dlf.· •  P•36.
,. DMe •  11•1+7• 
l,.. Wrj.. 
'· l!a,. t  p.;..&.
6. llUJ• ,  P•laS•
mentions � fobS of justioe, eomnntativ ant! d1stribu.t1Te.1
Wh11 \he content of the norm of ;Justice may var.v, th , 
sentiment o'f the just ia a pertnarJ.ent clement 1n the make-up 
2 of brmlan betngs. 
Just1oe and social solidarity pzaovoke and c n f� tb.e
rule of positive law (AU...�!) but tbe ;JuP14ical non
{AN!L9b3•e\tt) exists �en tnwgh the ru.J.e ot posltiv• 1 ., 
1s not ereatea.. Indeed, 1a Dugu1t11 tbeo17, the oonstmot!ve 
or t eebnical aspecl ot the ru.J.e (.enpbastzed 'b7 aenv .Wld
Dabin) 1s r.:tegated to an 1!3fel'ior x-ola. Duguit oon.s14era 
that 'he o�nauuet1ve rule ot law ( 1. 
· • the fonal tive 
ot the State1 1� decision, cr C\latom) POse · ae an t . -
t1•• C)baJ'&-cter oul7 1t 1 t eneblttnee a ;tul'la.teal n&n C l'tgle 
4e cbott}J 
A. 1oq pe!'1o4 of ttae � elapse btto» a PMle 4t 41'01'
b.-ae• a lot. 
ttoonatata-
1. IMA- •  PP•51-53• 
L DJA. •  P.50· 
3·. Ib1f. ,  p.}9. 
... O&l-• p.4J. 
tb.e wb3eet-.tter at the law, and th se.notion o� legal
l effect.. A:m.ong the t.o�ul �tHat custom :weaoainates.
I.n s.noi�t legal evatems it bas the e11atu.a ot a moci Qt
tnt�etat ion ed.dltlmsed to the juagee 2 snct. tn eo ft.1- a
tt pPOY14ea 'tk$ pound.'WO!itk. tor the <J>�rel&'Pl!.ent of th lan
b)' meana ot d.eeieteas and· ju.Aptllts� it tacU1te.tea the 
won o� '\he le;1.slat•�' Ol'l17 a-t a lat r stage of cteveloiDtnt
does legislation aJ-lee .. at a per104 when. the au.thonta,tye 
power � the atat• t.s eet;a-.11eb.ed• 4 Of �•, the
a4Tantase oZ tht wtttea laY. ovei' tb.e o'Uler �� e>t ln
is that 1t te ]lNetse and oategol'1oa1.5 And Ntt an
souoee o� ln a�e va:uA enl11 to the •nent to m10b. th., 
1nMr�a'te the, ..-ex1$tU.S E.4s+• ie 4!s!U., 6 llU8U1' aclaits
that thwe will ••• H oeplete e�-.tenot betwetn the
•141ea.l noa (N;le 4• dnlt, 4l'"·lt tJb�eot#) an4 tht
v1tten l•w (lo1, �lt 14s'slat1t) )Q.t h• ,aleo so.sreata tb.a\
'�• leslal•tor a'4' BOiltts.Ms be aneacl ot tbt "3tn'1clloal 
--------
1. It!&&- . PP• 7]-7�·
a. ll!&A. .  »•1'· 
3. l!t&A· , PP. SO-Il.
•· D&f.. · p.&&.
5• D14_., J>lh68·9· On the other ban4 Dqalt belttfta that
iiiiiola 1a the ,.,,._1 SOU'C• •1oh is oloeeat to 'b.t . 
3UT�1eal Mft• Whert ll.f1'biien lat1 and CIU8iom aontliet,
the 3W1p. oqht to applJ the lat'ttr: PIJ9J.
6. Il!J� ; P• 73•
oon.soienee" and have aome illfl,ten.ce on :l , 1
In th second 20�k Q'f the �� Dtt1� it •11alts a 
or1t•rion w.Bicb shows us the tmportfinee �f cr1at1nsu1shtng 
betwen the ob jt"tot ive law and the formal law. 111 ttt.J. Book,
he 41at1ns;uishea a �\ tqmtl. fl'Om a £loA,t llt!Mrif!l_. 1J!he
e�:�aence of tb.e fQ� 1s that 1t is a rule ot ltlw vbl.1ch oa:n 
ult1etely be traced back to a GrwldnoR. such as the
aonst1 tution O't tru. state. 2 �e lattw howeyer 1a th "real" 
law • tt is th• c�reaeton o� 'the "J'Ur1d1eal conec1ence".' 
'!he �11 f'o!'§l.ft.! ma:r of!: ma� nt.>t co�aponlJ. to the d.r<U::Q 
m;at,.,��!l,- But it ;,.s o� the grot · MtRLU. wb.ioh •an imP" •
obltgation. !fo ont..� 1m obl!g$0. to ob&y a loi �'lieh is
oonbsry to �!l• 4 
Obl!pti-on doee net aria bGOs�UJa ar tbt annotion wbtoh
ts et«P1Tftfl ft-OJa the tomal �ctww.. Ind.e.ttt• »u&ult oon­
s14.ers ·tb.e notion of' aanet 1CJn to be prtmUJ!17 of s mol'tll
rather � ot a toaa.l or o&eotve natUPe'
-------
1. DU.. t P•90�
L T,Mpr&e M!lml! At.l' I'd• p.Jl,.o.
3. JMA. !he "3Vid1oal consci.m.ce" ta � � not • 
Sft'IIP ooneeince but is made 11P ot the mass o� 1nd111.4'Wll 
OQJ!lP1�-tl. 
t..� �b.!�, p.l7th 
"Lt. lo1, etant pal' natuPe tp.\fll :Mgl<t aotrtal•• 1a
nela t1on 4$ la lo1 a torcemea' \Ul eon· . -oou.p
scoial qQi tome le. o�notion drae d.e la 101.
La lo1 PG:r'tt elruil1 en elle-m.&m� sa ;wop1•e aanotion. ,.1 
•Hweit, oc:ntimles �t, it is ntauU.U with ,_.eg r4 to
pcma1 oJt u11a1Dal laws that the �estion of th• 41Peot 
applieatl.on of pbye1ea1 i'OJ'Oe uisee ana., wM heN, the
I>b7e1oal aanot!on operates 1n the :majQPi.ty ot casta sa a
detew•nt • a wav4ing 1mat fol'Ce will. be anl1�<l tt th law 
is broken. 2 When the la.\f is 'bl'Okro, o.ol'lat:raa1nt 1 tlllPl�Jed 
not P�tl01a�g te �s•�• th� �-cut ion fit the· l!!W but tht 
exll0ut1on o� a ;Ju.asm&llt gi.Vtm 5�� e.crnt�n1t;r with ta• law.) 
ln olvtl eases, the eane."'Gion uSW!il� �t:t t� �em ot. 
a.ecree ot nrtllit).f ot� of lJ$1!£oun8.n.ce, once the JUJ.• ot law
1 .. �-t ...... ;r.-.11 4 a -�r��· 
ln tke�o parag.rapfl.s., �1 t 1ti making two Pt'inoil*l 
PGinl&t l1f.rst f1£ all he :18 &$SC'iX"''iUI that '\he pi:<.feloal 
eano-ttcm eanno'i he a � itd.e:at SD;l 1t'tall0n I'G·� olMcU••• 
(elt� o£ eftlle& 1t l!lt;q bo a Pt'l14•n'bial rea.Gtm); •• lt
in.\ewene• onlf "Wl;tell a vtolat ton :he.� oo�:N4 or· :la b8\lt to
ocw.. It, is con&equ.entU\l (in eo tav as e�tton. te
l. 19&0. t p.l76.
2. IJ2i1l· .  l\P•l?S-9•
J. lbJa. ,  p,l79. 
,..  DiA- ·  p.l.IO.
oonoel'll84) and 4eterremt_ but 1t doea , t aorall1 3uettty 
obediec.. on the pari ot the eub ;J�t. eneh. mwal 3u '\U1oat 1011
Jl119t be toun4 1n the �1!1t seo�, 1t is nt.w r
a n.l.e ot law wb.icll. is entoreea� but a. :Judgment et..,. n 1n
aecordance w1 th the law:� The eanet1on mq b lUer l;r a· aot 
ot �Uclpent ( 1a a e1?1l case) :ron owe« b7 a ttD.anc tel lo a 
tntottcecl eventual.lJ'J 1a a Gl'1m1nal case the ;ttt�nt .. 
41HCtl;r affect tlltt aeouaea �ither pb-y"!ttell7 ( 1mpr1so ent) 
or rt:oanos.au,- ( t1-ne ) ., 
It a- JQ boWWft' 'bat this seotmd point is o t� 
qaestlon. For one can sa, With P'POIJPtety tbat GTen t_n tbe
oaeo 11here a lJ&l'son is detelYed 'bJ a penal·t:f boa QODit tinS 
a :to14)144en aot. $!;! J.!!:_!f_!ltm.d.J ;ghU 1 in \h eaae o�
the aPPlication of �ste.al t� tn the ft'ent ot a bl't b.
tk.lewot "be la.w,"la exttoJteea, wen �wgb. � tu 1114am•nt ot
3Wl1et.al etttc•:tt• or oovatt in aa3oP1"' o� uaee the
ru.le ut law is actually e'b•F•4 'dthm.lt rteou..l'st to b
appl:loatlon of ib pbJaical sanot1e»n. 
fA• �'•lat1CJ.ash!p betweea D.u.IJii" • s v!n ot the a.anotlon
and. hla �017 o� 'be $•• is obV1ou.e. Grtt.tcd.siJIS, aa
he 414, tile .,-th t/8 8\atB 'PEIJ,'BOWitJ" he 1'-8f6MC tiM ft)aal 
law ae ihe pnduot ot the 1lld1'Y1cluala who h4t1d 811PI'IIl• """" 
1n a p&nioular IJ001•t1• and whoM task it •• to 1'oN\llate
pre-existing E!al!i! 4. R.o.J.!- Bttt he did not - any  the
llnPO:t"'kaoe ef the· 'WJ'�;ttcm. law. He 1-?Gali�e<l that th pewer 
ot OU1o1als bad to be l"'�i!ill.& ted and tb.eiP ju�isdict ion
•tr�s.bl1ehed. In h1s opinion. the gr-1-.ater,t :pr;ot ot,1on against
�nnios.l aotion was tb.$ oon titut1.onal tN:tn . Jllk or �
state which ensln'me4 the prinCiple ot legaltty.1 Vltmate�, 
1t th-e canst1tution.�l �woJtk b'eolte down, thor -wa 
.ttigll� ot :rsaist��c(;) { tsk� a passive OP active t w 4eptn41Dg
em the gravity o:f th$ ci�umstanees) \aich woul4 b�ome a
�ight tt4 inaurPection u.nd<r.r lltatr=e aircumstanoes. � 
lV. 
I now vli$h ·to re:t�er to 1tb.G veitinga of 'i'WO at DQstt111 
:rollGwe:r-s, !<ogeJ' Do� ana. !law n'glacie. wb.o hav. 4e¥elOP'd 
hia th£1\lgh.t. 'lhese wi'iors ax-e oonoerned tr.ith shot�Ull that
invclv� in 111lg-uit* t '"'-rk tllet� ie to �e fOWld a ntr�u.ral-law 
4ootriae whioh his �tpos1t1vistic" meta.pbJaiqtat pr_ tntitl
h1J1 ftoa �ani•inl• 'lkt�ltt main wit181• o:t ])UgU1t la
t�w. t \thile he �QOOgni.�ted ;Just i.Qe and $Oaial eolia.l'J a a
oonstilucmt elemwts ot the �uridical J'lQfti he nev�eleae 
1ntd.o'ttt4 t.bal �one oe.t1-ld 110t go beyom tho er.msclenoes ot
a � ot" ( u;. tr.�.e esse <:4 inteWl&:tional law) Gt a...-.1.
1. !Jeeit.f., B.ook 3,., PP• 681 .... 705.
a. D.!!- ' PP•7l5-750·
groups. Thea · writers assert that the nom· of justice
may exiat eYen though they are not recognized or appl1 a by
a part1ftlar social group. 1
In an article 1n the R!rq Inteuationale 4e .la. !hio£1• 
tg Pro&t.2 Boana� oaa&Ns the op1n1on that the tar141c 1 
norm consists ot both tact 1!!4 ftlue. Be c11stlnSQ1 bes 
two stases 1n tb.e development of th juridic 1 nona. At
tirs't, the aom ia clo.sel7 assooiated with the 1110ftll wlet
1 t has Talue (Gel tung). 3 But it also has "et.t1o1enc " 
( am&n,g peopl.t who aooept and ob·serve it) end tt S.s this
latter qtl&l1t7 which 1n•eets the ;tur1c:U.ce.l noa with 1t
poattive �1nt. �h1& stage ot develG-..nt 1s Jlleached 'When
the maaa ot lnd1T'1dWil COD.$01Gnees recognize that •b• nora 
shoald be obered, 4- .Ybl1 obedience { wheth.r Yolunta17 or
1Dnlun'bly) is a third stage bUt extraneous to the ttrat 
tvo etaaea. It oonoehS the ttetrtcaov" ot \he jur1dtoal 
mma. • 
T.tewe4 in tht.a _,., 881'8 DennaJ'd, the natuftl 1•• 8!14 
poattt.Te law are Mt cb.'asttaally opposed. "Poaltlnti" ta 
11ehl7 a etas• lathe 4rteloPJilent 0'1 tb.e les81 DDI'Il, a 
1. ar �. tt•a IHtsP£!-bl:��S f:''' Ar.ehl-.ea
4• lld.loaoJbi• 411 4Jto1 ( .1•2; ) P• . at P·"''· 
'the •3GJ��lt7 uy ..-.n Yio.late the non., 
2. Droit g!unl 1t golt ;eol&tlt ( 1928-9) pp,l-16.
3. lt.y.' p.9. 
1t.. Ib14. , p.lO. 
s. pu. ,  p.lO.
�7 
qna11ty wll1oh attaches ·ttsel:t to the moral DO& e.t a oert in 
tim*l an4 in a PQtiftla .. oountJ7.1 liJatul'al law 1n et'tttOt
becomes part o:t poe1 t1ve law when the me. a of 1n411'1duala 
1a a P8l?tiftlo ooabJ" l!'ooop.J.s that tt qht to be ob 
ats1a4e devtlope this 11ne or thoaght in a po•thttmns 
1f02'k; Ve.leg soctple et CoD'ft'A• J!u:!i41<aea, .3 B apeea 
with BotmaM taat ·the moral norm. ia rea11sec1 1n hla� br 
2 '·
a oolleetin e:xpui.ence on the part of the membSl'a �
pari1CN.lar aootal poat»-. 4 But he disBJl"f:lea nth Bom.M •hat 
"·tftk&wttt ad "atflgyitt" oe.n be sepuated, to� he •satna
tbat tile 3V141.081 ncn._ 1s etf'1oac1oae tt it is oonet4ee4 
wrtlq' · ot obedt.e.noe. 5 · Aooo .. lng to ReS].aae. the ort-terton
O't "iul4le1tv" is th opWo b£2.8 of the mass ot ln4i'f't.dual 
pasrtioular oom.,,n1tF• Oonsec;pently, th , ge Qf "po 1t1vi n 
ts reaohed wen the moral norm. becomes a �urid1cal ou.stom. 1
As thblga 11$'\V stand, �e lhJguj ti;m oonoept!on at the,
78lat loas)lip bet . en natural la and :posl tive la cou.J. b
set oat as �l.lows:
VoraJ. non ecmta1n1ng tmpera t1-ve (Val!P£) 
PpattlU� CoUeetive e.xperie•• 1n »arttottlar ( Efttoao1 t6) 
00\Ult'l!'fl 
$W.lU.l1nB ll'Pt we oan say tbat Bonnar« ana Reglade 
deftlol*l JNgd.lt' s thOught 1n ,._ reapecu. In the f'tnt
P�t the, haft po1nte4 to t� l¥ltural law 4oo'OrtDAt. 1Dhertnt
1n Us thMW o� the 3urid1oal norm. !be PJ'tno1P1•• ot
�n!M (in41T14ul I1D4 soo!.al) cannot Net on th• Qgt or
Peeosntttea br l.n41"f14ual eQllseiencea Ia a Pbt1oular 1001&1 
poup <tor neh oonsot•••• mav en. !be 1JIPII tlvt baJia 
of th••• prlJloiplee, a.et be eousht 1 *•"' tbet •• 1n
etreot � bJ the natue t:d .-. althcNP tll., oaDDOt
etteotl� p14e the ooaaoteneea or the ••••• ot a 
P&rt1oul.ar- potf.P un'til t- aN ftOOSQt..-4• USil•ll'r; of
ooune, thtt7 rill be�· 
1. !!lip SH1!lt !t Coneeptg Jur141P•• P.52.
In the eeoona :pleoe, »uptt' e tollOVJOa bs'f' de.eloped
his 'Yin to the ettflet .tbe.t the be.e1o tea�e 0'1 pos1t1: 
law ita rteesn1t1on. and. o'b.,dience b1 the aem'b :.e ot a 
pa.Ftlo� eootal gNQP• Ae mteh, they place emphaa1 on
�stomaJtJ law a* the J!U,11n aou.roe of positt•e 1a1r.
If we v1•w the na'tu.tfe.l law as a "bait 4m. PQ1aeanee"1 
which becous a P&l't � the �1Jll 41cal lifo &t a :pal'ttoular
ooantry wh.en 1t 1• :reoopt.ze4 b7 tbt mem.bea 0'1 ._he ooatUd. tv, 
we wtll flT014 the POs1tt.on 1n 11'h1ob o.nr and Dabln :ttn4
themselves. !beee tllf!1tfn's in effect <tonat.4.or tha't the 
1nOOl"PONt1on r;tl nattu'al 1811 lBto positive law ul timat•lv 
depen48 on the wUl ct tu 3�1$' (J.eglelatOJt Ol' �}. 
The .rteot or an aihennce to the Dt.J.p.1 tian 8\atldpota-. will
be to eaphas1ae thtJ 8001olo810al phenomenon ·Ill poPill$1' 
acotP1Bnc• to the detriment ot the eitttn law. BoJmaJid
bas exPJ-teaed the op�ion �t Dd8UJ. t is olORI' to tbe
"rat1oDal�et'' eoneept.ioa o-r -� 1q (br wbieh lut mearaa,
1 thjDk., ,._ "J�a1iosl1st" oeueptton � the Nla,loneh1P
. a 
'be'-en !Ulftftll. 1ft' ancl poe1UV9 le.w).; eata ..... a .ot
po1Jlt., a.e beth Aqu.1Ms aaA �· rega!\1 t.he tavl' cort•nt
� QAt lestalat• as taaentttAl to the·�--· ot ounoa.
Oerta inl.7, howevw g 1!10!-e s tht;J.n 'bh't S«hoolm.en, Dugu1 t
places fmPbasie on the social reoopit1on crt th moral w1· • 
In the va-1t1nga of �1t, Ge:nw and Da.btn ._, oan a. 
tnat the lesal !lOX. ie l'�l-A.t$d to th(l ot'a.l no . .  w ana 
ot tae aootal bond. YlheihEn- we "h1� that tm. eeaanc . of
"Pos1t1Y1ttt" ls ttl be fwn&J. in the tact ot ob dleno 
(ouetn.) "" 1n the law laid down in t1 to 1 'II (•ttten 
law) 1e oel'tainly a mavtel' Qf �anc • Ir- »•SIU'd ' 
J,egieh-. an4. the owns $9 Htlectt1ng � ;tur1dio-a1 
eonact.-• tu· pp b"'"n 1he t• will not ••• n4t•
SOlletbuta, howft•• 'he le,tela�ue and the CO!ll"ta mey b
ahead of th41 3111'1.41oal 08neo·1enee and. may iU'lU:eno• 1t. 
In U¥ oase, we mtSt P$togn.1ze that atatut e . .  
4ee1a1one est aa.tiat¥ the basic! needs of the lmtlaJl b•trc• 
who aue up soe1e'V• tt obe41e.nce to thtm ts to,. •l'allr
luatltlH· the aere .OJd, tllat a �e:r os- • le 1•3. t1"'
boci¥ :P&•a•·• e ftl• $1 law is not a au:rtieiea$ u,.1 �eon 
to o))ft1,u.ft to� 1\ ts alwe7.o P�Hl�i�l• uat lte tDeoiratnt 
181' oont�.u W "�J'li!eal c.e�tau"* 'fbe-. CP 1)0'
thtt l.,al ••tea fJtOYldes a -� U mch a �hfna sholll 
oo� te •• 'be •••en�lal •••ttoxu it 1a baa•llJ' 
1Qoft8nl �t ye !!eOOsnlP the pesetb!.Ut,- � tbt •ntUo
Mtwen. ptttJi$1 law and poa1t1-v• au.1
Chapter 10.
I.. 
In ftRluattng the oontr11Nt1on of tbe raohoolmen to,
and lt s place in, jur!sprw!enee, the t1ret on4 Pl't.uJ7 
tad.pent wh1.oh w would make le that thew approach to 1 • 
1s a OJ'Sl one. Thd� d1eouas1on of pon111w law, ll'bioh
relates 1t to the utuml 1a , indiCates tbat th.cw tb.wght.
that 'ihe na'tm-e of poeitive law oot�U . 41 .ous e4 _ n1v 
on tbe baela o� the a«td ion and recognition oe a Mpr­
\Jpe law. 
On tbe otheP bud, it 1 clear that 1n 'hel .. ailda
thtn'• 18 no contu.·ad.on or, eh0\114 we aa,-, 1dentift .. tton td
natual law and. positive law. They "'" 'lllH � tlae t•t
tbat 11• hni'M <•• Bit'!) •• ot a autennt V'Pe to
1!1 •"""Ail• Q.'thcNsh 1• was wtltlted to tbe letter. 1
The wlue or ta �ontP.t.butiona rJt th•IUdera aa--1 
lawre•a which we haw 41seusee4 le tbe.t �- eDl-.. upea
and dAYeloP tbe Hlat18Deh1P lutt.een natul'al law 8DI to•ltiw
law, b7 eapbas1z1ng tbe jnr1st1c notion ot teohntqne. 
and the criterion of the PQ11t1cal oommon good, whioh rka 
wt that ePllere of mwal1"ty with whioh the jurist 1s 
oonoe:rnect. 
The �eation which I wish to diacuaa 1n this ohap&er 
mav 'be eXPlained 1n the following 1187• Since the adTent
ot the positivist school oC ju%'1spruden.c · , � ttaot;a
b.a'Ye 'been levelled against the netuftl law school on the
pound that theb approa.oh to law oontusee .and turns the 
laWJ'er · a"trQ f-rOJA tbe central question ot 3tlr1sPl'Ud.ence,
rtz., wbrit .&a law. The ne:tu.l'al lawyGs, 1 t is saj.d, ar . 
•eall7 oono81'11ed with the question-: -.bat onght 1 tD be, 
an4 there�on thetr tHatment of the roner ••stton 1a. 
trea th.e outaet, doomed to �a1lure 1n so ta7J e they haTe a 
pre-oonoe1ved belief 'bat law and morality are n•esaar1]J'
relatd. 
!o Ws arsament, the natural la.,.er 1ght rtPlJ tbat 
h1a ••tho4 et approaoh to tbe ... ,ton or �- 4trlhl,lon 
ot law is ae YBlid aa 8.'NI othcn- whiOh l&t$1all.1 4ert.nes
the aphere ot ent�t117 o� the legal thtoJtlet, .tlfiher that
apNH be 'the lesal oono.ep\s or the analtttcal 3U'1a1;, tM
Jol}cldid ot tat historical �1dt or the �loal 4tc1a1ona
o� the Hal1st. In these oases, it mipt be ea14, the
person defining law does so from a oertain picture, or
belief, o:r :t1eld e't V1a1on which attaches 1teelt to one 
or other or these features of law.1
At th1e stage, however, the problem mtght reach a 
deadlock nth t.he na'tuNl la'WJ'e�, the snalytioal 3nr1 t,
the h1stortoal 3UJ'iat, end the realist all ••latming: 
"Well, this 1s the wt1J I ua law and theretope thJ.s 1•
the way 1n wh1oh I in�nd tc define it." If thla bappena
1 t WOtlld seem that one ooul.d p no ftlrthez-, that the 
qu.•et1on of dletinition 4.epe.nds on the pein't qt Yiew ot the
2 ;Jurist in quenion. 
It seas to me, runrr�er, that the qQest1on cannot
:rest heres that the Pl'Ob.lem of detinition is not e.it all 
dependent on t ile sub ject ive at titude of t h  definor, un1 a 
ot cou.rse we blve in mind st1pulat1ve def1n1t1on, where
the definer pUrpos es to gin a paJ!'t 1oul.a.J:t meaning to a woPd
tor h1s own 'PQrposea. When I say that the problelll ot tbe 
definition of law is not dependent on the sub3ect1ve
att1'tu4e ot the defi.run' 1 mean tbat his vo1nt ot vte·w 1s
not b.1s own oHat1on o:r something whi.ob. bas oc eurred to hta 
out of t he blue, as it wet-e. He u.sually l'epreaents •oa•
sohocl a£ thought or legal tradition wb1cn may str tch onr 
a great 1'1Wrlb er  O.f y ea:re. The analjt1oal 3U1'1et, �or 1n­
atanee; may have :ronet hie id eas on t h• b eie ot the
tndttion whteh e tl'etob.es trotB Aust 1n to the ;,.e ent aq,
while the ns:t�l J.anez- aay r efeza h1a approaoll te tu
worke ot o �am ao4em natu.ftl lawyea, 01' .ven to anc ient
aOlU'Qta.. To tbie ext.nt, the "s�iitll'l" which Proteeaol'
WUllaae ueets is 11kel7 to mipepee•t tu ob�eot 1Y1'1
whloh e-."ae-.s to the posit 1ona a®pto4 by the utural
lane .- the &1Ullrt1eal ;t\lrl&t•
1 
ln an Qlti(tlt which appeared ill P'lble 1n 1938.
Protessol' Oakeshott 1a pa.t1cularl.,- oono rned with th 
q\leetton o'f d1ttweat fl'PPl'Oache s to t he def1n1t1 on ot 1 "• 
His thea1s seems to be that th.e sphere ot 3Ur1et1o nqt1117
is net ex!Ulueted m&rttl11 by one appr.oaohjl tb.Erl tndeed
coneentrat1o:n on one alone 1e 1nsuff1o1 nt. The natu� l
lavr.vtr by oonoentx-at 1ng on the "point of 1nt ereeot1n" 
'between law and •thtos may neglect the ena:trsis or legal 
conoepte, wbJ.le the llntll7t1ce.l 3\lrtst, by oono entft'iDs on
the lattft't uy neglect the former cpeartion. '!be eolut1on.
which Oakeabett otte'J.!I.J ie not to llllllP all t h• theot-iea 
together, to oreat' soae tJP(' ot hotoh-potoh of l•sal
theor1tl, ae this 1s a� ifie.ial, but to conoen'bate on e. 
:pal'tto\llar tracl1 t ton or wey ot thtnkinB 1n a •Y wh!.oh will
lea.4 the 31J.P1at to enqo.ire into· tru. saft'1o1en0)' or that
tra41 t1on and theMb7 to. becOJaO aoqtta1nt tcl  with otb.R
tra41, 10D.a. 1 In other 'WOr<ls. the problem o� 41tfo.et
approaob.•a te law 1e not sol'Yed. from the mdtld.t• bT �'•-
3eot tq all t he  tMi1t1ona and. at the same t tlle oonetNo"ba
csoa• V'.Pe o� univtreal theor;r ot law Wbioh tak•• 1n 101tetb1DI
troa ••en, ba.t tNm. the J.MW!t by aahe:ring to <tne !A the
)lope "bat this tra41'C1on will become more etll1ah"ene4 )J'
1 ta oontaot wtth othe�s.
Now it 1a a etr 1k1n8 f$ot and 1n!eed wol'th not1q
that the tO\'lllde:P of, o:r an adherent to , tbe ana]Ttioal or 
natural law tradition does not ooll'Pletel� attach h1uel:t
to the 1Ptbo4 of apProaoh cbaraote·%tist1o of his tlta41t1on,
but makes some oono esa1on a' least to other tra4it1ona • 
.Aust in' a wrk. tor tna'b.ne�-. 1a not deYOted ent1rel7 to a
atud.J ot "law as 1 t 1a. " He devotfa tJnaee ohe.pt_.s to a 
d1souas1oa o� u.t il:l:tr thUebf rooop1a1rJc that llOral1 tJ 11 
withia the epheN c4 a �ia11e enqutn, 1 YhUe bia at'Hlapt 
to arau• tor 'the rtoOgn1t1on of oeJ'tatn prtno1Pl•a 'bottoatd 
on the ns:ture ot man 18 said ltv aome •o point to an
1nc1t>1--' aat"Oel law tbeOJ7'• 2 Wlth the nat'Qial l&WJ'ftll,
t' 1a Obviotte t-.t 41BCQss1en 1e not oontined enti�tlr to 
the qtteatton tJt the re1at1o:o.sh1p betwe•n law an4 uttalltr, 
tor tbey 4o tn4•e4 �gntse i;he importance til lepl concept,, 
This dda aaeat that, while an atl:utl'tm� at a 
,art10UlaJ' aehOOl Stw"t.Ohte the qll•ton t4 'tihtt Atttrdtton
fd. law 1n " paJ-ti.oular • ., , he is nw�leaa l'JI"apa!'e4 to
l'eoosnta• tbat otbeJt qaea"1ona J'll8J be aaDA aboUt law.
ana tM.e te no1 nttft8,1Ye4 'bV $he tae·t that IRlOh cp•at1ou are 
1. Ltotuee 2, 1. ,._ ot the H:J1.DU �S!f, ,tj&�PFAA•nge 
J)tt!Diad• (L1UU7 of ea• . • -, . • 
L llU4• ,  Int�4t1on, XV• 
ooJJt1ned to another aoien.ce, n s  in the case ttf Auetin,
to n(leontolog ". 1 �Ten !&la�x'l, the �XPoMnt aC tne
theory o:t le:w, does net completely succeed 1n . xcluding
ethical notions � ta. $PhePe of law. 2
The basic d.itfnence betweetl the anal.Jt!oal �at
ond the na tln'al la�er aeqa to be tbilJ• Doth set out to
anaJ.rze the not 1on 0t law- Th. : follm&t-, in g1'1'1ng an answer
-to tlw qUestion "wbat u law? t' tinds that tbe»o ia 11. 
ncte•seeJ'f eonn•tton 'b$tW$�n law and lllQ.rt.tls. The latt•r;
tn ana'WQ"blg the samt �estion. finds that there b. a 
n•oaaary o.onneot ten. In this wa:v, the · ·netenoe <1t the 
t._ tracU.tiOR·s with their a'e&p$ct1ve methocls et enqlUX'J 
ean b• ex.pla�. !fb.e anal.1'1oal 3t'..riet, baYha ant 4
at l11a cotJ:eluel�n, :mrtuJall!V oonside:rs. it blPt>l'tfln1 to
anal71t the basic notions o:t law ( au.oh tlptgbt", '*4u.1r"•  
"persoaalt'Q' u ),. l '!he ut\U'S.l la'Wif#'t arn-rtns a\ h1a
oonolueioa. cens14ers it to be at pr1tu,aJI¥ t.mp�once to
etuar the ''pqm'C et inter•eotlon't bet en lav .anA ao�1it»'• 
1. ot_ - . w. oua_ tilt ' Tae  Jfature Gt :L•-r• bi1Ufl) IIJAlM• 
Vol. 2 ( ltliJ.J p.l28 .,, 139.
2. be l.*•oopttl<m ot � Gru.dJlOft aa a ure "PPahlate"
or ltt$Jl t�t OO•s not (Wftl'COIM the WQblea. 
J. et lfu't '�lJ'\1081 Jur1sPN4-"• s.n Jf14-oenwnJ . 
A Re»b to Prot••ao� a.tpheiaer • , . 185 Uld.'VOait¥ � 
PellJUIJ'lftnia ltaw :&mew, P• 953 a1 PP• ,.,,..,._ ( U56-7 ).
II.  
Wtth these coha1d�:t�:t; iona 'betore our i:ad, I now want
to aek the quest ion whethev the n t'l.lPal 1a theo17, as 1t
ha s  been PJ�ese.nted in. the ll!'ev'iou.e ehap•s, is su.1'.r1c1ent ,
1n "he sense that 1 t gives u a s  wide a picture as possible
of the p.henom�n \'>Jb.ieh we oall pOsit ive l&"«•
One of the moat promilleat :rea tux-es ot tho soboolaen' a 
d1sw.ss1on is what I shall oall the 'th1erapch.1oal " appro ch.
!'he rues of 'POsit ive law are at the bottom of sou tn 
fd ve�1eal stwcw.ro, with natural law at the top. lloreOYer,
the P10t\U'e which comes to our minds � we read the
relevant obapw;ra of the SW11II@ or De Lostku is or
legislator deriVing his rules :t?om a 9UJ>mor aol'lll 8114,
after a pPOQ(tse of a'tlbmitting these rul .s to ooolal oon-
41t1onin,fh finiU.tlg or d1eoovering oortElin detailed Pl'toepta
which ma.v- 'llen M applied to the �ttO'Ql.ar aircruma�cea
at .bie oOQAtrJ". 
cwta.bll.J, 'he pie� 1s str·engtbenecl in our a1D4a
lfhen ye ttu-n to Qeny 1 s diacuss1on: aene!'al tn-i1»1p1ea beoom.e
leaa gen.-al util tbey 4iss(!)l?� inte a as,e ot cont1Jlgent 
Pl'iu1Pl•tt whteh &1!2 b!M �e applicable t(l) a part 1WlaP 
lesal qs't•• Witb. Dabin, Usptte h1e em:phaaia on the
oonoep't ot the »Ubl ie c�u gOod and tb8 Mn· •jllrid1oal
D&ture o� natural law, the picture sttll lingers, althcnagh
bJ.e cmpbas1s Qn :Pr'tldene� and ohoiee does aom.e·what m1t1gat 
1ts ettecta. 
The defect in th,1s approaah 1a tnat one is inclined 
to toa a picture at the leg1elator as sOllle �pe ot Jmmst1
meobsJaia whose t3slt it 1e to ao�1nt b1m.a u- with general
l?P1ne1Ples and t h\tn, !ll tbe m.rumer ot the momltot, t o
red•c• suoh PP1n01Ples to a mo?e detnil$d form 1n saoh a 
wtt¥ as tlU,lt � 'becom.e atttomat iea1.1y a:ppl.f:.cable to 'he
legal ��  wtth. wb.toh he 1s conoemed. 
:rtwtheft01'$t tbe e:pproach eonveye the i'm.PN . ston that 
tb• nataftl l$w ts o:nl.7 rel�ant to , ott o.n ob3tot �
concern at the legtslato�, whoee taak it 1s to f'�t
lews 'h'tt a �1e\lla:r? cemmu.nity. lt a.ttachtSe to ont · epat 
ot an 9tl.� tato 'P')a!ti"fe l&w and a,.erts O'U.P atttntloa
tNlll otheJ' segments whQz,ae t.he n8tunl law 1s :r elwallt.
lt Rggests 'hat matt:uJal law o� presats 1t.-u- i9 M 
1lD61!1 11l tha tom of ralea ot l1Qs1t1ve law tn tM G or 
that a)"atera. 
Perupa th1o eol\Cem w1 th natunl law ae 4!. prine1pl• 
ot log1Sla tJ..oa ar1�es h'om. a limited Pot».' o£ 'f1tw r:4 the
natural laWfe�s. In ihi.tlld.ng of the l'elattOA•biP betwe-en 
na'tll.ftl law ant1. l)OSJ1t 1•� law thfJIY � be thbltblg U1 t·au
at a etrcl• ••attons whai 1awe ought the lepelatOP to
Mke'l 
On the oth&.r han4, 1t is olear that they ar also
concerned with thE» qu.estton! what type of laws ough1; th
sttb3eot to o'bers And J)ug\d:t •  s emphaais on the tac t  of 
obedience nnd soQl�l ��ognit ion doea direct aur ttention
to this qufJs\1oJU lt we discus� the gu.e s tion o-r -�
law in t he context of ob�flienaa to :ttulea of PO 1t1Y law,
1t 1s e"9'1dent that the hiera"Mhical lltOdel 'Will, to that 
enent, hAYe to be modlt!ed, at� it • 1a m.ol"'e- r�lnant t.o th 
ease of t!l.e l$gislator wno a0 t.a.�W: 1t 1a to tsl.JlQlat! mea
ot law, than to t)lfl subject whose task 1t 1s to 4 o14e� 
1n th� went at a con:rltct between tho$ tao!'ll  law and the
positt..,e law; whether to obtty the latteP. 
Ap.t.n. the Gehoohten' s discussion o� eqtt1t7 CUl4
bltel'}r$tat 1on S'llggttats th!at the jUdge :t.e concern 4 to a.­
exttnt "81th the na tutaa1 lawl' o� w1 th th&.t :pan or 1 t -.bleb
4t•ls with the etml�ntio� of rulea in the 1�, or »&rtiedla� 
OUoWilatanees; am Gen7' s 41aouarai,on crt �hni(Ue alAieata
tbat tn• � a3 wel.l ae 1!\8 legl$lato:r 1,., co•oaed Wlth 
•• lllfltQ,al l,tlw. � again, the hl�ll aoael doe• 
not -.t.tlee, u 'that it Aoea not ao�t :1¥ upla1n the 
;twt!otal .,_.._.,... eepeotal11 that ot e.. ooao11.•law ••*•••
tar heM th• ja4ge ts net ealy eono.,.,.4 With del'i't'iDI \1ut
�t.Ju)11>1.- e of hltt d$0·ie 1on � hi.gh� 'P!'1no!:nle••
Ptul].t, • uy also. S8'3 that the l•pl �all4 polttioal ) 
phJ.loaophu or theorist 1s oonoft'llecl with the Mtuzral laY.
'rhe legal theon�t ha a the taa'k tf exnm:t.ntng tht phenom�:noa
ot law, or d1E-cr.u�s� ths quemt ion of the •eJ.at1onsh1p
be"t-en ethte� and law, bisto17 an(! law, end so on. Te· a 
g:reetcn,' extQt tU!l tu leg1a.le.tox-,. mlb3oot1 o• twJse. tht
SPhere O't #V1stlo en.�U7 wl th vb1eh he ts cQllC ene4 1s 
not lild.te4 te a JB!'tteulu tlf'.estion Sll.Ch as ''What l.awa
ought the legielato¥' tf]) uke? " Although hta 110ft wlll
neo.eeaeJ'117 tnolude qt.testiens ot thte type� 1t lflll. be -..  
extenetYe, ani he will attempt to g1v• ae complete • psown 
e,s llGSe1ble of the Menotl'IMJl wb1oh we· oall 1••·.1 cnea-17. 
a h1erarebf.oe.l pic'b\ute ril'l no.t assist hlm 1n tld.a taak. 
It is fJubmi tted that • m1st fl.tsl)fnse with th•
"h1e""h$ealtt mcdel if we wteh to eQla:t.n the Hlatioaalitp 
of' natu:ral law and pos1't!Ye law. As e:pplted 'o t» 1•81•­
latop, 1t •w have S!llt ., .. ue . bu.t :1' iotte not .,_lP us to 
tt.IJPM!.$8 'the tanct1on ot ·na1h.t!'a;l law d1ac'tlflltQll 1n oVlt» 
c�sts. When the «t�eertton tt�v na�l lawt u l• •••• br 
e�eu in 11fd'litS'el�• to d19011$s1on abnt a. legal ••tam, 
1 t JI.O.St :not 'b• taka t01!' pan,ed tbst th1�t (Jteatto• Jaa•
on1r one eall.1Dg, naaelu , wet laws Ollgh1i a 1tp.1 ., ....
to �tave. nt antral ua.n1llga. In et.t•t, the •••"io•l' 
taa7 'b• •eking answe?e �• o� rp.eet1oaa aa.oll •••
a .  What is the �stittcation tor obe(11ence t o  la lfl 
b .  I n  'wba t  we.y i a  t he judge oonoemed ·with moztal IJ%t1no1pleat 
C •  In what way is t he  legfil theor1at ooncc;m G with moral 
prtnoi:Ple&O 
III. 
�}; ... ln.� ..  �.r!1.-�� .. :t�.s.i.���· 
Af11 ¥s, 1t 'Will be reealled, S!JQke ef' the bwlan 
l®gisla t� e. a i)�rtomL"'tg a ta.ek which Qmf! d b G  compared�
�.n an �logical w-ay ,  With that of the Sl:"ct ist � . 1 �e
o:naloQ aaggeat$ th.at the lcgi alator j.s s o qtJB "' nted with an 
outline t'lt the law to be mru1e fl.Jld, t n f'1lls �.n the 4 . t 11s 
ot thQ lt;,w., In er:Eect ,  tbe :pintW:""* !>reaent d 1e that ot 
an 1do.�u leeislato� aware of fll.l t.M n��ooa ot th OommtJn.1tv 
and llftT1ng the onpacity to worlt �ut an !deal eolutton. 
or eO'J.�s$� 1t 1fl ()bvirm$ that, ��. s_ M.:\tmr Qt taqt. 
laws � not matl!e 1n this vay. W��&t laws an aade 'b1 
parltaaente,r:r bo<iiec; or by aonte socltll poap, th9 oonoeJ;Jt1on 
or whe:t ts to be don� l'$0lly only a�1s.es once dis.,_uistcm 
has got under way ,  and 'the dicoussion 1 � uene et 1e­
ctn'er1ng the beet law.. Ih othel' ..ol'd. , the ett'b l ect.· tt
of t h• law is oot ideally coneet•ett by �be � · t •••
till• or e't�, bttt i t:�  t�rmuJ.atetl on.1y aft er l <"� and pst1 nt 
41souas1.on ana ettit 1e tam� In some oas s, 1Ddee4, th•
sub ;leot-Jil&tter ot t he w.le of law may be tol'JD.l1le.t d, not
on tho 'basts of whethel' it is the beet law, but aa a aer
$bm1ss1on. to the POltoJ ot the NJ.tng paJ9t7 OJ' taotton,
or to the obsngtng sta te ot "'lie oplnion.
tt woa.ld seem that. tb• na't;tJral law theo27 toea not 
�port to h:Pla1n hc>w laws are :mad•: what 1t .tee• ts •o
ausseat �· oentaot wh1eh mtob law npt to baYe with the 
PJ-1ne1ples ot raoral1t7· Ot oouae, tb.e �b$0J.7 ae lt 1e
eXPOU.n.4td 1n 'the ..olik o� �, is pre-ems.nentl.J •ltal)l·• in
OXPla'-ning the I'Uf'PGSt Of a oo4ir"1ed IJS'tG. In &Wih a
system the legislato.r oupt to ieo :L4e on the :ppino1plt 
whieh a�e t o  'b• 1noQrperate<l into tlle q·stea. Conseq\lfntlF; 
b.• will uke PX'ovisien 'ZO'I!' 'he protection o<f l1t• ani
Pl"oP•tl' ana. e"k to :red.u•• ih•se Pf'inOlPl.es. i$ a •w•
«•tail.cl toN. It is 4Ufio�" to soe hOw a o04o ·40ttl4 be 
a1 all ea'listao•o%7 it i� 414 !lot take aoaOWlt fit tllfQ 
baa!o llOftll prtnc'd:pl•a• 
IJl a ollulaoa law • .,._.. l,\o_.,tltt 1he 'baet..o Wlta ba•• 
SJ'OW up _, ••ane ot #U41o1al teoieiona siTe h. "h• 
OOJl�ext ot :tactual 0 1H11a&1alilaea. ln s•h a ••'•• tb.t
l eat•lat*" -of!F 4o•a not enact a PJlQfll •oct• ot pa-iao1Pl•• 
(tor the7 are lllreaq :toun4 in the ensthlg law). Ra'ihP;
s.t preeee48 pragaaatioallJ: - as tM n•td pr,eeente ltetlt tor 
a new Pleee of l•gtsle.t ion, the legisle.tiye bod7 coaenoe . 
it s cleltberatlone. Tnt" may eome a t!m, when the .new 
l�1sle.tion bas an etteot whic h inte�ePee with the proper
hDOt1ontng ot the •tnei:ples of th oonuaon law. Il'l this
oe.e•• the· 1eg1elat1ve b<>47 will bavft 'bo N-&.ppratee it•
enaQtmente and to d ec14 whether thG eta.:Otl1tv � the legal
8'1 eta 1e belq 'ftaltenec!.
O't o•ne, the same problem will SJ?i&e in a ooditled 
qatem. After a 1:1er1ot of' t tsne, new soolal nee4a .ar• •on 
to mst and oona"qttentJ.v the demand ariaea tor a new piece 
.f!IZ legi latton te eatis1"U these Me4s, o� tor e. !'etoa 1n
1he ext•"tns oo4e. A conflict be\W$en th• })Pine1plea t4
tM eoi and the new s.oeial n.eede mav 017SiaU1••• Da)tn,
1n ,d'J'ect, l'eoogatzea thle oflmt'11ot. Hle greater ftPb.ali•
on -tlle ooneept ot the PUbltc good 1Ja. an ant14ote � QeQ:r' s 
analJ'aia ( wl'\b. 1 1s oonceniwt1()n on the "ttl4i:vt4ual l'lgbta .. 
148 at tb.f Coctt } u tat it d0ee blghlf.sht the 4tttietllt1te 
whioh ra.e a ltgJ.a.la"Oor 1n reooneilt.Da thfJ inter•,•'• ot tb.tt
1n41Y14ual w�•k the lnteJttsis or tbt -�it¥• 
Uew1 1" .an be aa14 t.bat tu l$iJ!slat1ve bedr Nit 
1o 1Mt eonee.-nd �th the pr1no1Plts ot ibO natual law tt
ita 'en&otm.eata aH 'io P21'0V·14e a aattstaotorJ' •7 of lift
ro» the •eallere ot tile OCIUP1:D1"7• U 8 OQ'MtU:d.ty 18 1;0
ha•• ax:w I.esialatt•• enac:tnaeats ot- Nlea ot law, tM!l. 1 t
:mnat have so• basic ftlee protecting ltte and propeMy.
The "Dnlet " � thia context is not some t7H of log1oa1 
-met •• , 1n t the sense tb.a t a legal ayatem by it a ..,.., nattu-e
entails tb.eae baste 110ral rtll"• 'but la dt1'1Ye4 hoa an
evaluation ot the relat1onah1p between law and · -t.u Ju•n
needs of those 'lfbo are aubjeo, , to ita 41sc1pl1ne. 1
Does this mean tbat the legialato,.- Jr118t pntrora the
task of �he �a11a1 in asaesatng the needs at a leaal
ayeteltt The SOhool•en • B view does iap]¥ tbat the l•at.­
lator mu.et .,. eonc ernea. wt'h the basiC 110:ral rules in eo 
�ar as they are tireotb' related to the 111'e � peoPle 1n
an orpniaei society. But 1 t soes beyoD4 ttd.a in 8\111dt1ns 
tbat the •nho« o� the 1 fJglalator 1s atllilaJI tc the anhod
ot the aoraltat, tn so rar aa the arch1teotural Wlcl•l 1a 
ut111sed as a l'aa•la �or an &PP!'aiaal of tbe leglal.at;1ve 
f'unotion. Po:r when the sehoolMD. ap•ak o� posit1Te law
as l)•tng c1eF1Te4 boa natural ln b7 11'8¥ ot ooncluion
or d •" •J'II1nat1on th-a oan 'be tat.• •• •antna 'tbat tb.e 
leglelat.ive llo47 1tael.r paJ'lticipatee 1n this reaaoa1Jaa
proc eaa. 2 In4ee4, wbl' not make "he l.epalatift bod.J' a 
w.bber a-.aap: leave the ta$k o� »coulU41na" and
1. cr. Hm, Introduot ion. to AUB"lnt o;e.c1t. ,  XIV.
It 1a trtte that suarez. more so tlum Alfl'l1Da•, ctrrotea 
at'tenticm to poe1tin law es 'a• glgty lfSlalttt£11• 
§Uri Ald'-4 , !  · 
"4et ePm1ntng" to the moN.l 1st { who, after all . lt a1ght be 
said, wtll be mere a.ccttraie tban the leg1slato:P) nd allo 
him to, preeen.t h1a :tind1ngs to the legislator fo'f! apprataal'l 
Bo, it ie tlear that it would be wrong to oonoeive or 
the relat1onehl:p between lew and eth1ee 1n this way. The 
les1elat1ve body ctees not bV$ the task of 11acoy FinS tt• 
NJ.ea b7 reooare.e to the findings 0f the moral1crt . It 
O£!f!!!l• worka ou.t , overcomes obataolea end t�iQS to aat1atv 
a s  )QQDy deauan.4s as poesi'bl•• Ite decrees are net p l't '•4 !n 
the cala Q't a rfligiou.e cell or un1vex-aity- etu.q, but. aw 
brought :terth afte� deliberation 1n the :taee ot 1h$ ofta 
conn.tct tng opWoM 8xPl'etased by the r-eweaen�at S.yea. r>t 
the people, l 
PePb.apa ihe schoolm.en tried to Ulod� the pt.c�e 
whtoh their d1souse1on ot natuJiBl law su•ds when the)' 
P01n1 e4 to tbe �el'tC\1lltJ' or laelt of :wectat d t81"111n tlon 
lrh10h wae to be fOW¥1: 1n the seo nAa%7 Pl''ecep'ta or tbe· 
na1Qta1 law 81'14 1n tbe sat.111tn. In paJ't S.CU.lat't atares 
waa at patns. to shOw that the phlte.se "natural law" aa 
appl1e4 to the 8MordUV llt1·eG8Pte 41,4 not oa:rJ!I the •• 
•pbaata as tt 414 'Whtu applied -.o tlle pr� �o•vt•• 
SUOh pr•eP*s were more the remtlt of tbe 804p1rel ex:porteao• 
� 11$Dk1D4 ltltm ot baa1e ineltuitoa, althoqh �hey e od4 
be oalle4 "natural "  1n the eenst they ollOe aecerta1De4 
they oould be •••n to oo�on to the nature or man. 
l. 
It aeema , theretore, that the hterarchical mod 1 ,  1n
so far as the activity ot the l egislator is cone rned, 
must g1 ve way to a more r�ined model which ta.k s into
aecount the crtatiYe role 1n wllich tbe 1 gislator 1s plac a.. 
A"D;3 new aodel muet take a..ccount ot the task of !lebO£. tign 
and ot :1'01!5&91 gt. To be sure. the legislator lDllst
take account ot t.he bas!c mol'al norms and sl ao ot the
growth 1n mol'fll 1net1iutlona, but hi s work is not at the
deductive kind. 
lfa'tural h!w an,d the Jgjg. 
It ts Ofttn th011gbt that, whil nat�al l w 1s tb.e 
conoem of the legislator, it is quite foreign to the 
del1be1!'8t tons of the 3ttctge. Once the law ts mnde, 1t te 
sa14, the jUdge aettel)' has to mt�rPt-ri and to apply 11
to the o·trcumatane.es o:t the cas• before him. This will be
eo both 1n th• ease of the int erpretation of a body of
ju.41o1al 4eo1a1one. and 1n the oaee of the 1nterpJ-etatton 
of 't. ·11es1slat1•• enaotm.ent. Aecord1ng to this argwaen*;
the �dp aust tttiDtltt not aereatt" law.
FOJ' a long �me 1n AftSlo-AUl'ioan 3urlspJ;Idenoe, a 
dellate has proeee4ed as to whether \he 3Udge ••UV 4oea 
�1n4" the law, or whethU."' irrn>lvecl 1n his •rk \b•r• 1e 
eou •oreat 1ve choioe�, On tbe one hand, the "rorma11ata
a�gue that the ebo1ce of the judge is determined by -pre­
exi sting author1t1 es and that he merely pat th a 
aut horities into some o'l'der so a a  to elicit a dec ision in
the case betot-e him. On t,he other band, th �non­
tormaliets n a:rgu.e that the jud.ge often has recours to
flextra-legal ,' cone:lderat1ons which intxude int o  any 
tnterpr,etat ton ot the exist 1n1 law, 1
The SoboGlm.en make no ment 1on ot natu.Jtal law, as aueh;
e141ng the ludse 1n interpreting a rule of law but they
do reoosnlse the ensten.ce ot an equitable ;Jurisdiction 
which can be ut 111ad by the ;Judge to mitigate the hardship 
wh1ca may tl0w ft'Gm tbe ol'd1n&rY applicat ion of th , rule
of law. It seems, therefore. that recourse net be had 
to the collCeJt of GQ.'11 ty to explain the appenl by a 3\ldge 
to lfextra-leg&l. " principles. 
!he word. �extra-legal � t?uaesta that • •n•n a ;nap
appl1e.s egllity or treats a ease on its 11lttl'1t • ,  r. take
hta•cd.t eut s14e $he eld.s'tlftg 97stea ot ru.lee ana. pa •••
3t14pent on thea. It the, collle:Pt ot eqtt ty ta asntrttd
1t 1a lik•lV tut the 3\tdso may often hav-e rtctO'tU'S• to
"es.tra-lop1" prtnc1plee in <lleetd1ng • partleUlaP ease.
1. 
'.rbe Free Law movement ·On t he Oont1nent indicates tb d ger
involved her. ;  w1ib the tendeney to snb ject 1viem ·rui 
eventually to a. hapba zard ,  almost anaPchical svetem. ot 
legal dec isions. AceordinglV, one who �pproyes of
recou.rse to ext.ra•lepl W'lnC1Plee IJlllSt tpead wartly. 
Ontt way out of tb.te d.1ttteult7 118Y be to recogn1zt 
the equitable j\11'1sd1ot 1on aa &-eae tacto pari of the sphere
or engo.tn of the cJudge end therefore oontatne4 wtt.hia the
l$gal ayst·em. fb.e jUdge would have neour-a.e t o  e. Pan 
ef tho sy.st q when thl! neEd arose, an(} the pbltaee *extn­
legal"' wOUld denote the :r:an of the system wblch •·• no\
written or c·ontained 1n some :ro:rraal sou.rc • 
Thin would mean thnt any d1seu$slon at a qete or
posit ive law would have to tak-e acoount of "he f .et. 'bat
such a system 1e not �closed" or ·ase.lf--ccnta1ne4 • ,  that
1 t extends be,-ona the ieclaX"at t<ms of n.ll ot the geTelming
b.o41 and the "14'1 ttft 4eoi·s1ons ot the cou�a. 'lhts, 1a
'tUJ!'.Q, would meu. � moJte flexible evaluation of 1he concept 
ot a legal system an41 the eeMeP\ of a lepl mle. 
1n a 1'eoent m 1elo, 1 H. x.. A· Hal't disou.eaee th• 
quee1;1on of r•Ottrse $o "e.fira-legal " critel'la on the 
part of th jUdge. He tm.ggeats that the v1ee ot torma11 • 
in so �ar as it is a vtce1 11laY be overcome end that
decisions may be made 1n ac cordance with an tttnt el11gent 
purpose��r altbou.gb au.en PQ.l''PGGe may be possibly be immoral 
( •• I• ;Judio ial decisions or Nazi judges 1n ttceordane e wi'h
the Nazi phUOtJOJJh,v ) .  1 Pxtot'eeso:r Hart belie·treo that in
the major1 ty ot o:ase$ x-ecourae to nextx-a•legal " er1tex-1a 
is not neeessa"f7 - the �ro'bleme of the pen.umbn .... , while
important ,  sb.O\lld not OC!etll'IF the ;Judges too ach. 2
It 1e quite 1W$t l think; 'that t:Qe Yi·Oe O"f nronallhl"*
is not always a vice. 'tb.e accmsation of �o!'Ul811.n,. can
easily leed to e.xt.Pemea. aerta1nl.y, one l'Dt1St reeogn1ze 
the ulue of certainty as a prere<.p1s1 te foX' the •xlatenc• 
of any wlee at all : �ecottree to extl'&-lepl. pr-inc:tplee 
wbi·ch tenda to weaken tht.s :tactor may hErf'.O :ra.1nous etteets. 
�u.t it aeGs tbnt the �eoogni ticn ot an •qUl�a'bl e �uta• 
dtc'tion does mean t hat •h• .;Judge is oonc�e<l not onlJ wltb
app]Jtiag a wl e or l�w as such� bu.t with appl.7lb.f e rule 
wb.i:oll baa some moral quality. A sulmliss.loa to an ertl
philoao:phJ'• na 1n tke caae of tke Na21 3U4gee, makea a
mooke17 of the law in two reerpeeta : 'the eeourtty OJ.' 
certa int)" rJf the law is weuene4• and t he ertterl& reoop1ze4
1. D&l·' P• 61]. 
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1n such dec· is 1ona are ll01's1ly wrong. 1
Now I �11se that tb1s vi�r m�ans that the ooncept 
of UQIYl'A ft .bong 1& Pet't1nent to any syst em nt all here 
ad3Ud1cat1<m oeettl-s and, tJl.ereforet that the 3Ud,ge ougb.t 
to take account cf the tnOrnl valu$ which attaeh:<tG to tb.e
rule.e·;\,.!ch he t s  ap:plJ'1n3• Of cou.rst, when "" aeaert
that 'the •�tion of eqa1tJ 1e 1n41apens8ble to the 1nteJt­
pretat1on and application of nles of le.w, we do not nteaD. 
that the oono e:Pt of 1n'erpHtat1on logic,all¥ en:ta11s a 
eoncoJ'll with the principles of e�1'1• Olee,.-ly, thw� wet'e 
some Nazi 3Udaes wbo h.ad. no tattalms $bOU'· apl)lying a a oret 
blrulket law which gave them pow$r to consign to a eonoen tra•
t ion oaap a number td individual a w1 tb.ot.1 t � #Ut Cmlse 
fo� thea uapx-1sonment being shoe. Wba t we are eaying le
th$t tt· the ;}'adge is to satisfy trut human needs ot lil group
of people }l(J tmllt take S.OOOWlt ·Of the Pl'-1nQ1p1es of Of11 ty' 
1n 1Ua tnt&:t-PJ?eiia't i<m «2 the roles ot law or t h.,qt evat-. 
InA•-'• tbe�e mu.st have eome a stage '\Yhen a $114st Cit ·one
of the c�1m1nal or epec 1n1 eoums 1n u·a zt Germany woa.ld
be forced to ask :  "Am ! Pe&lly 3\tdging eceol'ding to 1'tlles
of l.aw, or merel.J a:ppl11n8' violence wrapPed up 1n th
tr&PP1n.le of law' . llJ
It i.e twe that 1n many eya1ems of law eqttity itself 
hae becne fo1'Jaal1zeil and the d1spen 1ng of eqtl!:tab·le
remedies narPowed blto oe?ta in .fixed ohrulr.t.ele,. Be Wa 
as 1t may, 1t may still b!$ aeswted that tb applJo t ten
o:t pr1neS..:Ples M ate  et. �W to a pax-t ioul� tas.e v
st ill take PlAeca. and t hat t he  tl eld.b11 1,tu ot the 1' pl
system ay only be t-etained it' the GP�tty for eu.ch 
a:ppl1caiton !G lett op�n. 1 
fld.s ao.ee no't mean that the quit�ble �-- will 
depend on a lmrtch o� some vape tne o� 1n'hltion u te-
wbat .ls Pl_gllt 1n tht parti.Qttlar oaae. T'he -eqUit blt &Pl'I'Oach 
will -· prine1'P1e•att1dod. Gttn7; 1n h.ia lfj1th9i,e 4'Mtr:: 
pzetg.&ea ,.baa •  h0v1 tb.e �u-dp w111 •m•• at 8ll •cp1table
aolu.llon ot a oase. Yet the ;Judge dll not be tree · a tu
leg1s1a ... : JUs t-P·&k 1e te. appl.J tht w11;te law *in
1n ., .. oflHS -, wbUt not. excluding ebo1o•, at leaat
oonflnee it 'rith1n oemin limits. 
2 3 
�:gml_ ta!l E+n<l �-sub.;J.�t· 
It eeetDS to me that diaoueaion of natural law 1a oft n
directed to a th.il'd conside!4at ion, name17, why ought the
subjett  to obey the Nlee of law of a particular at t • 
The schooltnen • e discusion t4 the unjust law points to 
this oons:tderatton. but 1t is not eX.Plic 1tly drawn ont.
As we have sugseetecl., their d1scusai·on c entx- ·a on the
question of whether there is an int:rins1c conn ct1on between 
law and good law, inStead or on the �est ion 1n what
1 oin:nDlStanc es the .subject ie obliged to obey a role of J.aw,
Dugu1t lnboua to br1ng the. eubj ot into the centre
of 41scu.sta1on., to bring the natU!'al law dow from the
cl011de.  as it were , and to show toot it beeaua.e the 1\.ellbera
ot a eoci.e'ty ve e;ut.4e4 by the prineiples ot 3ufrtice that
the is a duty to obey wles of law wb1oh enshl'Uie the
value of: .ru,e:tice. 
Of OOQrse, "course to natUl"'Sl law as a principle to 
�\1Stlfr obe4tonee to \he laws ot th$ state is 1ncrritablr
uae t o  41'6\v O.lU' attont10l'l to the re1at1onsb1P ot t be
tor'blal s&Urces of law wttb. the natural la'VI• WhUe Auetin
aDd Ke1aen W $  1nol1ne4 'to plaoe tile enrphae1e on t he
rormal �e, whether it be the wi ll  of t he  .sovereign or 
1. §IR£!• P• 1 1 3 . 
the il»PAH!!h the- na'lnlral law approa.oh looks to the 11Tes
and eol14uct of the membe�a of society '�ho re oral per on 
and not ��legal persona .-'• so 1t is that , when th . rormal
soareea ot law ens�ine immoral values of be.tnoos nature,
the subjtJCt 18 mox-ally entitled to resist�
t�!tual Ia:! Ml �he j. ... e.Bf!l ih!Pf.11$• 
Ptnany. diseusston ot natural law often takes pJ.ao• 
ia the couiext ot �kt oB the pb1losopb.v 0'1 law. A• we
pointed out earli•• 1 while the mrw.lYbiCI!al ;Ju»iat flM·e
no nee•ea" oonneott.on b¢w en mol'al1ty and law in 
answerlnS' the f:P$8'b1otu W'bat 1e laltl , ttw natural laver
finds that such a connection 4oes exist.
Now the natural lavw* a oonclu.sion 4oes ;Sll8Seet that 
the eonoept of a legal S.Yilrtem of' ot ·lepl nl· a .ia not
11m1tt4 to a mere :reeognttion o't f«mnsl acnu.-c••s. The
._itten law deea not exllauot tne fac\ors ·w.b,iqh are w1thb 
th• Ptt�Tiew et the lepl th.e�1at. laUe Aust� au Kelatn
l.abou.r to thtliaeate the b�ndariee of: an •n�117 m-.o the 
n.atve ot law, the natunl laW7WS ar-e eon11mt&11J' 
apbaeiz1ng the iJldettmdnaie nature o-t thtse llowuJulea.
In4•e4, while Austin and Kelsen have a part ioulal' 
pict1U'e oP Tin ot the legal sr•rtem, so teo do th• natt,u.al 
la,.ywth 'While the former may §.!!l la in t erm.  ot g nerel 
legal concept s or a a,yate� of norms , the latteP se tt a-
J>r1mar1ly dependent on or related t.o certain tundamental
veluea. 'r� nat\lpal la 11r�a bave an Erillarged vieion of"
tho sphere ot legal tXPGr1onoe. To the , the boundtll'le e�
law a.re not sGmet hin.g whteh can b photogra-phe4 na the
negative developecl, \vh.erbpon the jllri&t may tb. n get to 
work in. po·int tng ou.·� the contours and eha:pea which app s­
thex-eoa. The d11!le.n81ons, 1n th.e ne.tUPSl law pt-eture, ere 
moh more �of011nd t'f• �a.k1ng th anal<>g :turther, til 
natunl law:re might 2lQJ' ihat one p1ctw:�e e.lone 1a 1n­
auftieient o eXPlain the o'Dj ct wbioh appeaJis on th_ 
pho'tO#JlPbt foX' that one pS.etm� , while st,e:itq soaetbina, 
alao oJiit e  to otate something. JW. enrpl17' uto the
phenaenon wb.ioh we oall �s1-t1ve law� 1s not a tt t- ot
l.aldng one pt•W!'e. Rat neP it is s ocn�tw•e actirltr.
!fhe 3ltrJ.,st 1e eJ. wavs $IW1n8' 'to anarptn and �J'feo't hie
1n·a1fitht into th1,e "V'eJfJ/ Pt'O't<Nnd phenO'Bl8non.
I. 
1n this ohapt_.. I wish to d1Bcuss t.he aent to 
wh1oh legal poa1t1V1sm ( i:n  the & tnse 1n which 1h t phra 
is used to denote th.e th.eorlea of Austin and Eelaen) ta
eo•'Plete ae e. $1Btem. at tboul.&ht or as an urt•rpret t ton 
of tb plltnomenon ot law.
In eha:ptel' 1 of this wo rk  w• ment ioned that AUetln
joineil witb Bentham in de:nipatlna the natural 1 y sob.ool
and in propwn41ns a doctrine � ut111t1 as t he "N*
en tvton of etbieal �dgrnsnt. Wit h these writers; howe\'ei'J
tb.� n�t ion of utility ws n�t titG!1galJJz t1ed to 'h• 
eonoept •t pea1t 1ve lew, but WB$ l"at.Qer a p141rlg prinoiJJle 
f'v legislators. lndeC!Kl, the tren4 ot tb.• Rrq!1nge It 
i9r1Sl?nJj§A.ee Det@D!l1.!.4 is to debJ 1bat ethical no"!ou
ar«t nEJO$saar11:J .fl � ·fit t-he ;Jlirtst • s  ( ttldSe or legal
theoriat ) stoek-in .... traa.•• Austin belined '$bat au.o-h 
notions eoneerned law ''ae it ought to be� but not law " a 
it 1.ert1. although lle recognized tl't..at ethit& and poa1t1n 
law re 'Pcom.�.ected by numerous and 1nd1osolubl t 1ea. 1
It seems to 1ne tba:t the o ontl1ct b ot�en the natural 
law sehool and the posit ivist school 1s often 0nact a. on 
a stage where custl'tain m1srepreaentation o:r distort ions of
the ideas of both schools are P6rP$1rrated. It is,
therefore, neceasa� to aatabl1 h the pctnt at issue. 
In Tlfll mad the lllQ in queet1on to ask ia th!.a ; +n what way 
1a the approach ot Aust in to the definition of :pos1t1v l ..,
11ke:11 ·to lead to an acceptance of the omrdpoteno ot the
state and the eo:rr�sponding duty <>f obediene(# to 1t s 
commands ( e1 the!' on the part ot: the 3Urie� or on the part
of the ·ordinary sub;Jeet )f 
In the art 1ele c it ed  1n the prev10\ls chapt er,. Prof' seor 
IlaJ't p.1ta ;ro:rwe.rd the view 'that AUat1n wa. s not �la 4l'Y 
anall'et f1ddl1� with verbal diet 1nct1on whil o·at 1ee
bQ.med .. but nad) n real cone em with the imPtlo·t of TA01'6l
?-&lues on the law. Nevmb less, he continue· • Austin 
1ns 1e'\ e4 fi>ll the •eparat 1$ll of the two t 1ol4a or -�. 
that ia to say , law �as it 1s n boa law �•as it wght . to bett. 2
Pro:tee•• Ral't eJ-it 1e1zes �essor Fza1etlmann' s  t.ntor­
w•tation of tb.e Anet mtan pos 1t i.on to th.• eff ect that tt
1, p. 6  (Lib� ot Ideaa lti.• ), 
2. U B!nBM L&w R;v1g, P• 593 at P• 596. 
� . 1 ' had a teli\i.ency t o  bl-1ng �bout state �.bsolut tsm. Austin s 
d1scuas1en of the moral duty oS disotedieho e &n the ground 
Qf utility indicates ·that he dld not accept the abaolut 
- 2 n� e of the at�te · e commands. 
It appeEilrs, ther�to:Pe, that the two important (llltst ions 
which ,.equire 41scuas1o.n are � 
1) To wha·t extent 1s th<ll tl$.eo1"3' of utility e. suff1.e1ent
doctrine - as aga tn.st. the natural law approaeb ... tor use in
evaluating posit ive la� 
2} Whether, dfl.l$P1 te the tnet tbnt one r�ognizea that
Aust in waa a�e of an ethical in:tluenco ( 1n the tora .of 
u.til1taritm1am) , 'the 'Whole trend of hie tJtwlJ' is to 
emphasize the fact that as :t� a.s the jurist 1e coneem.e4
conoemea with the rU.tfioult �blem Qf &ae�1ntng Whethe
an em:pba&1$ e the pQsitiv·e natUl'ie of a v11le et: law tellds 
t� oversbatlow the moral e14e Qf the ptet�e ana to et?este
an intellectual atllf>ephel'et tn whioh l!B!lhl. beooaaes tbe
•rtter1on ot pol !tioEil obedtenet. 3
Beto�e l niba.rk 0n th1e question, l wish to Oa'W
attention to th.e fact that a muaber of Jaettn' a comaen'tatea
dQ not weloeme his 1ntrod1J.ct1on of the dootrlne ot ut111tJ 
1. 1Jl1A• • p. 594. n J... 
2. DU.. • P•598 and n 15•
3. ttl Puller, "Poa1"1v1a• and J'tdelit)' t,o Law: A llePl)t to
�·a•• lart �M. n Ha"a" Lay ( 1958 ) :p. 6]0 at P:P. 6J7•66J.
tnto a discussion of o� text-book on 3n�1eprudence. 
Pollock qutte enapnatioally sta tes that tbe lSVJUe:r (and t he
1eg16llato� ) d·oea not ha'Ve to oonc f)"ro h1me�11' with ethtos -
to t.h,.s ext ®'It l\Uei�in •  a d.S.souse!on of ut ilt::ty was not a 
l 
necessa� pe�t .of the �.JD!ltL-tlt i!Jj __ @l?mWme! De:t�· 
eert.a:tnly with the "PO.St-.r\uet inian writ�J's one :t:t.nae 11 ttle
d1seuoa1an tit tht:, doetr'ine of utility, 0'1!' t!Jt e:n:y other 
ethical doctrine. Aust tn• s �aoontol�sr � ie oona1r.ned t.o 
the realm ot �J.1t1cal l?h1loso�. 2 
In Cnaptep 1 of' this work, I mtg�stad thnt the
er1t1ctsm wb.lob. Aust in and »entmnu d$l1vtJred aga�et the 
na'tul'$1 law school was t.o some extent m1st11J-eet , 1n that 
tbetr uatn targ�t �s ilaekstone, who be4 relied on O.Ottaa 
ancl PQat-�tian s<m.M$8• Now tb.e sevont>et:tnth arul
e1P,ttenth cEmtur'9 tto�tJttn·e was an iJUltVWualistto one .. 
thta 119.$ � u  oa Cit the natural l'tgb.te eeheol - ana th 
1. f.b-1\ 1r tf ;ynsmdtn!.to.., . Basal• ln .rurtsp:pt14eneean4 · . .  ee, P• at PP• 22 et eeg. \ lSSa).  
2. s••• -r• e.-mple, Holland, iVl&DirW:t ( 12th »1. 1916).
l doctri.ll<t ry� the common. good wa s  �)'her ne�Ileoted. 
The ut ilitarian re-aot :lon against t his school of 
thought was t o  �phae1:ze the 0h.angi::1g neeaa ot society and 
tba down-to-sarth :natur$ of the goals wr�hy of pursuit. 
OertainJ.t• the Gta'e of English SOQiety at tbG end or 'he
o1gh.1eenth century ani at ·tile oepmung o£ tho nineteenth
cent'Ql'Y \16$ a s·�i� tte ·totally dif:f'G:t�en t to tha-t of the
ebang� 111 "he llveJi of ·the people and th.e sat isfaction ot
human wants 1n tho now aoe ial aet t�ng was rest111ct� by
a number of a�b& 1c rolea which :no lollgcn;a appl1e.d to the
' 2 obanged oond.i:tion o:r. tlunga. · 
Bentham saw that there we1--e pressing needs which 
»•qt11red uast1c governmental a.ot ion. a. alae beltwecl 
tha.'li the phUoeo:PbN of lsw ·bo which Blackstone ws attached
1. I� ts t rue t hat G.ft"tiue lays strees en the "eocialtle lf'
netttre of ua... tat e!' wr1t��a such aa Thomas1ue tuft
"\hie uto � PffChalogieal theory, �..MileTel", ill wb.tch
iutvtdual ne�s e.l'e eurphastmell. More tmpo!'tan' than
"his 10 the faet tut the pomt�tian dc,et.rine ts
baaea an a aocd.al eont:Met theO!'Yt an4 bDt oa a oommcm 
100d 'iheoJ'V ..
2. !'or a cl18CU.Ssl()n t:Jt: �he var1oue t"aeats or Benthall i e
'Wl!lk aee •mpos1u.nu Je'1!fll.f1¥ Bentham �"ld. the Law
( ¥. by Keeton �.Wd Seh'W&Henberga', 194.8 }.
was 1n the •Y of such gtnt.emmental ao�1oJu he was
espeo1ally oP1t 1ea1 of Blaekstone• s belief that a contl1ot
between the moral law and positive law was suffle1®t 1n
1tae1t te x-encler the rule of positive law invalid. Tbe 
Oomaent on 'the CQIP@n'tarieg is a work 1n which, with ID'f!&l'$
re11sht he seta about destroying the Blackston!B.n pos1t1cn
and 1n propetUldiJll a t.beory of uttl1ty to take 1t e place.
AUattn stands lly htm in this work t:1t 4ftetrnct 1on.
But ,oth Bentham and Atl.st tn, 1n propftn41Dg the 4oetptne
of ut11ttJ ae the erttwion o'E ngooc:tt• lays and as the 
;1\l8'tif10ation of p011 t leal Qbed1enc $ go mu.oh furthezt tha:n
•-"17 eaphae1zing utility. They pull down the d.octr1ne of
natural law altoso�er, and dftJ' that 1-. is even a l'at1onal
fth1eal theO.i7· Both t.Ae C,og,ent on the OOPFtv&•! 
ancl the ft!!&nee tt .f!�-f!iJ:IAence peit&P\•4 contain 
tl'1t1otaaa of a theo17 of in.n.ete PJI'Ulc t.pl ea which 1s 
1 14en,tr1e4 .S.'th the nat11:ral law approach.
'l'b.e qu.ea, lon wh1eh t'ollows from t h1s rejeotlcm. or
natural �1'1 18 thte. ln wat FOaPQt is th• f.Htl'tae Of 
ut111tr en a.d:Vanee on the natu.ral law th-.I'Jf ln lihat W87
!a 1t a su.por!osa oztit •1on 'to the eon.oept ef the pu.'l11e 
1. Aue-. UJ., !J?tOU,• , pp. S7 et ••q• He 1\akes . Paley andButler as r-•Pl'•eentat ive e� th1a appoaeh. Ne1thu he
ner B•ntho g.,t to gp1Pa with the seb.olaetio 4oetr1ne.
�to•on good as a stan4ard for "good leg1slat 1o-n"t I do not 
rtsh to embark on a comparison e:f the doetrine of ut111tw
md t he doetr1ne of the common goed, bu. t  me:.ely to point 
mt a numbeP tf1f eone1d.e1'8 t1ons which seem to me to raise
!itt!Oul tiea 1n r�epect of th acoeptano·e of the cone ept of 
11tUi ty as "-he gt,le crl ter1on. ot wba t the law should b • 
· zn the J'lPst 'Place,. the ngreateet happiness of the
l greatest DWilbertt prine1ple seems to lea-ve· room tor 
l arbi'l:M-.17 les1slat1q enactJtenta. It may be applied to a
polit toal oomrm1ft1tJ' tn such a way aa to cut across baste 
•man 1'1ghta on the ground that the 4c.m.1al ot these rtgb.ta
will beneti t the oommtm1ty - 1n the long run. The exataPles 
wbioll .. find 1A hieteru Of 'tyl'llllts �stity1ng thetP
4ecrees on the powtd et util ity ere all too nwa.w.e.
In tlle seeond C$&•, the ortt�1a lty wh.ich the gPeateat 
bapptaeae of tu peateet ntl1Dber is to be Judg$1. are vague.
la Ollt to -� on a det.ailed SOOiOlOBieal tnvesttpt10n 
and to woi"k at soae tJ'pe td ata:t1et 1Ca1 ueaeure 'to aau«e 
ptoPl•' • ..a.ata'l ln , this oaae, the enqt�trv 1e en«l••••
After one soeto1og1eal 1nveet1ga't1oa has t ken plaee, the
1i&Jl• s '1187 have ohen8841 ao that no law OUght to be paeaed
until some tinal deten.tnat1on ot what the wnto deserving 
reoogn1, 1on art. 
'.rhis leads us on to a third po�t. It m1sht b·e eaid 
"No, we wUl not l eave the decision to sociologists but 
will allow 1he XtePreeontattves or the people ( e1ected under
tree eut'trage } to dee14e. � In eo faP a 3  thct� tN.ly
pepreaent the tntere·ets of the members ot the communt tv • 
they ought to be able to wrk c:mt aOJile l,)Z!acttul method of
maklrag 'Ulte 3114pent. Httre again, 1n41vidu.al judgments
will 'be tou-nd. to . Xis,, :JO "hat no act ot legtelat1on (on 
this vft!l!3 stringent 1nte�etation et the utility princiPle} 
woald be ;tustU1ea unless theM were genartil asre·ement among 
the reprea·entativea-. 1 
In om«f' to prevent the ut 1lit7 Pl'Uleiple from en41ng 
1n nb3-.t 1Y1em, QUO 18 driven to a more pehal\ent, lee•
unomaln. notion than �1:\awmes.s lff o,.. uhwaen wantaw. 2 1t
•• l!Mts the not1o:n fJ't .. oo.Jalcm. �God" in tb.eir place, tile
ox-1\ele. ot ;Judpeat are ••• 1n. a aere ob.jectlve Ylflt•
xa tbta cutee, the �tttloa-. tc>a crt a Jt\lle «t poeltin law
1. ,.. ·�Solut loa wlU.cb. bae be•n a4o:P\e4 in raanr ocmntnee
1a \bat the TOt• of: �e •301'1b' preY&1la.
2. 01' OOUJla•• I am taking heN the •et 4n-'1e PNsen.tation
ot. '"• u't111tF pr.Ule1;pl•· lfo 4n\tt w1�•• ane,-
._,_ - in »aztt10\ller .Tobn .stuart 111 1 who cU.dilliQ.1ahe4
b�--. nt;ttU11tat1T•M anA "qQan't1tat1-re• PltJ8J11U".t• • 
r.tb.a the prtnc1Pl•·
is to be fOI.Uld, not in the payohologieal stat ot hap-pin es 
vkii ab it b�1ngs about , but 1n its conformity with moral 
:ruleih 
Wow thEJ ooneept. of the common good does ee to stand
up 1n t he te.ce of the a�gumenta against. the ut il ity pr1rlc1ple 
noted. above. In the f1.Pnt plaee., tnetae 1s re-cegn1 tion of 
the te.c·t \.hat there are 'basic Nl.es and right · whieb 'b3r 
their veyty na:tu:re demand to be reco.gni:ed by the legislator 
{ l'ltlts pJ:tail1b1t 1ng l'lnlrdtr and then , the :right to 11t and 
propert:v )  and wh1eh can nevttl' be thNet aside on th ground 
that they ere not, at anv· part icUJ.ar time or in anv
p8.Pt1cttlar pl.ao e. condUc ive to the welfare of the people. 
In the second plaee , in view ef the tact or the
tsletence or these wlea, the b.road oont $nt or &:NJ lepl 
system is to that $:dent e"Pecif1ed, even although. noh
Nl ea  Ql'e su.bjeet to 1nt$Ppretation. tepl qateu ought 
to contain• macng other things� rules prov14tng -tor the
entf»::tment ot c.OlJ.'lreets and the pl'Ohibition of oftenoee
agatnat t he hWlan pepaon. No dcmbt they must alae contain
oth•r rul e$  wl\ieh de!)en.a. more on the :ract of u tUit)', tlu.ln
ot P1gb•n•• ( e_. g, tftt'fic lan ) . 
Wba' ot the tb.l.rd ob;Jeotimt/ Thttx-. 1e neea. or ooun • 
tor someone ex- somebody to 4.-ten.t.ne 3ttet what ton. "he
oo!IDlOngQOd Will assume in a partieular context. The
prinCiples of �ttstioe so not automatic lly become part of
a legal system.. we oan say that the legislator baa the
task ot making tb.e legal rulea which will -.nsh:r1ne 'hese
Pl'lnc 1Plea. As we suggest ed in the previous chapter this
taslt 1a not merely on• ot pa.tttns 1nto s tecbnieal torm
what the ''soe1al " 110rel.iat baa already d.1eeovar•• 'fb.e 
task is a meh more 1�ortnnt and creative one, involving
among othex- things the recone111at1cn of interests whe!"e
there 1a a oontl1,t. 
:tt de.ee ee.em, the:re�wth tba.t the ooneept ot the 
PG11tleal eQ1rlm.On. good has this advan"eae over tha ut1l 1ty
pJ'in.otple: 1 t doee provide ua with so111etbtng m.G!l$ 
ob3ee:t1ve!J'·�uldeA wh1Clh prevents th.e OP1te.r1a ot
l.eg1el8t!on b-tMJOld.ng mert�v arb1tre.PJ ol.' eXPOdt.mt. �
CottJ!lfHh th\9 gap 'between tb.� two principles will not stem eo
w14e !t we 1nterprtt the ut111t:Y pr1.no1ple as a prmc:t;ple
wbloh is n()t ti:ree'e4 t() tbe at'U\1nmem.t .t the s;reat,eet
t\JDQQ.� • ., aumil b&pptnea·s 'but to the atta1D1Ddt C1l value•
wh1cm. are wn-al as we11 as eudaa.onte" te. In4•e4, AUat1n 
hias•lr 'b elleYo4 tlult tn. �ec.-p'$s or 'lhf DtYiae :Lalf
brousnt aboat the g:r.-ea.t•J.rt uppine:se , and that tttil 1t7 was
1 an 1l14ex to these p:t-eeepta. The �U!b he pouts ou.t ,
2 
i s  the gen$l'S.ll7 usetttl. He was not ,  however; pr pared 
to vecegn1ze the faculty ot conscience as the means b7 
yh!.ch the tltn!!Da ws e recognized. 
III. 
I now wish to 41ecuss t h  s eco.nd question wb.1oh I 
posed at the beginning ot this cbapte!'. Does the .A.ust lntan
emphat1a on PQtd. tift law sugges:t s e&ptaa leek o'Jr interest
in 't hf) l'elationeh1P b .. ween the moral law and. po81t1Ye law 
IUld conetqtum.tll' ..,u.lt ebed1enoe to 1awe rath� than 
obe41tnc.e te )let le.m· In the tll'tlcle c ited above,
Prottaaox- Hart argues that Auot in recognised the 'win dangers
of an 2..'0b1em and absOltltisra: he certainl3r thought tha' there 
1. Aue't ia, OJb$11• • PP•l.t.7 et seq. "SP41Elk1ng generau,.,
bulan oonau� , whioh is eUbjit.et 'to the Dtv:lM o.oaan4a,
1a tn .. f;t;abl$ S�R1tle4 by E!JJ.u, .,. - . RlDIWn ol' 
..... � p . .. , . 
OJt ttt• �•et1on of a l;tnle uJralt\:rlf . see '!�Jlb})ott,
" 
., BAlM·• boo ee41np of the Br1t 1eh Acd_,.t Vol. ,,,p: Y ; Vtab'bott diuusse�J anaongst otbCJl' tJ.htnp the 
A1tr1CJU1ty mvolv«l in aceept1ns a NJ.• a an OPU'ioal 
,.nenl:taation.
!• Aaet �, !2•c.1��t , p, l13; u. a. trapent.
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might be a mos.l 4tttiV to disobey a Wle ot law,. but :rej�t·ed 
the Blaekston.ian thee!e that a ll1eJ.te· confl ict between the
moral law rmd the 'PQattive l.a.w \me auff1c1ent to render 
th poet 'ttw law invalid. 1
·Now tbt qu.esticm has o.rten bee-n phl'a&.ed in t hi s  way.
A peraoa l'lBN' be lesallr" o'bl!gea to ·oubmlt � e rule ot a
system which l'egulates his eonduet. Th.1e lepl obligat ion
1a tllepe.tlitat on the :raet that tbere ia a 11ke�1hood ot
to.:ree being applied by · the Ste:t-e s.:r � b.e rule is brok•n• 
tlevenh•leas�  e'lcb a pere·on llt8Y be morallY obl1ge4 to
disobey e nle of law wh.1ch omae s a great am.ou:tt o� 
utf' era a t'O the ea:rnmwai tr. 
a. tb.e :pos1t1v1st 3Ust,U, h18 PQa1t1o:n by POO RU1ratq
both Cl\lllpt1<ms9' By thia I meen : c an he plaoe the eubaa1a
on lop.l ot.ea.1ence while atiU a<laitting 'le .any de�• at
all tbat a pe:vsen may be JQ.Oftllb' obliged te disobey a
nle tit lalll To m.v mtntl there is st>M -de� ot o441tJ, 
in reooptzUtg both oblipttoruu �t1JP.tel7 oithe:r ob-e41fl.l'l0e
ls ow84 w 1:8 ne$ owe&.
In. 'h• 
ifa, . 111 Dt2R pt +tts gd tm Bt,t,l• 
Jtdsc J�eeoa­
nisn ihie ofAll?• Aoo•rtt mg to Ke18e, tu 3Uist a. $Ut'tat 
ean . ·onl.J a41Dit one t)fpe of nougb:t '* - the legal noaght �. 
1'lle J.epl :aystem 1.8 s$l�-aontaiao4. Vi.,-i.-v1e th•
ltpl .. CN.Sbt �, the me·ral , .. �, n b•a0111ee an �1• •• , 
an ob ject of pe�tch.ologioal examinat ion, but in no way
relevant to 't he quest ion of legal obligation. 1 
21.·3 
Dn t his respect ,  Kelsen is forced into the poe1t ion 
of reoogn1z1ng legal obl igation alone ( 1n a ju:r1et1e
en(l\lb7 ) and e xo lud1!)8 mo:Pal. e:rit eria ot obligation. In
his 111nd, theJ-e is no balt'...._7 posit ion as Aust in would 
like it.. EVen if the JD30C1 retnsee to obey a part iculel'
PUl e  1n a legal syst em, an ptt1e1a* of t hat system 1e still
obliged to cam cm.t the du:ty imPosed upon him to appl.J 
that l'Ule. 2 
tot us Jte-exrun1ne the poat't1on. lt an in41v14ual is
taeed with tb.e qaest1on of obedience to e. rule at law,
which 1s unjnat-, what ita he to do? :B'l'om one pout � new, 
he 11oughtn to su�l11 t to t h.e role ot law - trom th,e petnt of 
view of t he :rae" that 1t 1.sS11es from. the superiw authority
1n the nat• to W'h:tcb. he owes allegtane•·• Prom another
poud of Yin he· ftettght "' no t io Qbey 1t - t-roa the pOlnt ot
v1ew ot t ll9  mostal prtnoiples whic h appl7 to h1m in h1s 
aiatue •• a hUman be!Jlg. 3 But he tma.t 'hk• the e:nqu117 
ftrta•r and aatte a de01s1en as io wheth.,.. er pt to �wm 
t.M ooadUot :p2'eacr1'be4 by the l'Qle of law. 1'llere the 1'tll.e 
1. twentieth Century l',;epl Pkilosopby serieth Vol. l,
p. 4.09 ( 1949 ).
2. �M. , PP• ,!J-61.
3. Por a d1acuaa1on of the 41tterent ways 1n whioh the von"•rh* .. uy be uaed tee Hare, Tht lt!PJN!U 2� lbnJ.a. 
Part In, PP• l51 et seq.
of lay 1s f'l·aglt'antly unjust, he ought to adhe�e to the
moral law and disobe-..:r it , even though this mea.ns that he 
rill b e  su.bjectl'td. to the penalty or punishment at t he legal 
rul9• V1n$d in thi s way , tl'te not ion of a. *'legal oughtn 
i s  an 01.\ct one, for in th!s eontext the "'wght � 1o ultimately
ot a pf�sonal� TaOI-al. kind.. ·Of' CotU'e�, in a well-oriered 
aoe1et�, th�e la a preeum:pt1on tlwt any rule ot law w111
be lU.ndiqt that ie to say , the� 1s a -prern1Vl'J:)t ion that a 
wle of -pca1'tive lew will not infringe the moral law.
T'h$ KelsetU.an pos:lt 1v1.nrt may veply: Xelsen 1s thinking
ill te.-..ma @nll' of a J,9i,ical exp.lanstion of tww the o:tf1o1ale
of a le�l system ought to. oot , n.ot of the1ll' moral duties. 
ORe ou Gilly reply that 1t Kel�en• s thee?t 1& merely a
logical eulanatton of tbe ruatur• of a legal BJ"StGifl, then 
1t is 1neurt1c1ent • :tt •et b., S\lPPlemented. by a monl 
XPlana'\ i(>n. PoP tlesh-and,-blood 1nd1v1duals llYe under
the :pe.Ftie\lJJar legal eyotem. 1n ·tpes'tion. !he cent-1 
quen1ota which theY m:t.1e� ask 1e ..  oup't we t.Q ebey
!"'ll• of lAW� .,. Thi s qu-estictn must be taeel lw the l•gal
"�"rtil�.� and not rel �gate<! to the 118o or peyeholog
or aoetologr. 1 
ot the picture. In his mind, tho law ie a logioally self­
contained iWr:J'tem ot n� deriving tb.e11� �11d1t7 eeeh from
a ftPet. .. 10:P nortm a1�d rt>..fo1,lable u.lt1�toly to a <!lW!fMD• 
Now auuh a V1Gw may bo ao� epted as ext>laimng the marmet- 1n
t�hlel\ the aat11al mnk:tn.g t.rMl axocut1on or la"i!,� by tb,e 
aut�1tative off1e1�ls !11mkea place ... tile. system 'b" wbtcl\ 
a la" ott norm ita 1n1d d.own und.0r the authority of a su;perS.Ql'
ru>N o,nd Qt the same tlm.e be<H".>me$ au\.h.ortty 'tor an intes-1or
law-e�uttng agtn�. V1� in this 11e;ht, the tt · tlatn1an 
:P1e1UrQ ia com-polling. But 1 t giv-tls U$ no picture at all
at th.e cx.-�t·er1a w which the oft1c1a1 is to 4ec14e l!bat
oont•t th• nol11'1 will hflv.o, nor or!ter·ia 'by which w M to
;tu<�Se ih$ goodn�s.s or ba.dneeu Qf the Nl• e:J!t law. An4 :t:l
1e 1lh·:tn 1:1e e,pe.."'ik .fllf !l!d1�ne..a th:a.t t�l1s iaS'!Ut lttiJ.st be
t�aoetl to:r w� have ill lllinil ·e. posit ion wh.ez-e people mq be
forced te onFI.;y oo:t a. eou.vse of cond oot ta wh1ch pertairuJ 
aOJJe 1Jml01'31 ve lue. 
lt ctm or4Y b• �ea?etted that Auatin 114 i't.&b'b d"'ote
mo:r.e� a'tt. entto:n to the pro'blft of' the �elationBhip beheen 
l•,al tm.4 ntoral obl!ge.tioa. At le&st.l\ bfl-.eP, b.$ 41t:tera 
hn. Xele-. in r•osnl•tns that "there •1 be a •em 
obl1p t1on to d1$ohey a Nl.e ot l.B,w. un:rortunatel.J',. latea­
wtten SQh as Holland neglect A.us"t1n' s 41seua&1on ot the 
aorel duty of d1sobe41ence in the tace ot a bad law. !hef
use phl'ases such e.e nlepl.J.y b1nd1ns" without se ing that 
this is onlY P611't o� the picture. !he value or Professor 
Hal"t ' a contribution. to thi s Cl'lestioa ts that 1t re-directs
our atten\ion to the other part of the p1otve which has
beooae obsov«l over the yea»e.
It uy be that the or1.t1e1t;�m ot natu:eal law and the 
ant1pa'h7 which 1t has caused. 1n the minds 0'1 Austin' s
auootae�s bl'ed a teel1n.g that pos1t 1Tt law was the onl7 
�l " t¥P& f!Jf law. or t he only law ot whtoh the 3nna\ 
cOQld take cognizance. When the natural lay �aded tnto the 
ba�.. the legal theot-1et found himselt with DQ 
etteettve moral f0'ti.nde't1en tor l'OEJ1t 1ve law and oonae\Pently 
felt hluel1' •�sed from en�lrtq tnto the •eral qu.eattoa.
!hie may have 'bl"'Olsbt 1n its train the teetltng that a
legal �qatem waa " el:t-suftio1enttJ. 1
1V 
It ,. aatt -.he re·l•vanc• of aora� o,.tter1a ta th•
won fit 1a,_'llaflld.ng, la.,...ppJ.TlDg and law-o'D•bs• ,. do not 
Uar �he oenatat7 and e ecu-1 "' 1dlich •• th1Blt ought to t.e
found in e l egal syst em� Th e natu1�l lttw approach j,s not
an&reb1st 1e. In so far na the posit ivist cone nt�at a hta
attention on the· formal eourc�s of l aw. h m.r;y b taken as
poin:liing to th� ne oestlBl"j" element of' e�rta1n:t;v. But
cma1nty ilt only (1ll� or t h.e valu.etz V?hich e ra found in � 
le-gal ey st ar1. 
OrcU.n.arily ,  we will find thts v�lue ��1.e1ent. 1;.
when Qt& na.ards be.eomo too at rict end unrt:'ap�n�1ve to hlnnBn 
neetis t th�e is nafJd. tor the emphaeie ot' tb.$ othw value -
jtlaticc. When et?.n&.r.dc become er.,m late� 1.mpe"1011a 
to the monl values which m.e:n chert"tiab.-. the t-Q..nct1on etgainet 
poa it tvtam ie likely to b� m'>ro !!.&rk«t.. Redbruch' e poot-
191}5 workn a:1-e e e�.ee in point.
There 1a aor:ne vtalue 111 atiaert!ng e. division �•ween
the l�w na 1t is end t h� law ae it ·mtght tQ be. In early
nineteetb. c�ntury- Fnzla!'Uiit the asae� ion wae cp11e
jn.stitied� ind�ed WS.fJ bert l1.f1C18l tn that 1t PliVed tb.• W8J' 
tor a mort Vigo�a approaeh to law as a ti1ac:tpl1ne \'f1th
ita own diat1n�t ive featuro:a. But we mnst nlso $ssert
ttat there i s  a :relat ionship betwetm law as it ia and law 
e.a it outJb.t t-o he. W<f do this in Qrder to point to tho 
tact 'ba' a tWetem of l (tpl. rttl G$ must b in e.o.ool'd wt"ll
m.ore.l � 1llf!6 1t it 1s to :aet!sf"J the n�eds of thoee 1lbo. u. 
eull;!e'ot to 1.ts 4trect1on.. �o-day , it seems, we ought to
make 'this assertion. 
When we say that there 1e a P · lat ionshi'O 1 bet en la
as it 1s and la.w ae 1t ought to be• we ue drawing attent ion 
to ihe tact that t he 3nftiet w.ght to be conc erned w1tll
"h.e ural va.lu af law. Aa we have ahown 1n the prev1oas 
c:ba"or, the natuPal law t.octrine of i·be relat ionship
b'ftnen ethiee and poa1t iv., law 1JJtly be eDlm.1ned trom the 
potnt ot vtew ot 
1)  �- 1egislatetJ-., 2 )  the 3Ut1p, 3 )  the Sttb3eet, 4.)  the 
lepl �heor1e,. As SUch, the ttB$ or 'the word �lat1onsb1p�
•'11BB•••• that 
l )  moral wlea ought to be taken tnto aoeount b:J' tJle
leg1elator 1n mnklng laws.
· 2) thft 3u4«•• ta appl:ving wl.ee ot law, ought to eEmcen
himetlr with the taOral yaluee on which pa.-t ioular w.l e ot 
law ape f0\l»de4• ol' wttb. the 'PlJ.PPOsea to whieh tb.ey ere 
41'Pectect. 
' )  the t.ut.u of' eb«litnee to t n• J'Qles ot a legal eystn is
1&1 ilma1ebr a mol'&1 4tlt7• 
4) ta• legal ta•riet should be eonoene& wltlu
1. td .... 11, ·�f''''(i P� .p=· Lawen. 
� Polit ical a��en �§rp;�a ». �: 
"!Jut • "tat1onsh1P be,nen law and. mQPale ' 1m 1taeU a 
bJ.aUei :phrase under eovf!' of which hom time to tiae
an wm1staka'ble bUt conhe &tl eha..'lce medl e7 enn 'ba 
•. ., •. " 
a.) the actual impact of m.o1�l vnlnee on law,
b }  the contaet wttich law mhould have wi:tb. r!O�l 1ty�
The d1ff"tcl:t.1t qutJstion 1n to kno"V whether to b<!�in
an enquiry in to the na.tuY.'e or 1;)0Bit ive law by asserting 
th.G.t the!'e ta s nf�tul'!tJ. 1.aw from wbi�h -pon,�t iV(Il law derives
its �l1d1t�, £ 'by 0Xf!lml.n1ng poe it1""e law ae '·t 1a, ana 
en�tring 1.nto the w.J.uee to wh1.ch it is I-$lt1t ad. !he
i�oh.aolt�ren f'ollow th@ f·lx-at method.� bu. t thSj.r wel'e ta.Orfllista.
The juri sti' it llm!' be �to.� ottght to follow th� second
mnh�-� ":!a oueht to got to grj_pa '\rl.th tha notion of a 
le�l ayetem and the ·m'lbmiat� not 1 onB vrhieh -r.$r.ta in to 
1t. PePhe.pa :i:t '1-rlll b�:ppe11 that ,. :tn ole:rtf'JJing these 
nettono, h@ w1.ll be led. to cm t1f11re into the nature of th� 
values with wb.ioh these DQt1onG �re bound l!P• Onl.y th&lJ.
will he heve e complete J.)1$tu�e ot l@.w• 
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